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Major policy decisions dealing with financial markets can create substantial 
uncertainty about systemic risk, sometimes with disastrous consequences. 
The decision to allow Lehman Brothers to fail, for example, led to the financial 
meltdown in 2008, causing the Great Recession. In a similar vein, recent fears 
of a breakup of the eurozone have resulted in panic on the financial markets 
due to concerns about the potential systemic effects of a breakup.
Several essential aspects of systemic risk are still unresolved issues for academics, 
policy makers, and the public at large. Is systemic risk really a significant factor 
in the financial industry? What are the determinants of this risk? How should 
a policy maker deal with systemic risk? Can we trust the outcome of a 
standard simulation on the likelihood of multiple simultaneous extreme 
events? This thesis addresses these important issues.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the most feared events in banking is the cry of systemic
risk. It matches the fear of a cry of “fire!” in a crowded theater or
other gatherings. But unlike fire, the term systemic risk is not
clearly defined. Moreover, unlike firefighters, who rarely are
accused of sparking or spreading rather than extinguishing fires,
bank regulators at times have been accused of contributing to,
albeit unintentionally, rather than retarding systemic risk.
Kaufman and Scott (2003)
Since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, policy
makers and supervisors are increasingly aware of the economy-wide danger
of a systemic financial crisis. This concern for systemic risk has led to sev-
eral reforms in supervisory tools. A tangible result is the adoption of the
Single Supervisory Mechanism in November 2014. This mechanism makes
the European Central Bank the chief supervisor of banks in the eurozone, a
major milestone in the creation of a banking union.
Another recent event with a prominent role for systemic risk is the third
bailout package for Greece in August 2015. The reforms linked to this pack-
age are very similar to the rejected proposals in a Greek referendum held
only one week before the agreement. Nonetheless, Greece’s policy makers
accepted the conditions attached to the rescue package, thereby neglecting
the outcome of the referendum, and violating their promises at the elections
less than six months before. However, a sovereign default, or even worse,
Greece leaving the eurozone (a Grexit), could very well trigger a series of
cascading events, particularly in the economy of Greece. More specifically,
a sudden reintroduction of a national currency would be expected to bring
about a new capital outflow, an uncontrolled depreciation of the new cur-
rency, bank runs, trials on contractual obligations, and other systemic misery.
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Ultimately, it may even lead to a breakup of the eurozone.
Nevertheless, cross-border systemic risk related to a hypothetical bank-
ruptcy of Greece has decreased over time, at least in the perception of the
financiers in the Trojka (EC, ECB and the IMF). In late 2009, the Trojka pre-
ferred to avoid a Grexit at any cost with the systemic Lehman event fresh in
mind and markets behaving very nervously. Since then foreign direct invest-
ments in Greece have plunged, markets have priced a potential breakup of
the euro, and Greek banks and the Trojka are the main investors in sovereign
debt of Greece. This makes the cross-border effect of a Greek default better
predictable. Indeed, financial markets outside Greece reacted moderately in
response to the recent uncertainty around Greece. For instance, Portuguese
ten year bonds temporarily increased to 3.2%, a muted response compared
to the spike at 17.3% in January 2012. Accordingly, policy institutions are
confident that spillover effects are now in control such that the systemic im-
pact of a Greek default and a Grexit would be mainly local. This explains
why the Greeks found themselves with their backs against the wall during
the negotiations.
Despite its importance, the concept of systemic risk lacks a uniform def-
inition as noted in Kaufman and Scott (2003). Generally speaking, the
concept of systemic risk is on the risk of the collapse of an entire system.
To assess this risk, an in-depth analysis of several characteristics of the sys-
tem is essential. Obviously, multiple fragile components with strong linkages
correspond to a very fragile system. It is however empirically less clearcut
to find out beforehand whether linkages between the components are strong
conditional on a nontrivial shock. In addition, what is the impact on sys-
temic risk when we add components to the system with strong linkages to
the original components of the system? For instance, would a euro entry of
countries as Poland or, less likely, Switzerland stabilize the euro economy
as a whole? Is the mutual trade ban between Russia and lots of European
countries helpful in stimulating domestic production and thereby stabilizing
the economies? Addressing such issues involves an assessment of contagious
effects from possibly highly complex linkages within the system (see e.g. Hal-
dane and May (2011)). Indeed, the concept of systemic risk is not limited to
the financial system. It extends to an assessment of other systemic problems
including the social-economic impact of a cyber attack, a power breakdown
or an outbreak of a virus disease such as Ebola.
Systemic risk differs from the related concept of systematic risk. In a fi-
nance context, systematic risk refers to the risk that cannot be eliminated by
diversification within an equity portfolio. For instance, stocks tend to have a
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common exposure to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other catastro-
phes. Unless one implements a hedging strategy, investing in multiple stocks
cannot completely eliminate the exposure to systematic risks. Thus, sys-
tematic risk captures the common exposure of the individual components to
some external shock. As such, systematic risk can trigger a systemic event,
but it is no more than one possible cause of such an event.
This thesis focuses on systemic risk in the financial industry. In this
context, Taylor (2010) defines systemic risk as
Any definition of systemic risk must be based on three considera-
tions. The first is the risk of a large triggering event. The second
is the risk of financial propagation of such an event through the
financial sector by contagion or chain reaction. The third is the
macroeconomic risk that the financial disruption will severely af-
fect the whole economy.
The first two considerations are discussed in this thesis from multiple per-
spectives. In future research, these perspectives may contribute to an anal-
ysis of the third consideration, the link to the whole economy.
To establish systemic risk in the financial industry, we measure systemic
risk in Europe (Chapter 2) and the U.S. (Chapter 3) with two different
methods. Having measured a substantial level of systemic risk in the financial
industry, we consider the effects of systemic risk on stock pricing in Chapter
2. We identify determinants of systemic risk, empirically (Chapter 3) as
well as theoretically (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 considers a fair allocation of
systemic risk to the contributing institutions. Finally, we present in Chapter
6 a more accurate method to compute and simulate systemic risk using the
multivariate normal distribution.
The chapters are ordered by the link to real life economics. The first
two chapters have an empirical focus, while the other three Chapters are
increasingly theoretical. Though the chapters share their relation with sys-
temic risk, each chapter can be read and understood independently. Next,
we discuss the contents of each chapter in more detail.
Chapter 2 provides evidence that big financials in Europe have signif-
icantly lower risk-adjusted returns than other European financials. This
pattern is absent in any other industry. We interpret this as evidence for
latent government guarantees. This safety net protects big financials from
tail events, and is quite strong. Even during the debt crisis, higher prob-
abilities of distress dominated doubts on government guarantees. Another
finding is that our financial risk factor improves upon the momentum factor
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in explaining financial stock returns, and the anomalies on big and value
stocks in the European Fama and French (2012)-model.
In Chapter 3, we use tail dependence as a measure for systemic risk in
financial markets at the industry level. In particular, we measure tail de-
pendence in the 48 U.S. Fama and French (1997) industries by comparing
comovements in extreme negative returns within these industries. The in-
dustries that score highest on tail dependence are banking, petroleum &
natural gas, utilities, financial trading and insurance. All other industries
score significantly lower. We identify a large market beta, a large market
cap and a small volatility as significant determinants of tail dependence. In
addition, tail dependence is a significant predictor for tail dependence in the
next year.
Chapter 4 analyzes in a theoretical model how social welfare is jointly
affected by bank size, banks’ capital structure, and asset dependence across
banks. The model suggests that banks always prefer a capital ratio below
the socially optimal level, while banks prefer an extra large size when cross-
sectional dependencies are typically low. More stringent capital requirements
simultaneously result in larger banks under low bankruptcy costs, high fi-
nancing costs and high taxes. To enhance social welfare, policies on capital
are nevertheless more effective than policies on size. This is particularly true
when dependencies are low, i.e., during economic booms. Our results are
in support of the countercyclical capital buffers in the Basel III proposals
and imply a negative association between the stringency of monetary and
prudential policy.
Chapter 5 identifies a simple sufficient condition to fairly allocate sys-
temic risk according to the Shapley value concept. Our condition implies
that two allocation measures in Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) and Zhou
(2010) are a Shapley value. The widely used MES in Acharya et al. (2012),
and ΔCoVaR in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) are however not a Shapley
value.
The tails of the multivariate normal distribution play a pivotal role in
simulating systemic risk, either directly or indirectly. For instance, the 𝑡-
distribution is an infinite mixture of normal distributions. Even for the mul-
tivariate normal distribution, existing methods lack an accurate modeling of
the multivariate tails. In Chapter 6, we propose a new analytical method to
bound the probability of the multivariate normal distribution. Our method
combines a Taylor expansion with a change of measure. The bounds are (𝑖)
tighter than bounds of existing methods, (𝑖𝑖) in a substantial proportion of
simulated low-dimensional cases more precise than the simulation method
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of Genz (1992), and (𝑖𝑖𝑖) tightest if the condition number of the covariance
matrix is close to one. Since the relative error of the bounds declines in the
tails, our method is particularly useful in the multivariate tail region. This
is of particularly interest for systemic risk as systemic events are associated
with events in this tail region.

Chapter 2
The size anomaly in European
financial stock returns
2.1 Introduction
Recent research shows that tail risk is important in asset pricing (e.g., Gabaix
(2012), and Wachter (2013)). The financial crisis has shown that the impact
of this tail risk is potentially huge for society. The bailouts during the crisis
reduced the potential tail risk of protected financials and led to a correspond-
ing reduction in spillover effects. Such bailouts have led investors to suppose
that governments bail out the systemically most important financials during
periods of serious distress.
Moral hazard may induce the protected financials to opt for more risky in-
vestments. On the one hand, the standard risk-return tradeoff in the CAPM
predicts a higher expected return on the assets of such financials. On the
other hand, investors of the protected financials are forward-looking. They
price ex-ante the higher return on assets, thereby indicating that the return
on debt and equity of a protected financial is not necessarily higher. Even
stronger, investors may anticipate the implicit embedded put option of the
protection. Similar to an insurance premium, investors may demand a lower
return on an investment in a protected financial. When sufficiently large,
such government guarantees increase sovereign risk, which leads investors to
demand a higher return on sovereign bonds. As a consequence, the lower
financing cost of protected financials is an implicit government subsidy at
the expense of tax payers. It is therefore important to identify ex-ante the
protected financials.
Though not always explicitly formalized, the “too-big-to-fail” concern is
I thank Nico van der Sar and Casper de Vries for comments on an earlier version.
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generally accepted, and suggests that size is an indicator of systemic im-
portance (see e.g. Huang et al. (2012)), and thus a potential indicator of
government protection. The size effect may act in several ways. A default of
a big financial results in a default on a large amount of debt, which has a large
direct impact on the financial system and a large indirect impact through
spillover effects and banking panics (see Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). Re-
latedly, big financials are more involved in interbank activities (see Furfine
(2003)). As such, the default of a big financial may induce a cascading effect
of defaults in the banking system. In addition, the assets of big financials
tend to be more diversified. This makes the exposure of big financials more
similar (see Ibragimov et al. (2011)). As a consequence, a default of a big
financial is more likely to be associated with multiple distressed financials.
In any case, regulators aim to prevent a default of a big financial by a
bailout in case of distress. In contrast, small financials do not have a similar
protection. The higher tail risk of small financials should therefore translate
into an additional size risk premium for small stocks in the financial industry.
This risk premium is on top of the size premium in equity returns that is well
documented in the literature (Banz (1981), Chan and Chen (1991), Fama
and French (1993), and Van Dijk (2011)).
Our approach is related to the following literature. Viale et al. (2009)
consider several asset pricing models for U.S. bank stocks during the period
1985–2003. The pricing of bank stocks differs from non-financials as shocks
to the yield curve have a significant effect on bank stocks. Our setup and
results differ from this study. After correcting for standard risk factors, we
find limited evidence for an effect of the yield curve on average stock returns
in the European financial industry. Rather than finding an empirically opti-
mal asset pricing model, we establish and explain the link between average
financial stock returns and government guarantees. A similar approach for
the U.S. is in Zeng et al. (2014), who create a banking factor long in big
banks and short in small banks during the sample period 1980–2007. They
find a significant return for the U.S. banking factor. In several asset pricing
models, this factor helps in pricing stocks, including non-financial stocks.
Gandhi and Lustig (2015) adjust returns of bank stocks using the three
risk factors from Fama and French (1993) and two bond factors. They con-
struct a banking factor in an indirect way from a principal component anal-
ysis on the residuals of a standard asset pricing model for ten financial size
portfolios. During the period 1970–2013, the biggest U.S. bank stocks had
significantly lower risk-adjusted returns than smaller sized bank stocks. In
contrast, the risk-adjusted returns of portfolios of non-financial stocks tend
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to increase in size. Notably, big banks had a similar volatility, and a higher
leverage than smaller banks. The findings in Gandhi and Lustig (2015) are
thus consistent with government guarantees that protect big U.S. banks in
disaster states.
We report smaller risk-adjusted returns for big financials, which provides
evidence on a safety net for big financials. We find a higher volatility of
big financials which is in support of a moral hazard story. These findings
motivate us to construct a European financial risk factor, SMBfin, with a
methodology closely related to Zeng et al. (2014). The significant return of
this factor provides European evidence for implicit government guarantees
to the financial industry by the unexplained return difference in size. We
extend the existing literature by showing that such a return difference is
absent in any other industry. Moreover, the momentum risk factor (Carhart
(1997)) is not a substitute for our financial risk factor because it cannot fully
explain the anomaly.
Our sample period ends in June 2013. Thus, it contains the most re-
cent crisis period. This period has highlighted the importance of, and time
variation in, cross-country differences within Europe. Therefore, we study
time variation in the factor loadings on our risk factor SMBfin and the 3FF
factors of the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993). We detect a
large increase in the HML loading of big financials in Southern Europe. We
show that this time variation in the HML loading is mitigated if we exclude
financials from the 3FF factors, and include SMBfin as a separate factor.
We test in a cross-sectional setup for the determinants of the exposure on
our financial risk factor SMBfin. In particular big financials in less prosper-
ous countries tend to benefit from the guarantees as they are more exposed
to adverse shocks. This effect dominates doubts on the national safety net,
even after mid 2008. Interbank lending raised the guarantee up to the start
of the crisis, afterwards investments in government securities is a significant
determinant for government protection.
In addition, we address the pricing of the whole universe of European
stocks, including non-financials, in the framework of Fama and French (FF
2012). FF (2012) find a value pattern in the risk-adjusted returns of big
stocks, and a size pattern in the risk-adjusted return of value stocks. We
show that an important driver of the anomalies is the increasing weight over
time of financials in the value portfolio of the HML factor. The anomalies
are non-existent in an asset pricing model with SMBfin and the 3FF factors
constructed without financials.
The banking landscape in Europe and the U.S. differ from each other.
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More specifically, Europe abounds with financial conglomerates engaged in
several business lines within the financial industry. For instance, Europe’s
largest banks also offer insurance products. However, a major component of
systemic risk is the risk on simultaneous bank runs at multiple institutions,
either physically or electronically. Compared to the insurance business, bank
runs make banking operations more prone to a systemic crisis, and govern-
ment guarantees. Isolating the effect of banking operations on stock returns
of conglomerates is infeasible from a practical perspective. Nonetheless, one
could argue that our results are a lower bound on the impact of govern-
ment guarantees for institutions specialized in banking. In addition, the
biggest European institutions operate on a global scale, which may indi-
cate that foreign affiliates may not enjoy a government protection. Still, our
cross-sectional results are significant with this distorting feature. In other
words, the results could be more pronounced when eliminating the effect of
non-banking businesses and foreign operations on the stock returns. As this
exercise is infeasible from a practical perspective, we simply use stock returns
that include the effect of non-banking businesses and foreign operations.
Since we construct a single factor for whole Europe, our results are condi-
tional on an integrated stock market in Europe. Evidence for the latter is in
Fratzscher (2002), Kim et al. (2005), Hardouvelis et al. (2006), and Bekaert
et al. (2009). Although our sample is restricted to publicly held banks, it is
likely that our results extend to privately owned banks or cooperative banks.
For instance, Barry et al. (2011) find no significant differences in default risk
between publicly held and privately owned banks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and vari-
ables. Section 2.3 lays out the methodology. In Section 2.4 we address time
variation in both factor loadings and factor compositions. Section 2.5 ex-
plains the factor loading on our risk factor SMBfin for individual stocks. We
discuss the implications for the Fama and French (2012)-model in Section
2.6. Section 2.7 presents the conclusions.
2.2 Data and variables
Our sample runs from July 1990 to June 2013. The market return (RM) and
the European risk factors SMB (size factor, Small Minus Big), HML (value
factor, High Book-to-Market (value) Minus Low B/M (growth)), and WML
(momentum factor, previous Winners Minus previous Losers) are taken from
Kenneth French’s website.1 The monthly U.S. dollar denominated returns of
1http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Developed
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the risk factors are converted to euro denominated returns (or its predeces-
sor ecu). We use the German 1-month Treasury bill rate from Datastream
for the risk-free rate. We further collect the total return index (Datastream
code RI), price-to-book ratio (PTBV), market value of equity (MV) and
unadjusted prices (UP) of active and dead stocks listed on the main ex-
change of the following 16 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. This is the
same set of countries used in FF (2012). We drop stocks without a positive
price-to-book-ratio.
Returns are in ecu before 1999, afterwards returns are converted to euros
if necessary. We winsorize the monthly returns outside the 0.1% to 99.9%
range.2 Our results are robust to the following adjustments: (i) a minimum
price of AC1 at the end of the previous month to minimize potential biases
arising from low-price and illiquid stocks, (ii) the correction for Datastream
data in Ince and Porter (2006) who suggest to drop a monthly return greater
than 300% if it is reversed within one month, and (iii) dropping secondary
listings. We omit these corrections in our baseline model to keep the data
selection process simple and easy to replicate.
Size is the market value of equity at the end of June of year 𝑡. We use
the inverse of the price-to-book ratio for the B/M ratio. To ensure that
this accounting ratio is known before the returns, we match the year-end
financial statement data of year 𝑡−1 with monthly returns from July of year
𝑡 to June of year 𝑡 + 1, which is standard practice (e.g., FF (1993, 2012),
Hou et al. (2011)). Following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and FF (2012),
momentum in month 𝑡 is the cumulative raw return from month 𝑡 − 12 to
month 𝑡 − 2, skipping month 𝑡 − 1. This avoids the short-term reversal
effect first documented in Jegadeesh (1990), and mitigates the impact of
microstructure biases such as bid-ask bounce or non-synchronous trading.
This is standard in momentum tests.
For each stock, we identify the industry by the Datastream Industrial
Classification Benckmark (Datastream code INDC). This classification struc-
ture is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) jointly created
by FTSE and Dow Jones, and is used in e.g. Bekaert et al. (2009), and Hou
et al. (2011). Detailed descriptives are in Appendix 2.A.
2The quantiles are taken from the complete set of returns because there is no reason
to believe that data errors are equally spread among stock markets or over time.
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2.3 Methodology
We start with the standard three-factor model from Fama and French (1993)
(3FF model) having the excess market return (RM – RF), Small-Minus-Big
(SMB) and High-Minus-Low Book-To-Market (HML) as risk factors.3 For
each industry, we test for the size dependence in the risk-adjusted returns of
five equally-weighted size portfolios.4 Following FF (2012), the size break-
points are at the 3rd, 7th, 13th, and 25th percentile of aggregate market cap-
italization. The time-average of the market caps at the breakpoints roughly
correspond to the time-average of the market caps of the NYSE size quin-
tiles used in Fama and French (1993). Table 2.1 shows that the risk-adjusted
(r-a) returns are monotonically decreasing in size in the financial industry.
A standard risk-return trade-off cannot explain this pattern. Namely, the
volatilities of the portfolios increase in size. The volatilities of the excess
returns are 4.0% for the portfolio of smallest financials, 4.7%, 5.0%, 5.5%,
and 6.6% for the portfolio of big financials. For the risk-adjusted returns
we find volatilities equal to 1.6%, 1.5%, 1.8%, 1.9%, and 2.2%, respectively.
This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that government protection
induces moral hazard for the big protected financials.
The results in Table 2.1 suggest that the 3FF model, including the SMB
factor, misses an important effect related to size in the financial industry. As
in Gandhi and Lustig (2015), we interpret the size pattern in risk-adjusted
returns as a compensation for, possibly unobserved, financial tail risk. Big
financials are supposed to be too-big-to-fail, and are therefore protected from
default risk by implicit or explicit government guarantees. Investors trade on
this latent put option by demanding a lower return for big financials. The r-a
return difference of 0.63% (= 0.34%+0.29%) between the two most extreme
size groups is significant (𝑡 = 3.87) in the financial industry. None of the
other industries exhibits a similar size pattern. The size pattern in volatil-
ities is also consistent with a risk protection from tail risk. Big financials
anticipate the larger government guarantees by investing in more volatile as-
sets. Thus, our results are in line with the hypothesis that the largest firms
in the financial industry exhibit the largest government guarantees.
3We added (i) the two bond factors from Fama and French (1993), (ii) the return
of a portfolio long in a long term bond index and short in a risk free bond, (iii) the
return of a portfolio long in a corporate investment grade bond index and short in a risk
free bond, (iv) the monthly change of the spread between the 1-month Treasury bill rate
and the 10-year government bond yield. This does not change our results qualitatively.
For parsimony, our baseline model does not include any of these risk factors. Moreover,
general European bond index data is only available since 1993.
4Value-weighted portfolios give qualitatively similar results.
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r-a return by size group (3FF)
1 2 3 4 5 𝑡(1–5)
Financials 0.29* -0.09 -0.12 -0.29** -0.34** 3.78**
Basic Materials 0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.12
Industrials 0.17 0.03 0.04 -0.11 -0.07 1.66
Consumer Goods 0.11 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.29 -1.01
Health Care 0.32 0.59** 0.56* 0.45* 0.59** -1.40
Consumer Services 0.12 -0.10 -0.00 -0.06 0.08 0.24
Telecommunic. 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.81* 0.39 -0.29
Utilities 0.41* 0.55** 0.21 0.34 0.14 1.40
Technology 0.89** 0.35 0.34 0.42 0.37 1.75
Oil & Gas 0.46 -0.12 -0.22 0.36 0.23 0.86
Table 2.1: Size-Industry returns on 3FF factors.
Regressions of equally weighted (size, industry) portfolios on standard 3FF factors. The
size groups increase in size with breakpoints at the 3rd, 7th, 13th, and 25th percentile of
aggregate market capitalization. The rightmost column contains the 𝑡-value of a
portfolio long in the risk-adjusted returns of the smallest stocks and short in the largest
stocks. Industry classifications are based on the Datastream Industry Classification
Benchmark. *, ** = significant at 5%, 1%.
The results in Table 2.1 indicate that the standard 3FF model mis-
prices stocks in the health care, utilities, financial and technology industry.
Nonetheless, the financial industry is the only industry with a significant
difference between the risk-adjusted returns of the two extreme size portfo-
lios (rightmost column). As a consequence, a factor related to the size of a
firm in the financial industry is missing. Therefore, we construct for each in-
dustry a self-financing portfolio that takes an equally-weighted long position
in the bottom 10% of aggregate market cap, and an equally-weighted short
position in the top 80%. The breakpoints at the 10% and 80% percentiles
maximize the average monthly return of this portfolio.
Value-weighted returns produce qualitatively similar results. That being
said, a value-weighted industry portfolio may highly depend on a single firm
if the total market cap of that industry mainly consists of one big firm.
Further, the biggest firms within the bottom 10% have the largest weight
in a value-weighted portfolio of small financials, while precisely those firms
may benefit more from government guarantees.
We conjecture that government guarantees hardly exist in non-financial
industries, and for small financials. In contrast, guarantees have a substantial
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mean mean r-a
SMB return SMB return
mean 𝑁𝑆 mean 𝑁𝐵 (NW 𝑡-value) (NW 𝑡-value)
Financials 523.2 76.3 0.18 (0.83) 0.60** (4.65)
Basic Materials 255.9 34.4 -0.13 (-0.55) 0.00 (0.01)
Industrials 937.8 173.8 0.08 (0.61) 0.21 (1.68)
Consumer Goods 600.1 49.3 -0.19 (-0.99) -0.16 (-1.06)
Health Care 208.1 11.8 -0.14 (-0.38) -0.18 (-0.64)
Consumer Services 535.2 80.6 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.15)
Telecommunic. 41.2 8.8 -0.18 (-0.43) -0.11 (-0.33)
Utilities 75.2 23.9 0.16 (0.83) 0.22 (1.37)
Technology 418.8 24.4 0.25 (0.95) 0.40 (1.49)
Oil & Gas 129.8 8.4 0.23 (0.55) 0.09 (0.38)
Table 2.2: SMB returns on 3FF factors.
Risk-adjusted (r-a) returns are adjusted for risks in the standard 3FF model. NS and
NB are the number of stocks in the industry portfolios with small stocks and big stocks,
respectively. The SMB is equally weighted and long in bottom 10% industry market cap
and short in biggest 80%. Industry classifications are based on the Datastream Industry
Classification Benchmark. *, ** = significant at 5%, 1%.
effect on the returns in the top 80% market cap of financials. The descriptive
statistics of the constructed industry-specific SMB portfolios in Table 2.2 are
in support of our conjecture. It follows that the self-financing portfolio of the
financial industry has a monthly return of 0.18%. The 3FF model predicts
a negative return of –0.42% (not reported in Table 2.2), which leaves a sig-
nificant 0.60% (= 0.18%+0.42%) unexplained. None of the other industries
has a risk-adjusted return difference close to 0.60% per month. Thus, the
3FF model cannot explain the returns of the financial size portfolio. The av-
erage number of stocks in the portfolios of small and big financials are 523.2
and 76.3, respectively. This demonstrates that the size pattern is present
in a large sample of stocks, and excludes outliers in the cross-section as an
explanation.
During our sample period, the European banking system was mainly na-
tionally regulated while some countries tend to have larger financials than
others. To correct for this effect, we construct for each country a self-
financing portfolio that takes an equally-weighted long position in the bottom
10% of aggregate financial market cap, and an equally-weighted short posi-
tion in the top 80%. We weigh the national financial size portfolio returns
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by the monthly number of stocks and refer to this portfolio as SMBfin. After
adjusting the weighted portfolio returns for the 3FF risks, the risk-adjusted
SMBfin return equals 0.62% (𝑡 = 4.74).
The SMBfin factor is only based on financial stocks. As such, it may
have additional explanatory power on top of the standard SMB factor in
the 3FF model. Accordingly, we examine the additional explanatory power
of the SMBfin factor to regressions on the 3FF factors. It follows from the
Frisch–Waugh–Lovell theorem that the projection of the SMBfin factor on
the 3FF factors can be subtracted from the SMBfin factor without altering
the regression results. In other words, the regression results are unchanged
if we correct SMBfin for the risk in the 3FF factors. Therefore, we regress
the returns of the SMBfin portfolio on the 3FF factors with intercept, and
define the risk factor ESMBfin as the intercept plus residual. This risk fac-
tor is by construction uncorrelated with the 3FF factors. FF (1993) adopt
a similar approach to measure the effect of the market return on common
variation in returns left by the other factors. Similar to Gandhi and Lustig
(2015), the ESMBfin factor represents returns unexplained by the 3FF fac-
tors. Figure 2.1 is the 12-month moving average of ESMBfin. It shows
that during normal times, small financials have a higher risk-adjusted return
than big financials to compensate for, e.g., the smaller potential benefit from
government guarantees.
Considering the spike in Figure 2.1 at the start of our sample period,
U.S. interest rates increased considerably during 1994. For instance, the
federal funds rate doubled from 3% to 6%. The spike suggests that small
European financials were initially less exposed to this increase than big Eu-
ropean financials. A possible explanation is that the financing of Europe’s
biggest financials depends more on short-term U.S. debt. On the asset side,
big financials have a smaller exposure to interest rate changes if they invest
more in long-term assets such as mortgages. This maturity mismatch can
make big financials more exposed to an unanticipated spike in the Fed rate.
In addition, the more uncertain prospects of the U.S. economy are likely
to have an additional upward effect on the discount rates of big European
financials than on the discount rates of their smaller counterparts. This can
further raise the return of the risk-adjusted ESMBfin.
The ESMBfin factor dropped sharply in 2008 and 2011 when conditions
of the European financial system turned out to be worse than expected. Big
financial stocks were protected by government guarantees, either implicit
or explicit. This made investors less willing to hold the more risky small
financial stocks. This put a downward pressure on the long small-short big
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Figure 2.1: 12 month moving average ESMBfin
12 month moving average return of monthly risk-adjusted return of SMB
portfolio of financials as obtained by a regression on the 3FF factors.
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portfolio.
Table 2.3 presents the residuals if we regress the industry size portfolios
on the 3FF factors and the financial risk factor SMBfin (or equivalently,
ESMBfin derived from the FWL theorem). The size pattern in risk-adjusted
returns of the financial industry vanishes. That is, SMBfin explains the
size pattern in financials. The same holds true for the spread of the two
extreme size financial portfolios. This spread is now an insignificant 0.03%
(𝑡 = 0.40). In addition, none of the financial size portfolios earns a significant
risk-adjusted return.
The loadings on the SMBfin factor are in Table 2.4. As expected, the
exposure to SMBfin decreases monotonically in size, starting from 0.29 (𝑡 =
5.28) for the smallest financials to −0.68 (𝑡 = −13.8) for the biggest finan-
cials.5 The SMBfin portfolio is long in the 10% smallest national market cap
such that it tends to be long in the second financial size group, the second
5Appendix B shows that a 𝑡-test on the risk-adjusted returns of a portfolio long in a
portfolio in Table 2.3 and short in the corresponding portfolio in Table 2.1, tests on the
risk-adjusted returns of SMBfin for any portfolio in the table. Thus, all portfolios would
show identical test statistics. Hence, we report the 𝑡-statistics of the SMBfin coefficients
rather than the 𝑡-statistics of the effect of ESMBfin on the risk-adjusted return.
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r-a return by size group (3FF+SMBfin)
1 2 3 4 5 𝑡(1–5)
Financials 0.11 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 0.40
Basic Materials -0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.07 -0.10 0.08
Industrials 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 1.00
Consumer Goods 0.04 0.08 0.08 -0.04 0.16 -0.64
Health Care 0.25 0.69** 0.51* 0.39 0.43* -0.68
Consumer Services -0.01 -0.13 0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.20
Telecommunications 0.15 0.22 0.17 0.67 0.24 -0.25
Utilities 0.36* 0.48** 0.21 0.32 0.12 1.30
Technology 0.76** 0.43 0.46 0.56* 0.44 1.08
Oil & Gas 0.31 -0.14 -0.40 0.22 -0.04 1.31
Table 2.3: Returns on 3FF and SMBfin.
Regressions of equally weighted size portfolios on standard 3FF factors and the SMBfin
factor. The size groups increase in size with breakpoints at the 3rd, 7th, 13th, and 25th
percentile of aggregate market cap. The rightmost column contains the 𝑡-value of a
portfolio long in the risk-adjusted returns of the smallest stocks and short in the largest
stocks. Industry classifications are based on the Datastream Industry Classification
Benchmark. *, ** = significant at 5%, 1%.
size group has a negative exposure of −0.10 (𝑡 = −2.12) to SMBfin. This co-
incides with the negative coefficient of this group in Table 2.1, and indicates
that government guarantees are widespread in the financial industry. None
of the other industries shows a similar size pattern in risk-adjusted returns.
Our financial risk factor may shed some light on the so-called low risk
anomaly in financial stocks (Baker and Wurgler (2015)). This anomaly states
that banks with a smaller market beta have higher returns, even after cor-
recting for risks in the 3FF model. Since large financials are more diversified
than small financials, their market beta coefficients are indeed larger in our
regressions (not reported). That is, large beta financials are large financials
with less tail risk by the government guarantees. The smaller tail risk of the
large beta financials is thus captured by our SMBfin factor.
The model does however still a poor job in explaining the returns of
the health care, utilities and technology industry. This is not surprising
since other industries are not protected to the same extent by government
guarantees. Nonetheless, the standard SMB factor should already captures
guarantees to big non-financial firms that are absent for small firms. For
instance, the U.S. government bailed out General Motors in 2009 to avoid
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SMBfin loading by size group (3FF+SMBfin)
1 2 3 4 5
Financials 0.29** -0.10* -0.33** -0.41** -0.69**
Basic Materials 0.16 -0.09 -0.10 0.02 0.14
Industrials 0.18** 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.02
Consumer Goods 0.11* -0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.22**
Health Care 0.11 -0.16 0.08 0.10 0.26*
Consumer Services 0.20** 0.05 -0.07 -0.09 0.08
Telecommunications 0.21 0.08 0.20 0.23 0.24*
Utilities 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.04
Technology 0.21 -0.12 -0.18* -0.23* -0.13
Oil & Gas 0.24 0.04 0.29* 0.23* 0.44**
Table 2.4: SMBfin factor loading.
Regressions of equally weighted size portfolios on standard 3FF factors and the SMBfin
factor. The size groups increase in size with breakpoints at the 3rd, 7th, 13th, and 25th
percentile of aggregate market capitalization. Industry classifications are based on the
Datastream Industry Classification Benchmark. *, ** = significant at 5%, 1%.
a mass unemployment. The financial risk factor SMBfin captures the addi-
tional guarantees to the financial industry. Thus additional guarantees to
the financial industry are rational in light of the systemic nature of this in-
dustry due to interbank relationships, interactions with the real economy,
and the similar risk profiles of big financials.
2.4 Time variation and the crisis
We argued that the safety net reduces the tail risk of big financials. Market
participants anticipate this lower tail risk by demanding a lower return for
big financials. Our results in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 suggest that this
mechanism is not captured by the standard 3FF model. That is, the 3FF
model cannot explain the lower return of big financials as their risk-adjusted
return is significantly negative. This has led us to construct a financial SMB
portfolio with a significant risk-adjusted return of 0.62% per month (after
separation by country, see p.15).
A well-known additional risk factor to the 3FF model is the momentum
risk factor which is long in previous year’s winners and short in previous
year’s losers (Carhart (1997)). It is well documented that this factor captures
some additional risk as it earns a significant average risk-adjusted return in
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the 3FF model. The significant risk-adjusted return of our financial SMB
portfolio suggests that small financials tend to be included in the long winner
portfolio, while big financials are in the short loser portfolio. Indeed, our
financial risk factor is significantly correlated with the European momentum
factor (𝜌 = 0.45, 𝑡 = 4.36). This raises the question whether the momentum
factor also explains the size anomaly in financial stock returns.
Table 2.5 shows that the 3FF model augmented with the momentum fac-
tor partly explains the size pattern in financials. Nevertheless, the spread in
risk-adjusted returns is still a significant 0.43% (0.35% + 0.08%, 𝑡 = 2.56).
Thus, a momentum factor partly corrects for government guarantees in the
financial industry, but in a more indirect way compared to the SMBfin fac-
tor. The factor loadings of the five financial size portfolios on the momentum
factor decrease monotonically in size (details available upon request), and
are all significantly negative (𝑡 = −2.05 for the smallest stocks). In other
words, each financial size group is more exposed to the loser portfolio than
to the winner portfolio. This gives a lower average return, and a negative
correlation with the momentum portfolio. This effect is strongest for big
financials since they are safer by the supposedly larger government guaran-
tees. Similar to our SMBfin factor, the momentum factor cannot explain the
returns of size portfolios in health care, utilities and technology.
Time variation in the coefficients of asset pricing models explains some
of the momentum returns (see, e.g., Chordia and Shivakumar (2002)). Such
time variation would of course also translate into incorrect inferences on our
SMBfin factor. It is thus of interest to see if time variation can explain
the return of the SMBfin factor. To study this, we considered (i) daily
data with annual regressions starting in July, (ii) monthly data with 5 year
rolling windows, and (iii) a state-space model using monthly data. All three
methods give very similar results. We report the results with daily data
(method (i)), since daily data gives the most timely estimation of changes
in the coefficients. In addition, the setup does not rely on the parametric
assumptions needed in state-space models.
The annual coefficients of the daily SMBfin portfolio regressed on the
daily 3FF factors are in Figure 2.2. The loadings are moderately volatile
with one exception, the large tilt in the HML loading in July 2007. One
could argue that the significant return of our SMBfin portfolio stems from
this drop. However, our results do not change qualitatively if we end the
sample period at the end of June 2007, before the crisis. That is, the r-a
return on the SMBfin portfolio remains significant with an average monthly
return of 0.56%.
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r-a return by size group (3FF + Momentum)
1 2 3 4 5 𝑡(1–5)
Financials 0.36** 0.04 -0.01 -0.11 -0.07 2.56*
Basic Materials 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.57
Industrials 0.33** 0.17* 0.17* -0.03 0.05 1.93
Consumer Goods 0.28* 0.19 0.07 0.08 0.25 0.17
Health Care 0.56* 0.61** 0.57* 0.39 0.50* 0.21
Consumer Services 0.28* 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.90
Telecommunications 0.57 0.25 0.28 0.84 0.33 0.65
Utilities 0.42* 0.51** 0.14 0.26 0.01 2.17*
Technology 1.02** 0.46 0.43 0.61* 0.51 1.67
Oil & Gas 0.50 0.02 -0.28 0.23 0.17 1.21
Table 2.5: Returns on 3FF and momentum.
Regressions on standard 3FF factors and the momentum factor. The size groups increase
in size with breakpoints at the 3rd, 7th, 13th, and 25th percentile of aggregate market
capitalization. The rightmost column contains the 𝑡-value of a portfolio long in the
risk-adjusted returns of the smallest stocks and short in the largest stocks. Industry
classifications are based on the Datastream Industry Classification Benchmark.
*, ** = significant at 5%, 1%.
Using daily data, we also tested if the mean r-a SMBfin return is zero in
each year. Even when allowing for annual changes in regression coefficients,
the 𝐹 -test clearly rejects zero returns (𝑝 < 0.1%). Thus, time variation
in the HML loading cannot explain the significant returns of our financial
size portfolio. This is in line with Ang and Kristensen (2012) who find for
U.S. stocks a significant variation in factor loadings, but also overwhelming
evidence that a conditional version of the Fama and French (1993) model
cannot account for the momentum effect.
The more negative HML loading during July 2007–June 2009 before the
European debt crisis are, however, a statistical artefact due to (i) the large
positive net weight of financials in the value-weighted HML factor (top plot
Figure 2.3) as a substantial proportion of financials has become distressed,
and (ii) the high volatility of financials during the crisis period, thereby
determining the dynamics of the HML portfolio (bottom plot Figure 2.3).
That is, since the crisis period the HML factor increasingly represents the
dynamics of financials.
The annual tilts in the percentage of the market cap of financials are
attributable to the annual rebalancing of the portfolios. To correct for this
composition effect, we redo the regression of SMBfin on the 3FF factors,
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Figure 2.2: SMBfin on 3FF
Factor loadings of the financial risk factor SMBfin on the three Fama and
French (1993) factors. Daily data from July 1990 to June 2013. Regressions run
from July of year 𝑡 to June of year 𝑡+ 1, year 𝑡 is on the horizontal axis.
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where the SMB and HML factors are now constructed without the financials.
We find again a significant monthly r-a SMBfin return, now 0.54% (𝑡 = 2.80).
Compared to the results with the original daily 3FF model in Figure 2.2, the
major new finding is the postponed drop in HML loading from July 2007 to
July 2009 in Figure 2.4. The composition effect thus explains a substantial
part of the drop in the original HML loading of SMBfin between July 2007
and June 2009.
There is a very sharp size distinction in the drop. The HML loading of
small financials is stable over time (top plot Figure 2.5). The effect of the
crisis on the loadings of small financials is thus comparable to firms in other
industries composing the non-financial risk factors, while the higher HML
loading of big financials completely explains the drop in HML loading over
the most recent years (bottom plot Figure 2.5). Big financials are thus more
like distressed firms as of July 2009, even after correcting for the composition
effect of the HML portfolio.
From late 2009, investors started to fear a sovereign debt crisis as a
result of rising private and sovereign debt levels, mainly in Southern Eu-
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Figure 2.3: HML characteristics over time
Top: Percentage of market cap financials in total market cap of high B/M, low
B/M, and HML portfolio, bottom: 12 month moving average volatility of HML
constructed without financials, and HML exclusively with financials.
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Figure 2.4: SMBfin on 3FFnonfin
Factor loadings of the financial risk factor SMBfin on the three Fama and
French (1993) factors constructed without financials. Regressions run from July
of year 𝑡 to June of year 𝑡+ 1, year 𝑡 is on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 2.5: Components SMBfin on 3FFnonfin
Factor loadings of the components of SMBfin on the three Fama and French
(1993) factors constructed without financials. Regressions run from July of year
𝑡 to June of year 𝑡+ 1, year 𝑡 is on the horizontal axis.
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Figure 2.6: Bfin by region on 3FFnonfin
Top: Northern Europe (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, U.K.), bottom: Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain).
Regressions run from July of year 𝑡 to June of year 𝑡+ 1, year 𝑡 is on the horizontal axis.
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rope. The quick rise of sovereign debt was induced by several bailouts in
the banking sector. European banks in turn own a significant amount of
the sovereign debt, which forced bank’s to depreciate on their assets. The
resulting deplorable state of the banking system made a bailout more likely,
thereby further depressing sovereign debt prices. This mechanism explains
why solvency concerns regarding banks and sovereigns were reinforcing. The
feedback loop suggests that the European debt crisis split Europe into two
parts, with financials in the Southern countries much more affected. When
the crisis unfolded, financials in the Northern countries were in general only
moderately hit by indirect contagious effects in the financial industry. In-
deed, the time variation in the European HML loading of our risk factor
is mainly attributable to big financials in Southern Europe (Figure 2.6 and
Figure 2.7). The HML loading of big financials in Northern Europe as well as
the HML loading of small financials in Southern Europe exhibits only a mod-
erate increase. This indicates that big financials in Southern Europe faced
additional adverse shocks during the European debt crisis. Possibly, such
financials had more sovereign debt of distressed countries on their balance
sheets, or investors started to doubt the safety net in Southern Europe.
Nonetheless, the different shape of the HML loading of small financials
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Figure 2.7: Sfin by region on 3FFnonfin
Top: Northern Europe (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, U.K.), bottom: Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain).
Regressions run from July of year 𝑡 to June of year 𝑡+ 1, year 𝑡 is on the horizontal axis.
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across Europe suggests that a safety net explanation is not the whole story.
This motivates us to assess the impact of the following two mechanisms that
could both explain the increased distress of Europe’s biggest financials. On
the one hand, we discussed the feedback loop that default risk of sovereign
debt may induce investors to doubt the reliability of the safety net through
depreciations on bank balance sheets. On the other hand, sovereign distress
and unexpected macroeconomic shocks directly raises credit risk on the assets
of financials. As a consequence, solvency risk of financials increases, which
could also result in a distressed status. In the next section, we address the
relative impact of both mechanisms by considering the factor loadings on
our financial risk factor.
2.5 Explaining the factor loading
A more negative loading on our financial risk factor SMBfin indicates higher
expected government guarantees, and thus a lower tail risk. It is of partic-
ular interest for investors and regulators to identify which financials have
a substantially negative exposure to our financial risk factor. Using daily
data, we regress the stock returns of each financial on SMBfin, and the
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3FF factors without financials. We use annual windows to account for time
variation in both factor loadings and characteristics. Each window starts
in July to ensure that year-end balance sheet data is at the centre of each
window. The regressions provide us panel data with the loading 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 on the
financial risk factor of financial stock 𝑖 in annual window 𝑡. We estimate the
between-effects panel regression6
𝑏𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 +
∑︁
𝑗
𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗
where 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of stock 𝑖, 𝛾𝑡 are stock-independent time dummies
for each window, 𝛽𝑗 are regression coefficients of the explanatory variables
𝑋𝑖𝑗 of stock 𝑖, and an upper bars denotes a stock-specific time series average
over the annual windows where stock 𝑖 has a complete series of daily returns.
The time dummies account for time-varying effects of omitted variables in
the unbalanced panel.
We tested several explanatory bank-specific variables from Bankscope
and macro variables from Eurostat. In our final model, we selected variables
that meet the following requirements (i) a clear economic interpretation, (ii)
a large number of observations, (iii) significant in a univariate model with
time dummies included, (iv) significant in the final multivariate model, (v)
a similar coefficient estimate in both models (iii) and (iv), and (vi) a low
correlation with the other included variables in a multivariate setting. For
instance, we do not use the debt-to-GDP ratio and real GDP per capita
simultaneously because of the high negative correlation (–0.52). Although
debt is a stock variable and GDP a flow variable, both variables are indicators
for the state of the national economy. Noteworthy, the debt-to-GDP ratio is
for the whole sample only available since 1995.
Panel A in Table 2.6 presents the univariate regressions. We find that
common equity, total assets, the leverage ratio, the proportion of government
securities, the proportion of bank loans, and the debt-to-GDP ratio have a
negative effect on the financial risk factor loading 𝑏𝑖,𝑡. A negative loading
on SMBfin means that the r-a returns are more similar to the r-a returns
of big financials. Thus, we interpret variables with negative coefficients as
indicators of more government guarantees. Real GDP per capita affects the
loading positively.
6A fixed (within) effects model differences the results of subsequent periods. It focuses
on the time series dimension instead of the cross-section, our point of interest. A random
effects model provides inconsistent estimates because the Hausman test is rejected. This
basically means that the stock-specific error series is correlated with the explanatory vari-
able.
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When controlling for common equity, the regressions in Panel B in Table
2.6 report an insignificant coefficient of total assets. We suggest that this
follows from the construction of our financial risk factor which uses equity
instead of total assets as a measure for size. Similarly, the leverage ratio
is insignificant if common equity is included as a regressor. It is natural
that a high leverage, i.e., a large amount of debt, is only feasible for healthy
financials. Firms in more moderate conditions experience harder conditions
when attracting more debt. However, financials with a high leverage tend
to be systemically more important because of the relatively large amount
of outstanding debt. A high leverage could thus be due to better prospects
(less observed guarantees), and could also indicate more systemic linkages
(more observed guarantees). This makes it hard to relate leverage to our
risk factor which measures implicit guarantees. We explain the significant
univariate result on leverage by the positive relation between leverage and
size.
The panel regression weighs each financial stock equally. This assigns
a relatively large weight to the more abundant small financials, which have
smaller government guarantees. Nevertheless, the two rightmost columns in
Table 2.6 show that our results are robust under different size groups. A
minimum of AC3 bln of common equity does not change our results qualita-
tively. The smaller number of included financials affects the standard error
of common equity, not the sign of the point estimate. Alternatively, the less
negative point estimate of big financials on common equity may indicate a
nonlinear effect in the expected benefit from the safety net.
What are the economic mechanisms behind the significant variables? Fi-
nancials with a higher level of common equity are in general bigger and more
levered and thus have more debt on their balance sheet. The corresponding
larger number of linkages with other financials makes such financials system-
ically more important, which explains the negative factor loading of common
equity to our risk factor, and thus the higher guarantees. More government
securities, more bank loans, and a higher debt-to-GDP ratio increase the
likelihood of being hit by a systemic crisis. This increases the measured
guarantee from the safety net. A high real GDP per capita may indicate a
favourable state of the national economy or a stable banking system with
a well-performing supervision. Both can explain the negative relation be-
tween GDP per capita and observed implicit guarantees. Thus, we find that
financials in countries with a poor state of the economy, as measured by
debt-to-GDP or GDP per capita, are more likely to benefit from a safety net
rather than to be penalized by a less reliable safety net.
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We elaborate on the previous result in a more formal way. Let 𝐺 de-
note the government guarantee to financial firm 𝑖. This guarantee is not
necessarily explicitly formalized in supervisory regulations. If not, market
participants have implicit beliefs on the size of the guarantee to firm 𝑖. This
size could depend on the state of the domestic economy of this financial.
Let Ω represent some indicator of this state. A larger Ω is associated with
a more favourable state. This makes the probability of default decrease as
Ω increases. In contrast, the expected guarantee conditional on a default
increases as Ω increases, since a better state of the economy is associated
with a more reliable safety net. More formally, the law of total probability
states that
E[𝐺] = P(𝐷)E [𝐺 |𝐷 ] + P(︀𝐷𝐶)︀E [︀𝐺 ⃒⃒𝐷𝐶 ]︀
where 𝐷𝐶 is the complement of the default event 𝐷. By using that guar-
antees are only allocated in case of a default, E
[︀
𝐺
⃒⃒
𝐷𝐶
]︀
= 0, and allowing
the terms to depend on the state of the economy Ω:
E[𝐺 of firm 𝑖 ; Ω] = P(default firm 𝑖 ;
−⏞ ⏟ 
Ω )× E[𝐺 given default firm 𝑖 ;
+⏞ ⏟ 
Ω ]
(2.1)
We find in Panel B in Table 2.6 a significantly positive relation between
the state of the economy and factor loadings. The negative of the factor
loading is a measure for the unconditional size of the government guarantees
E[𝐺 of firm 𝑖 ; Ω], thus the left-hand side (LHS) in (2.1). Thus, the LHS
decreases in Ω. This negative dependence on Ω implies that the right-hand
side (RHS) must also decrease with the state variable Ω. That is, the state
of the national economy has more impact on default probabilities (P(𝐷))
than on the safety net (E [𝐺 |𝐷 ]). The smaller effect through the safety
net suggests that investors assume a latent aggregate European safety net
when pricing European financials. This result holds for the complete sample
(Table 2.6), before (Panel A in Table 2.7) and after the start of the financial
crisis in 2008 (Panel B in Table 2.7).
Up to the crisis, bank loans had a significant impact on the factor loading,
while government securities were insignificant (Panel A in Table 2.7). Inter-
estingly, since the start of the crisis, government securities rather than bank
loans are a significant determinant of the factor loading on the SMBfin factor
(Panel B in Table 2.7). Although the government securities data is far from
complete, the pattern is clear from the available data. Having government
securities is increasingly associated with bad performance and financial dis-
tress risk. This made the holders of government securities potentially benefit
from a safety net as the negative loading in Table 2.7 indicates.
30 The size anomaly in European financial stock returns
P
anelA
:
July
1990–June
2008
P
anelB
:
July
2008–June
2013
univariate
m
ultivariate
univariate
m
ultivariate
coeff.
coeff.
coeff.
coeff.
(𝑡-value)
N
N
fin
𝑅
2
(𝑡-value)
(𝑡-value)
N
N
fin
𝑅
2
(𝑡-value)
com
m
on
–13.1**
2,369
363
0.34
–14.0**
–14.4**
–14.4**
746
210
0.31
–17.2**
–16.1**
equity
(–11.4)
(–12.4)
(–13.0)
(–9.2)
(–6.3)
(–5.7)
gov.sec./T
A
–4.4
927
180
0.13
–16.4**
258
85
0.19
–7.8*
–9.3**
(–1.7)
(–4.2)
(–2.4)
(–2.9)
bank
loans
–7.7**
2,211
327
0.12
–8.3**
–7.6**
–2.3
631
178
0.01
/T
A
(–3.5)
(–4.7)
(–4.3)
(–0.6)
debt/G
D
P
–31.8**
2,150
364
0.13
–27.1**
–56.7**
749
210
0.21
–49.4**
(–4.9)
(–4.8)
(–7.2)
(–3.9)
realG
D
P
44.0**
2,353
364
0.16
39.4**
89.5**
749
210
0.23
60.2**
/cap
(5.2)
(5.6)
(7.7)
(2.9)
N
1,972
2,172
256
258
N
fin
324
325
85
85
𝑅
2
0.44
0.49
0.52
0.47
T
able
2.7:
D
eterm
in
ants
S
M
B
fi
n
load
in
g
by
p
eriod
.
B
etw
een
effects
panelregressions
of
annualstock
specific
SM
B
fin
factor
loadings.
T
he
factor
loadings
are
first
estim
ated
in
annual
regressions
of
daily
financialstock
returns
on
the
3F
F
factors
w
ithout
financials
and
SM
B
fin.
In
the
second
regression,the
factor
loadings
are
regressed
on
the
logarithm
s
of
the
explanatory
variables.
T
he
coeffi
cients
are
m
ultiplied
by
100,
𝑡-values
are
in
brackets.
N
is
the
num
ber
of
(stock,year)
observations,N
fin
is
the
num
ber
of
different
stocks,com
m
on
equity
and
T
A
(totalassets)
are
in
(logs
of)
m
ln
AC
,leverage
is
the
ratio
of
totalassets
to
com
m
on
equity.
*,**
denotes
significant
at
the
5%
and
1%
level,respectively.
2.6. Extensions to non-financials 31
Another striking feature is that the state of the economy has become
more important since the start of the crisis period. Namely, the coefficient
estimates of real GDP per capita and the debt-to-GDP ratio are both more
than 50% higher since the start of the crisis in 2008, despite the steady growth
in both variables. Again, investors expect more benefits from a safety net
when national economic conditions are less favorable. Thus, compared the
higher default probability in less prosperous economies dominates any doubts
on the reliability of the national safety net, and this dominance has become
stronger since the crisis period.
We added interaction terms to each of the six multivariate regressions
in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 that have only significant coefficients. More
specifically, using three different time periods the interaction term captures
the interaction between standardized common equity and the standardized
employed national economic state variable, either debt-to-GDP or real GDP
per capita. Out of these six regressions, only the pre-crisis regression with
debt-to-GDP ratio (𝑡 = 2.66) as state variable yields a significant interaction
term. The other explanatory variables in this regression have very similar
coefficients and 𝑝-values as in the original regression without an interaction
term.
The significant positive coefficient of the interaction term indicates that
before the crisis, a large size was associated with a less negative slope on the
national debt-to-GDP ratio. That is, a large size had a mitigating impact
on the positive relation between the debt ratio and expected government
guarantees. Since the start of the crisis, this interrelation has disappeared.
That is, debt-to-GDP has become more important for big financials.
The stronger relations in Panel B in Table 2.7 suggest an enhanced effect
of debt-to-GDP and common equity on expected guarantees. The latter
coincides with the results in Section 2.4 where we identified a size effect in
the impact of the crisis. We argued that the crisis raised doubts on the safety
net for big financials in Southern Europe, i.e., the high debt countries. Here,
we find that the positive relation between debt-to-GDP and the measured
government guarantees of big financials is stronger since the crisis, whilst
the mitigating interacting effect through size and the domestic economy has
become weaker.
2.6 Extensions to non-financials
We discuss the effect of our financial risk factor on the whole universe of
European stocks, including non-financials. In doing this, we closely follow
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the approach in Fama and French (2012). Some average returns are poorly
explained in their basic European pricing model. To illustrate the pricing
ability of our factor, we perform similar regressions on the 5 × 5 portfolios
from Kenneth French’ website. The 5× 5 value weighted portfolios contain
equity from 16 European countries.7 The size breakpoints are at the 3rd,
7th, 13th, and 25th quantile, while the breakpoints are at quintiles for B/M
and momentum. As in FF (2012), the sample period runs in this section
from November 1990 to March 2011. If necessary, we convert the returns to
euro denominated returns rather than the dollar denominated returns in FF
(2012), which explains some of the small differences with their results.
2.6.1 Size-B/M portfolios
Panel A in Table 2.8 shows the intercepts and Newey-West 𝑡-values for the 25
size-B/M portfolios on the three-factor model. A value pattern is present in
the portfolios of big stocks. Investing in the big growth (Big, Low)-portfolio
by shorting the big value (Big, High)-portfolio creates a self-financing port-
folio with an expected return of 0.37% (𝑡 = 2.81). Similarly, a size pattern
is in the portfolios of value stocks. Investing in the small value portfolio
by shorting the big value portfolio generates an expected return of 0.46%
(0.21% + 0.26%, 𝑡 = 3.38).
To address time variation in the HML loading of the financials (see Figure
2.2) we exclude financials from the SMB and HML portfolio. The correspond-
ing 3FFNF factors improve the explanatory power of big stocks. Specifically,
Panel B in Table 2.8 shows that the return of the Big HML portfolio has
an expected risk-adjusted return of 0.29% (0.21% + 0.09%, 𝑡 = 1.84). Still,
the value SMB generates a significant expected return, now equal to 0.49%
(0.29% + 0.21%, 𝑡 = 2.76).
The model can neither explain the size pattern in value stocks and the
value pattern in big stocks. We find in Panel C in Table 2.8 that the SMBfin
factor reduces the r-a returns of these two portfolios to an insignificant 0.02%
(0.02%−0.00%, 𝑡 = 0.13) and 0.12% (0.14%−0.02%, 𝑡 = 0.78). In particular
the returns of big stocks are well explained. The returns are insignificant and
there is no value pattern in big stocks. Though there is still a size pattern
in the value stocks, none of the risk-adjusted returns is significant.
Panel D in Table 2.8 shows that the spreads of the extreme portfolios of
big and value stocks are more pronounced when we use the 3FFNF factors
and the momentum factor as regressors. Thus, our SMBfin factor has better
7A detailed description of the data is in Appendix 2.A.
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𝑎 𝑡(𝑎)
Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
Panel A: 3FF
Small -0.30 -0.07 0.01 0.10 0.21 -2.11 -0.68 0.16 1.32 3.08
2 -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 0.07 0.08 -1.36 -1.07 -0.49 1.23 1.34
3 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 0.02 -0.26 -0.18 -0.39 -1.19 0.22
4 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.17 -0.07 0.91 -0.08 -0.06 -1.71 -0.74
Big 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.26 1.52 0.88 0.64 0.02 -2.22
Panel B: 3FFNF
Small -0.15 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.29 -0.98 0.51 1.22 1.70 3.25
2 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.67 1.96 2.23
3 0.09 0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.77 0.66 0.13 -0.54 0.84
4 0.16 0.01 0.01 -0.15 -0.02 1.52 0.10 0.13 -1.67 -0.17
Big 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.21 1.08 -0.14 0.10 -0.05 -1.50
Panel C: 3FFNF + SMBfin
Small -0.38 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 0.14 -3.26 -1.25 -0.35 -0.17 1.81
2 -0.14 -0.11 -0.04 0.06 0.10 -1.52 -1.19 -0.50 0.79 1.45
3 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.10 0.09 -0.40 0.06 -0.45 -0.98 0.88
4 0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.12 0.04 0.85 -0.41 -0.09 -1.34 0.38
Big 0.00 -0.06 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.04 -0.96 0.22 1.54 0.16
Panel D: 3FFNF + WML
Small -0.26 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.23 -1.74 0.05 0.98 1.04 2.40
2 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.10 -0.62 0.60 0.05 1.13 1.25
3 0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 0.09 0.42 -0.04 -0.36 -0.84 0.90
4 0.18 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.01 1.57 0.01 0.21 -0.81 0.07
Big 0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.00 1.46 -0.66 -0.20 0.29 0.02
Panel E: 3FFNF+ SMBfin + WML
Small -0.39 -0.10 0.00 0.01 0.14 -3.46 -1.08 0.02 0.06 1.80
2 -0.15 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.07 -1.48 -0.30 -0.60 0.53 0.96
3 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.11 0.09 -0.21 -0.31 -0.66 -1.08 0.92
4 0.13 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.04 1.27 -0.32 0.05 -0.72 0.36
Big 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 0.11 0.12 0.78 -1.08 -0.08 1.19 0.88
Table 2.8: (Size, B/M)-portfolios.
(Size, B/M)-portfolios in different pricing models, the left panel contains the intercepts,
the right panel NW 𝑡-values.
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pricing abilities for big and value portfolios compared with the momentum
factor. Panel E reports regressions with the 3FFNF factor model augmented
with a momentum factor and our financial risk factor. The risk-adjusted
returns are on average comparable with the models in Panel C and Panel
D. Nevertheless, the size and value patterns are non-existent in this model.
To summarize, our financial risk factor improves upon the momentum factor
in explaining the value pattern in big stocks, and the size pattern in value
stocks. Moreover, it has a clear economic interpretation. The poorly ex-
plained returns of tiny stocks could be explained by liquidity issues. Other
explanations involve time variation in risk loadings, nonlinearities or other
misspecifications for tiny stocks.
2.6.2 Size-momentum portfolios
Panel A in Table 2.9 shows the intercepts and Newey-West 𝑡-values of the
5 × 5 size-momentum portfolios on the three-factor model. The portfolio
formation on momentum controls for annual changes in momentum. As
it does not control for the substantial time variation in HML loadings, we
observe a large magnitude of the r-a returns. Removing the financials from
the SMB and HML portfolio reduces most pricing errors somewhat, though
most pricing errors are still significant (details are available upon request).
In Panel B in Table 2.9 we add our SMBfin factor to the 3FFNF factors.
The regression results show that the pricing of the winner and loser portfolios
improve. This suggests that our SMBfin factor explains the anomaly to some
extent. In addition, none of the portfolios with big firms earns a significant
risk-adjusted return and the spread in big firms decreases substantially. This
confirms the result in Table 2.8 that the SMBfin factor is good at explaining
returns of big stocks. Nonetheless, the bias in the pricing of the loser and
winner portfolios is smaller with a momentum factor instead of the SMBfin
factor (Panel B and C in Table 2.9). Remarkably, including the momentum
factor reverses the momentum pattern in big stocks as shown in Panel C in
Table 2.9. Referring to Panel B and Panel C, our price factor reduces the
momentum pattern in big stocks and the size pattern in loser and winner
stocks. That being said, the spreads are still a significant 0.58%, 0.57% and
0.94%, respectively. Furthermore, the momentum factor does a better job
in terms of a smaller average pricing error.
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𝑎 𝑡(𝑎)
L 2 3 4 W L 2 3 4 W
Panel A: 3FF
Small -0.96 -0.20 0.04 0.59 1.39 -5.50 -1.80 0.48 5.74 5.40
2 -0.98 -0.30 0.05 0.33 1.04 -4.65 -3.14 0.69 3.58 6.10
3 -0.66 -0.31 -0.02 0.23 0.67 -3.23 -3.15 -0.20 2.24 3.90
4 -0.66 -0.20 -0.02 0.22 0.66 -2.91 -1.80 -0.18 2.02 4.29
Big -0.63 -0.25 0.08 0.21 0.49 -3.05 -2.23 1.29 2.06 2.26
Panel B: 3FFNF + SMBfin
Small -0.87 -0.23 -0.02 0.46 1.22 -4.32 -2.13 -0.24 4.71 4.58
2 -0.73 -0.25 0.01 0.24 0.94 -3.03 -2.38 0.18 2.43 4.86
3 -0.44 -0.21 0.00 0.16 0.59 -1.96 -1.85 0.03 1.66 3.06
4 -0.38 -0.11 0.02 0.17 0.50 -1.52 -0.96 0.19 1.51 2.96
Big -0.30 -0.11 0.08 0.08 0.28 -1.27 -0.83 1.15 0.74 1.33
Panel C: 3FFNF + WML
Small -0.24 0.04 0.07 0.42 0.94 -1.94 0.33 0.67 3.68 4.62
2 -0.12 0.01 0.11 0.15 0.58 -1.13 0.06 1.25 1.56 4.28
3 0.19 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.11 1.44 0.31 0.44 -0.16 0.72
4 0.25 0.15 0.02 -0.04 0.04 2.04 1.88 0.17 -0.39 0.31
Big 0.38 0.13 0.04 -0.25 -0.33 3.09 1.06 0.44 -3.05 -2.31
Table 2.9: (Size, Mom)-portfolios.
(Size, Mom)-portfolios in different pricing models, the left panel contains intercepts, the
right panel NW 𝑡-values. L and W refer to Loser and Winner portfolio, respectively.
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2.6.3 Model evaluation
Following Fama and French (2012), Table 2.10 reports the pricing errors
with the 𝐹 -test of Gibbons et al. (GRS 1989) and statistics of the regres-
sion intercepts that help us interpret the GRS test. The additional statistics
include the average absolute intercept |𝑎| of the 25 regressions, the aver-
age of the 25 regression adjusted 𝑅2, the average of the standard errors
𝑠(𝑎) of the intercepts, and SR(𝑎) which is loosely speaking a Sharp ratio:
SR(𝑎) = (𝑎𝑇𝑆−1𝑎)1/2 where 𝑎 is the column vector of the 25 regression in-
tercepts produced by a model when applied to the 25 portfolios, and 𝑆 is
the covariance matrix of regression residuals.
The absolute intercept |𝑎| and 𝑠(𝑎) represent the magnitude and the
precision of the intercepts, respectively. The SR(𝑎) statistic aims to correct
the magnitude of the intercepts by their precision. It is the core of the GRS
statistic and recommended in Lewellen et al. (2010). GRS (1989) show that
this statistic is the maximum Sharpe ratio for excess returns on portfolios of
the LHS assets constructed to have zero slopes on the RHS returns.
The GRS test cannot reject any of the four considered (Size, B/M)-
models. The model with financials in the 3FF factors and our SMBfin factor
outperforms the other models in terms of the GRS statistic. Accordingly,
removing the financials from the SMB and HML factors only improves on
the pricing of financials (Table 2.4) and big stocks (Panel B in Table 2.8).
Obviously, portfolios with big stocks contain more financials.
However, any time variation in the HML loading of the explained LHS
portfolios remains unaddressed in these setups. This is problematic as we find
large tilts in HML loadings of big financials. Indeed, pricing errors are large
in this static model with constant factor loadings. As a consequence, the
GRS test rejects all models with (Size, Mom)-portfolios. This indicates that
time variation in HML loadings is a key property of stock returns because the
(Size, Mom)-portfolios do not control for time variation of loadings along the
HML dimension. Noteworthy, by controlling for momentum, the momentum
factor has superior explanatory power compared to the SMBfin factor.
In summary, our SMBfin factor improves on the pricing of financials,
and the pricing of big and value stocks of stock portfolios that include non-
financials. The removal of financials from the 3FF factors tends to increase
average pricing errors of other stock portfolios. The pricing of momentum
portfolios is poor, which we explain by the lack of control for time variation
in HML loadings.
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2.7 Conclusion
Our study shows that big financials in Europe have significantly lower risk-
adjusted returns than other European financials. This pattern is not ob-
served in any other industry. Since government guarantees, either explicitly
or implicitly, protect shareholders of big financials from tail events, we con-
jecture that the lower returns of big financials are similar to an insurance
premium. The higher observed volatility of big financials is in line with
a moral hazard explanation where the safety net induces big financials to
invest in more risky assets.
Our size-dependent financial risk factor measures potential tail risk in
the financial industry, and thereby the resulting protection from government
guarantees. In contrast to the standard SMB risk factor in the 3FF model,
our financial SMB risk factor can explain the size pattern in European fi-
nancial stocks. In addition, this factor captures some of the time variation
in HML loadings of financials.
In a model with our financial risk factor and the 3FF factors without
financials, we find that particularly big financials in Southern Europe were
much more distressed after the start of the European debt crisis in late
2009. This suggests that the crisis increased doubts on the safety net for big
financials in Southern Europe. The expected guarantee, as indicated by the
financial risk factor loading, increases in the size of financials as measured by
common equity. Interbank lending raised the expected guarantee only before
the crisis, afterwards government securities are a significant determinant.
The unconditional expected guarantee decreases in the state of the national
economy. This suggests that the state of the domestic economy has more
impact on default probabilities than on bailout probabilities.
Removing financials from the 3FF factors explains some mispricing of
portfolios with big stocks by the presence of financials. Still, we need to
control for tilts in the HML loading. Our factor captures this time variation
and is able to explain some of the anomalies in the European model in
Fama and French (2012). Though the momentum portfolio partly captures
the guarantee in an indirect way, our factor explains the anomalies more
intuitively. Our factor is particularly successful in pricing financials, big
stocks, and value stocks.
Appendix
2.A Descriptives
Table 2.11 reports for each country the number of stocks by industry cate-
gory. The largest number of stocks are traded in the United Kingdom (UK).
France (FRA), Germany (DEU) and Sweden (SWE) follow. The order for
financial stocks is UK, Germany, Italy (ITA) and France.
Descriptive statistics of several risk factors are in Table 2.12. The excess
market returns are positive though insignificant. Following FF (2012) and
the U.S. results of FF (1993) and Zeng et al. (2014), we find no size premium.
The average SMB return is also close to zero for growth (time-varying bottom
30% B/M) and value (time-varying top 30% B/M) stocks. As argued in FF
(1993), a small size premium does not mean that the size risk factor is
irrelevant in asset pricing tests. The substantial volatility makes this risk
factor a good candidate to predict patterns in the cross-section of average
returns.
The return on the HML portfolio has a monthly return of 0.38% per
month (𝑡 = 1.78). As in FF (2012) and in the U.S. results of FF (1993), and
Loughran (1997), value premiums are higher for small stocks (bottom 10%
market cap). Like FF (2012) and Asness et al. (2013), we find a significant
momentum return WML, in our case 0.94% (𝑡 = 3.20). There is also size de-
pendence in momentum returns. Small stocks have a significant momentum
return, whilst big stocks (top 90% market cap) have not. An explanation is
that liquidity has a positive relation with size and a negative relation with
momentum.
The correlation matrix in Table 2.13 shows that higher excess market
returns are associated with a higher return on big stocks than on small
stocks. A straightforward explanation is that RM is a value-weighted return.
The momentum return tends to be higher when the excess market return
and the value premium are lower. That is, monthly returns exhibit more
autocorrelation during periods of distress.
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AUT 16 54 32 1 14 2 3 34 6 2 164
BEL 24 53 33 18 29 2 9 50 31 1 250
CHE 23 130 60 48 56 1 21 100 29 3 471
DEN 7 104 59 25 31 3 6 78 23 3 339
DEU 81 263 162 66 131 22 36 206 213 48 1,228
ESP 26 45 30 10 33 4 18 38 5 7 216
FIN 18 66 28 11 32 6 2 23 30 2 218
FRA 61 332 245 81 240 21 25 145 226 28 1,404
GRE 42 92 119 12 62 4 6 42 41 3 423
IRL 10 18 20 5 17 3 1 13 6 6 99
ITA 35 151 109 17 63 18 31 147 32 9 612
NLD 15 85 41 9 33 7 1 25 38 9 263
NOR 24 133 44 17 34 4 4 53 54 106 473
POR 16 34 22 1 28 5 3 25 5 1 140
SWE 52 240 79 86 87 13 11 74 119 22 783
UK 302 953 383 228 802 63 69 468 391 213 3,872
Total 752 2,753 1,466 635 1,692 178 246 1,521 1,249 463 10,955
Table 2.11: Descriptive statistics by country and by industry.
Number of stocks for each of the 16 countries and for each of the 10 Datastream ICB
industries.
2.A. Descriptives 41
mean (%) std (%) N-W 𝑡-stat
RM–RF 0.38 4.52 1.12
SMB -0.07 2.31 -0.50
SMBG -0.18 2.91 -1.00
SMBV 0.09 2.71 0.60
HML 0.38 2.45 1.78
HMLS 0.52 2.73 2.03
HMLB 0.25 2.98 1.17
WML 0.94 4.20 3.20
WMLS 1.36 3.88 4.66
WMLB 0.52 4.95 1.62
Table 2.12: Descriptive statistics of several risk factors.
RM–RF is the market return in excess of the risk-free rate, SMB is the return of the
small minus big portfolio, HML is the return of the high minus low book-to-market
portfolio, and WML is the return of the winner minus loser portfolio. The subscripts G,
V, S and B denote growth, value, small and big, respectively. Returns are on a monthly
basis.
correlation
RM–RF SMB HML
SMB -0.22**
HML 0.09 -0.08
WML -0.32** 0.08 -0.29**
Table 2.13: Correlations.
Correlation coefficients of some risk factors in Table 2.12.
*, ** = significant at 5%, 1%.
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2.B Proof equivalence
We show that the 𝑡-statistic on the significance of the mean difference be-
tween the risk-adjusted returns in Table 2.1 and Table 2.3 (or Table 2.5) is
identical for all return series 𝑦.
Let 1 and 𝐼 denote an all-ones vector and the identity matrix, respec-
tively, both of appropriate dimension. The matrices 𝑋 =
[︀
1 𝑋𝐹𝐹
]︀
, and
?˜? =
[︀
1 𝑋𝐹𝐹 𝑣
]︀
represent the nonsingular regression matrices of Table
2.1 and Table 2.3, respectively. Decompose the return series 𝑦 into three
components:
𝑦 = 𝑃𝑃𝑦 + (𝐼 − 𝑃 )𝑃𝑦 +
(︁
𝐼 − 𝑃
)︁
𝑦
where 𝑃 = 𝑋
(︀
𝑋𝑇𝑋
)︀−1
𝑋𝑇 and 𝑃 = ?˜?
(︁
?˜?𝑇 ?˜?
)︁−1
?˜?𝑇 are the projection
matrices on 𝑊 = Span(𝑋) and ?˜? = Span
(︁
?˜?
)︁
, respectively. Because
𝑊 ⊆ ?˜? , we have for the first component of 𝑦,
𝑦𝐴 := 𝑃𝑃𝑦 = 𝑃𝑦 ∈𝑊
For the second component, it follows that
𝑦𝐵 := (𝐼 − 𝑃 )𝑃𝑦 = (𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑦 ∈𝑊⊥ ∩ ?˜?
Using dim
(︁
𝑊⊥
⋂︀
?˜?
)︁
= 1 gives 𝑦𝐵 = 𝜆𝑦(𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑣 with coefficient
𝜆𝑦 =
𝑦𝑇 (𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑇 (𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑣⃒⃒⃒
𝑦𝑇 (𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑇 (𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑣
⃒⃒⃒
⃦⃦⃦
(𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑦
⃦⃦⃦
⃦⃦⃦
(𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑣
⃦⃦⃦ = 𝑦𝑇 (𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑣⃒⃒⃒
𝑦𝑇 (𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑣
⃒⃒⃒√︃𝑦𝑇 (𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑦
𝑣𝑇 (𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑣 .
The first and second term ensure that 𝜆𝑦 has the correct sign, and the correct
length, respectively. For the third component of 𝑦,
𝑦𝐶 := (𝐼 − 𝑃 )𝑦 ∈ ?˜?⊥ ⊆𝑊⊥
thus
𝑋𝑇 𝑦𝐶 = ?˜?
𝑇 𝑦𝐶 = 0 (2.2)
Define
𝑋(0) =
[︀
0 𝑋𝐹𝐹
]︀
𝑄 = 𝑋(0)
(︀
𝑋𝑇𝑋
)︀−1
𝑋𝑇 𝑅 = 𝑄− ?˜?
?˜?(0) =
[︀
0 𝑋𝐹𝐹 𝑣
]︀
?˜?= ?˜?(0)
(︁
?˜?𝑇 ?˜?
)︁−1
?˜?𝑇
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The risk-adjusted return is the intercept plus the unexplained return. In
other words, the risk-adjusted return is the return minus the correction for
risk. This correction is the projection on 𝑋 and ?˜? exclusive the projection
on the intercept term. That is, 𝑒 = (𝐼 − 𝑄)𝑦 for the risk-adjusted returns
in Table 2.1 and 𝑒 = (𝐼 − ?˜?)𝑦 for the risk-adjusted returns in Table 2.3 (or
Table 2.5). Consequently, the series of differences in risk-adjusted returns
equals 𝑑 := 𝑒− 𝑒 = 𝑅𝑦.
Since ?˜? =
[︀
𝑋 𝑣
]︀
and (?˜?𝑇 ?˜?)−1?˜?𝑇
[︀
𝑋 𝑣
]︀
= (?˜?𝑇 ?˜?)−1?˜?𝑇 ?˜? = 𝐼,
(?˜?𝑇 ?˜?)−1?˜?𝑇𝑋 =
[︀
𝐼 0
]︀𝑇
𝑋𝑇 ?˜?(?˜?𝑇 ?˜?)−1 =
[︀
𝐼 0
]︀
where 0 is a zero vector of appropriate dimension. This implies that the
columns in 𝑋 are orthogonal to the rows of 𝑅:
𝑅𝑋 = (𝑄− ?˜?)𝑋 = 𝑋(0) − ?˜?(0)
(︁
?˜?𝑇 ?˜?
)︁−1
?˜?𝑇𝑋 = 𝑋(0) − ?˜?(0)
[︀
𝐼 0
]︀𝑇
= 0
It now follows from 𝑦𝐴 ∈𝑊 that 𝑅𝑦𝐴 = 0. By (2.2), 𝑄𝑦𝐶 = ?˜?𝑦𝐶 = 0 holds
such that 𝑅𝑦𝐶 = (𝑄− ?˜?)𝑦𝐶 = 0. Using
𝑄𝑃 = 𝑋(0)
(︀
𝑋𝑇𝑋
)︀−1
𝑋𝑇𝑋
(︀
𝑋𝑇𝑋
)︀−1
𝑋𝑇 = 𝑄
𝑄𝑃 = 𝑋(0)
(︀
𝑋𝑇𝑋
)︀−1
𝑋𝑇 ?˜?
(︁
?˜?𝑇 ?˜?
)︁−1
?˜?𝑇 = 𝑄
?˜?𝑃 = ?˜?(0)
(︁
?˜?𝑇 ?˜?
)︁−1
?˜?𝑇𝑋
(︀
𝑋𝑇𝑋
)︀−1
𝑋𝑇 = ?˜?(0)
[︀
𝐼 0
]︀𝑇 (︀
𝑋𝑇𝑋
)︀−1
𝑋𝑇 = 𝑄
?˜?𝑃 = ?˜?(0)
(︁
?˜?𝑇 ?˜?
)︁−1
?˜?𝑇 ?˜?
(︁
?˜?𝑇 ?˜?
)︁−1
?˜?𝑇 = ?˜?
we obtain
𝑅(𝑃 − 𝑃 ) = (𝑄− ?˜?)(𝑃 − 𝑃 ) = 𝑄− ?˜? = 𝑅
Combining the previous results gives
𝑑 = 𝑅𝑦 = 𝑅𝑦𝐵 = 𝜆𝑦𝑅(𝑃 − 𝑃 )𝑣 = 𝜆𝑦𝑅𝑣,
which means that 𝜆𝑦 is a linear scalar for the mean of the elements of 𝑑 as
well as for the standard deviation of 𝑑. Hence, the 𝑡-statistic of 𝑑 does not
depend on 𝜆𝑦 and so the return series 𝑦. Instead, it is a measure for the
excess return series 𝑅𝑣 of the additional regressor 𝑣 in ?˜?.
We have proved our result when risk-adjusted returns include an intercept
term, just as in our research. It is straightforward to extend this result to a
more general setting by replacing the regressor 1 in 𝑋 and ?˜? by an arbitrary
(possibly empty) set of linearly independent regressors.

Chapter 3
Tail dependence:
A cross-industry comparison
Joint work with Michiel Bijlsma.
This Chapter is published as S.Muns and M.Bijlsma (2015), Tail Depen-
dence: A Cross-Industry Comparison, Journal of Portfolio Management 41,
volume 3, pp.109–116,
c○ Institutional Investor Journals, doi:10.3905/jpm.2015.41.3.109.
3.1 Introduction
Traditional risk management practices typically assume that stock returns
follow a normal distribution and that dependencies are constant over the
business cycle. This approach underestimates both the frequency and the
severity of a downturn and also underestimates the dependencies during a
downturn. A measure of tail dependence helps investors stress-test their
portfolios and adjust their positions to reduce their tail risk exposure.
Investors often allocate resources to different industries and select stocks
within each industry based on some risk-return preference. This motivates us
to analyze tail dependence within the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries.1
Our analysis shows substantial cross-industry differences in diversification
benefits of tail risks. We identify determinants of tail risk, and provide
empirical evidence that historical tail dependence helps investors to predict
which industries exhibit most tail dependence.
Our tail dependence measure is based on Hartmann et al. (2004), Poon
et al. (2004) and Segoviano and Goodhart (2009). Roughly speaking, it is
1The seven smallest industries are too small, and we omit the industry with unclassified
firms.
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the number of simultaneous tail returns within a particular industry used
in other studies. As such, it indicates the extent to which within-industry
diversification does not reduce tail risk.
This measure has some advantages over other measures of tail risk. It is
straightforward to calculate as it is constructed by setting a stock specific
threshold equal to the stock’s daily Value-at-Risk (VaR) and then simply
counting the number of stocks with returns exceeding the VaR. We believe
this measure is more intuitive than alternatives such as principal component
decompositions or copulas. In addition, our measure looks solely at tail
dependence, whereas other measures are also affected by regular non-tail
dependencies.
Our work relates most directly to papers that focus on systemic risk in
different industries.2 Bühler and Prokopczuk (2010) compare systemic risk
in twelve industries by estimating a copula that allows for tail dependence
using the stock prices of the five most important firms within each industry.
In their article, they define tail dependence as the probability that these
five firms simultaneously have a tail return. Their results suggest that tail
dependence is significantly larger in the banking industry. Kinlaw et al.
(2012) compare systemic risk in ten industries with a principal components
approach. They find that firms in finance, energy and technology have the
most systemic risk.
Our research extends on the existing literature in a number of ways. First,
we compare tail dependence across industries with a relatively simple and
intuitive measure. Second, we assess more industries and use a larger sample
of firms in each industry. This detects tail dependence that might be missed
for more broadly defined industries. Third, we analyze the determinants of
tail dependence in a panel regression. Fourth, we measure tail dependence in
residual returns from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). This measure
is of particular relevance for an investor hedging his exposure to the market.
Finally, we study time variation in tail dependence by using annual samples.
Though the industry ranking varies over time, we find that the banking
and petroleum & natural gas (oil) industries exhibit the highest level of tail
dependence. Utilities, financial trading and insurance show somewhat less
tail dependence than banking and oil, but more than other industries. We
document an overall increase in tail dependence, which implies that hedging
tail risk has become more important. Fortunately, the shared exposure to
the market return explains an increasing part of this tail dependence. This
2De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) and Kritzman et al. (2011) provide a more general
overview of the literature on systemic risk.
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makes hedging the market return a more effective strategy. We also find that
this year’s tail dependence is a significant predictor for the next year’s tail
dependence.
Our results on the determinants of tail dependence suggest that an in-
vestor targeting some VaR needs a more diversified portfolio for industries
where firms have (𝑖) a large market beta (i.e. electronic equipment, ma-
chinery), (𝑖𝑖) a large market cap (banks, oil) or (𝑖𝑖𝑖) less volatility (utils,
financials). Alternatively, we could interpret our results as indicating which
industries have a higher VaR because it is more costly to reduce tail risk
through diversification.
3.2 Methodology
We measure tail dependence of a portfolio of selected stocks by the expected
fraction of additional failing firms in the portfolio given that at least one
firm fails (EAF ):
EAF := 𝐸
[︂
𝜅− 1
𝑛0 − 1
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜅 ≥ 1
]︂
=
∑︀
𝑡∈𝜏
([#selected firms that fail in period 𝑡]− 1)
(𝑛0 − 1) |𝜏 |
(3.1)
where 𝜅 represents the number of failing firms, 𝑛0 is the number of firms
considered in each period, 𝜏 is the set of periods where at least one selected
firm fails, and |𝜏 | is the number of periods in this set. We define firm 𝑖
to be a failing firm when its daily stock return 𝑅𝑖 is below some negative
threshold level 𝑞𝑖. For a given percentage 𝑝, the threshold level is the 𝑝%
lower quantile of daily stock returns of firm 𝑖. Thus, for 𝑝 = 2%, a firm’s
return is below its failure level for approximately five days per year. We
measure EAF by computing the mean additional fraction of selected firms
that fail in the periods where at least one selected firm failed and will often
express it as a percentage rather than as a fraction.
Our measure is closely related to the fragility index proposed in Huang
(1992), and applied in Hartmann et al. (2004), Poon et al. (2004), De Vries
(2005) and Segoviano and Goodhart (2009), defined as the expected number
of failing firms given that at least one firm is failing. EAF is a transformation
of the fragility index such that it is always between zero and one.
We select the 20 largest firms in each industry. It is appropriate to focus
on tail dependence of large stocks because failures of larger firms have a
larger impact on the real economy. A measure that includes all stocks would
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be biased towards the characteristics of the smaller, less liquid, stocks. For
each day we select the largest 20 firms in an industry as measured by market
capitalization to mitigate potential distortions due to a varying number of
firms and survivorship bias. This improves upon the common approach in
the literature where a fixed set of firms is considered.3 We use the market
capitalization with a lag of one day because a firm’s market capitalization
based on the closing price is affected by an extreme negative return on that
day, which may exclude some extreme negative returns.
To identify determinants of tail risk, we calculate EAF in two different
ways, which differ in the returns used for identifying tail events. Our first
measure, the baseline EAF , uses stock returns.
It turns out that market risk contributes to tail dependence. For this
reason, in our second tail risk measure, EAFres, we use abnormal returns for
each firm 𝑖, instead of stock returns to determine tail events. More specif-
ically, we use the expected number of simultaneous abnormal tail returns.
The abnormal returns are defined as the residuals of the well-known CAPM
regression
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. (3.2)
Here, 𝛽𝑖,𝑡 captures the correlation of stock returns 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 with the market
return 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 and 𝛼𝑖 captures firm-specific omitted variables. The residuals
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 filter out tail events unrelated with the market. An abnormal tail return
is a tail return below the stock specific 𝑝% quantile of abnormal returns. We
use monthly values for 𝛽𝑖 by estimating market sensitivity over a five year
rolling window. Each time window provides the beta for each firm 𝑖 for the
next month. The difference DIF = EAF − EAFres measures the impact of
the market return on tail dependence.
3.3 Data
We employ U.S. equity data and the value-weighted market index from the
Center for Research for Security Prices (CRSP) over the period 1988-2011.4
We classify the securities according to the 48 industries used in Fama and
French (1997). We drop the industry with unclassified firms, plus seven
industries that have less than 20 securities for at least one period.5 This
3Our results are robust to using a constant sample of the twenty largest firms listed
over the sample period.
4The returns for the period 1988-1992 are only used to estimate the betas for the first
years of the sample 1993-2011.
5The neglected industries are agriculture, candy & soda, tobacco products, shipbuild-
ing & railroad equipment, defense, coal, and shipping containers.
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leaves 40 industries.
Panel A on the left in Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the
daily stock returns of these industries, sorted by their mean pair-wise cor-
relation 𝜌20. This correlation is largest in the banking industry (Banks),
followed by the petroleum & natural gas (Oil), utilities (Util), financial trad-
ing (FinTr), and insurance industry (Insur). These five industries tend to
have a smaller-than-average variance 𝜎2, indicating lower idiosyncratic risk.
In each industry, the average return is small and positive. Skewness 𝛾 is
present in many industries and is particularly negative in the petroleum &
natural gas industry.
The cross-sectional mean 𝛽 measures the correlation with the market
and partly captures exposure to macro-economic shocks and indirect expo-
sure due to feedback effects involving the real economy. The five industries
with a high intra-industry correlation have a relatively low correlation with
the market. Their 𝛽 is comparable with non-cyclical industries such as food
products (Food), precious metals (Gold) and beer & liquor (Beer). Compar-
ing 𝛽20 and 𝛽, we see that the twenty largest firms are often more sensitive
to the market return than the average firm. This is intuitive as larger firms
tend to be less locally oriented than their smaller counterparts.
The market sensitivity is much larger for the large financials (see 𝛽20).
Still, the twenty largest banks, insurers and financial traders are less sensi-
tive to the market return than many other industries, including the cyclical
industries for business services (BusSv), computers (Comps), and electronic
and electrical equipment (Chips and ElcEq). This suggests that the larger
correlation 𝜌20 is not explained by a larger exposure to the market return.
The size of the twenty largest banks (𝑀𝐶20) exceeds the industry average
(𝑀𝐶) by a larger multiple than in any other industry. One explanation here
is the larger number of firms in the banking industry. The time-varying
sample of the twenty largest firms tends to be more stable over time for
industries where the largest firms are less sensitive to the market return. For
instance, only 33 firms in the non-cyclical beer & liquor industry are in the
top 20 largest firms for at least one day, while this number is 112 for the
cyclical business services industry.
3.4 Results
In this section, we present and discuss our results. First, we measure tail
dependence for each industry and show that it provides additional informa-
tion to investors over straightforward correlation measures. Subsequently,
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we identify some determinants of this tail dependence. We then consider
how tail dependence and the ranking of industries evolve over time. This
highlights the need to continuously update tail risk mitigation strategies.
Subsequently, we study out-of-sample predictions to analyze the forward-
looking nature of our tail dependence measure. Finally, we focus on the five
industries with highest tail dependence to further study the effects of the
market return and time variation.
Panel B in Table 3.1 presents our tail dependence measure for each indus-
try and several threshold levels. For failure levels above 0.1%, the ranking of
the top five sectoral EAF from high to low is: banking, oil, utilities, financial
trading, and insurance. The ranking of these five industries is the same if 𝑝
is 0.5%. At this 0.5% VaR level, we find that on average 9.8% of the other 19
large banks fail on that particular day given that at least one bank is failing.
For the oil industry, this number is 9.2%, for utilities 6.6%, for financial trad-
ing 6.5%, and for insurance 5.6%. For small failure probabilities (high loss
thresholds) tail dependence in the banking and oil industry is substantially
larger than in other industries, suggesting that the most extreme returns are
more systemic and thus harder to reduce by diversification.
The ranking of tail dependence across industries is roughly the same as
the ranking in mean correlation coefficients 𝜌20. In other words, industries
where individual stocks are highly correlated are also industries with larger
tail dependence. The rank correlation between the two dependence measures
exceeds 0.75. Intuitively, the relation between 𝜌20 and EAF is more linear
for large values of 𝑝 (small loss thresholds) as our tail measure is then less
focused on the tail.
For small 𝑝, however, although the ranking of the top five industries
with high tail dependence remains the same, the relation between mean
correlation 𝜌20 and tail dependence EAF becomes nonlinear, as illustrated in
Figure 3.1. At a high correlation, a small increase in correlation is associated
with a large increase in tail dependence. This suggests that amplification
effects may play a role. The mean pairwise correlation coefficient misses the
nonlinear increase in tail dependence because it does not focus on the tail.
Notably, the mean industry beta of the top 20 firms is insignificantly related
to EAF in Table 3.1. Nevertheless, after controlling for other factors, we
show that 𝛽 does explain tail dependence.
An important step in mitigating tail risk is to identify some of the de-
terminants of tail risk. We relate our tail dependence measure to the log of
market capitalization, log volatility, and the market beta. Here, we define a
tail event as the three smallest returns in each year for each stock (𝑝 = 1.2%).
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Figure 3.1: Correlation and tail dependence
EAF for the failure probabilities 𝑝 = 0.1%, 0.5%, 10%. Data is from Table 3.1.
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We estimate a fixed-effects panel with annual periods (𝑃 -values in brackets,
and 𝑅2 = 0.70)
log(EAFi(𝑡)) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 0.11
(0.0%)
log(MVi(𝑡))− 0.84
(0.0%)
log(𝜎𝑖(𝑡)) + 0.51
(0.0%)
𝛽𝑖(𝑡)
(3.3)
where EAFi(𝑡) corresponds to industry 𝑖 in year 𝑡, the variables are annual
averages of the largest 20 firms in each industry, and 𝛽𝑖(𝑡) is estimated in
an instrumental variable panel regression up to a one year lag to account for
estimation error in 𝛽𝑖(𝑡).
We find a significant positive coefficient for market cap. An explanation
may be that a larger market cap makes firms less locally oriented, and so
increases the overlap of tail exposures. We find a significant negative corre-
lation for the stock volatility. This is intuitive, as a higher volatility implies
more idiosyncratic risk, less dependence with other firms, and hence less
joint tail risk. We also find a positive significant correlation for beta. This is
reasonable, because a larger beta implies more shared dependence with the
overall economy. Note that the significance of beta conflicts with our obser-
vation from Table 3.1 that the market beta and our tail dependence measure
are unrelated. Apparently, the market beta becomes significantly related
to tail dependence when controlling for market cap and volatility in annual
samples. Figure 3.2 shows the time dummies 𝛾𝑡 in (3.3). The increasing
pattern indicates that within industry tail dependence has increased since
the financial crisis.
In order to determine whether the level of tail dependence provides in-
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Figure 3.2: Time variation in tail dependence
Time dummies 𝛾𝑡 in (3.3).
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formation to investors on future levels of tail dependence, we estimate the
following fixed effects model in a first-difference GMM setup (Arellano and
Bond (1991) robust 𝑃 -value)
log(EAFi(𝑡)) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 0.18
(2.9%)
log(EAFi(𝑡− 1)) (3.4)
The coefficient implies that EAFi(𝑡) increases with a significant 0.2% if
EAFi(𝑡 − 1) increases with 1%. We thus find that EAF of the previous
year helps investors in estimating current year’s EAF .
As an extra step towards identifying the determinants of tail dependence,
we compare tail dependence using simple returns and abnormal returns from
the CAPM (3.2). Because we are mostly interested in industries that exhibit
high levels of tail dependence, we focus on the top five industries banking,
oil, utilities, financial trading and insurance which have most within industry
tail dependence.
The graph on the left hand in Figure 3.3 shows EAF as a function of the
firm-specific probability of an extreme negative return, 𝑝. We determine the
tail events by considering the whole sample period with 𝑝 from 0.1% to 10%
percent. As the failure probability 𝑝 decreases, we focus on more extreme
events and we zoom in on tail dependence. At the same time, the sampling
variance increases when observed events are more scarce.
The graph in the middle of Figure 3.3 shows EAF res, which is our tail
dependence measure when using abnormal CAPM returns. In the right hand
graph, the difference in the dependence measures, DIF , indicates that the
market return explains a substantial part of the EAF in the left hand graph.
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Figure 3.3: EAF
EAF for simple returns (left), abnormal CAPM returns (middle), and the difference be-
tween the two measures (right). The sample period is 1993-2011.
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The size of the correction differs per industry and is largest for the three
financial industries, which indicates that aggregate economic shocks explain
a large fraction of tail dependence within these industries.
To assess whether differences between the industries in the left hand
graph in Figure 3.3 are significant, we performed a bootstrap exercise. De-
tails are in the appendix. We find the following ordering in the case of simple
returns
EAF (Banks) ' EAF (Oil) > EAF (Util) ' EAF (FinTr) ' EAF (Insur)
The symbol ' denotes insignificantly larger than. The large tail dependence
in the banking and oil industry suggests that tail risk of common risk factors
(such as the market return, changes in the interest rate and changes in the oil
price), or common heteroskedasticity plays a larger role in both industries.
In unreported results, we find that daily changes in the oil price cannot
explain EAF (Oil).
The tail dependence is significantly lower for the abnormal returns than
for the simple returns in all five industries. An investor who hedges his
exposure to the market return therefore decreases his tail risk substantially.
Differences remain, however, between the industries for the abnormal CAPM
returns:
EAF (Oil)res ' EAF (Util)res ' EAF (Banks)res > EAF (Insur)res ' EAF (FinTr)res
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Though not implied by the inequalities, the oil industry and the banking
industry do differ significantly from each other. Thus we see the results in
Figure 3.3 confirmed by our bootstrap analysis.
A similar bootstrap procedure on DIF indicates that the industry-specific
decline based on abnormal returns is larger for the three financial industries:
DIF (FinTr) ' DIF (Banks) ' DIF (Insur) ' DIF (Oil) ' DIF (Util)
This ordering is in line with the betas 𝛽20 in Table 3.1. Compared to the
oil and utilities industry, tail dependence in the financial sector is highly
associated with shocks in the market index, and is hence harder to diversify
by investing in other industries.
To study how our measure of tail-dependence in the top five industries
evolves over time, we use annual windows with 3 tail observations per stock
in each year (𝑝 = 1.2%). The top graph in Figure 3.4 confirms the results in
Figure 3.2 which indicated that tail dependence varies over time. In addition,
the order of the top five industries varies over time. The oil sector exhibits
most tail dependence during the most recent half of our sample, which is in
line with Kinlaw et al. (2012). The spikes in 2008 and 2011 suggest that
shocks to firms in the oil industry are highly concentrated and occur on only
a few days. The market faced a downturn at the same days as DIF shows
similar spikes (see bottom graph).
Figure 3.4: Tail dependence over time
Tail dependence measures for annual EAF (top), EAFres (middle), and DIF (bottom).
Failure level 𝑝 = 1.2%, legend is in Figure 3.3.
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In general, the increasing pattern of DIF in Figure 3.4 suggests that the
increase in tail dependence over time is mainly attributable to a larger effect
of the market return on tail dependence. That is, reducing within industry
tail risk by hedging the market exposure has become more effective.
3.5 Conclusion
We measured downward tail dependence in the 48 Fama and French (1997)
industries. Our measure for tail dependence is the average fraction of firms
within an industry that experience an extreme negative return given that at
least one firm in that industry experiences such a return on that day. Our
analysis is based on a time-varying panel of the twenty largest U.S. firms in
each industry.
We obtain the following results. Firstly, the banking industry and the
oil industry exhibit the most tail dependence. The utility, financial trading
and insurance industry exhibit somewhat less tail dependence, but in gen-
eral more than the other industries. A top-down investor concerned about
downside risks will find it harder to reduce his tail risk by diversification
within these five industries.
Secondly, we find that (𝑖) a large market beta, (𝑖𝑖) a large market cap,
and (𝑖𝑖𝑖) a smaller volatility all increase within industry tail dependence.
Nonetheless, an industry with a low market beta does not guarantee low
tail dependence. Market risk, as estimated by the market beta, explains a
relatively large part of the tail dependence in the banking, financial trading
and insurance industry. This suggests that for these industries, it is more
difficult to use market-wide diversification to reduce the downside risk.
Finally, tail dependence has increased over time, with the oil industry re-
cently exhibiting the largest tail dependence. The market beta explains both
observations. During the most recent years, hedging the market exposure
was a more effective strategy to reduce within industry tail risk. Finally,
our tail dependence measure is a valuable tool in predicting next year’s tail
dependence.
Appendix
3.A Appendix
Table 3.2 shows the 𝑃 -values from our bootstrap exercise for the failure
probability 𝑝 = 1%. The 𝑃 -values below 5% and above 95% are significant at
the 5% level of significance. The upper triangle refers to cross-industry EAF ,
the lower triangle to cross-industry EAFres. The main diagonal compares
EAF based on simple returns with EAFres based on abnormal returns. Thus,
it refers to the 𝑃 -values for the null hypothesis DIF = 0.
Table 3.2: Bootstrapped 𝑃 -values for null hypothesis of EAF (𝑋) =
EAF (𝑌 ) against the one-sided alternative EAF (𝑋) > EAF (𝑌 ).
The upper triangle refers to EAF , the lower triangle to EAF res, the main diagonal
compares EAF with EAF res. All results are based on 10,000 bootstraps of the
(abnormal) returns of the time-varying sample of the largest 20 firms in each industry.
* indicates significant at the 5% level of confidence.
Banks Oil Util FinTr Insur
Banks 0.000* 0.370 0.032* 0.001* 0.001*
Oil 0.981* 0.007* 0.045* 0.038* 0.004*
Util 0.916 0.307 0.034* 0.351 0.203
FinTr 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.358
Insur 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.927 0.000*
The upper triangle shows that the banking industry has significantly
more tail dependence than utilities, financial traders and insurers, but not
significantly more than the oil industry.

Chapter 4
A welfare analysis on bank size,
capital and asset dependence
Joint work with Chen Zhou.
4.1 Introduction
The financial crisis has forcefully shown that the transmission of adverse
shocks on the financial system may have a severe effect on social welfare.
Three fundamental characteristics of the financial system are crucial in this
transmission mechanism. First, by their typically high leverage, the small
capital ratio makes individual financial institutions highly sensitive to asset
losses. Second, a similar asset balance of different institutions suggests that
a single shock may hit multiple institutions simultaneously. Third, some
financial institutions are extraordinarily large, and consequently their failure
would impose a large shock to the system which is more severe than the
failure of a group of small institutions. Thus, the stability of a financial
system and the potential welfare loss once the system fails depend on three
important bank characteristics: the capital structure, the asset portfolio
composition and the bank size. All three characteristics are a consequence
of banks’ management decisions over time.
For each characteristic, banks tend to choose a level that is suboptimal
for society. First, because equity financing is not tax deductible and banks’
shareholders have limited liability in case of a default, bank owners prefer a
lower level of capital than optimal for society. Second, after a major stress
event, regulators tend to save banks ex-post to prevent a systemic banking
crisis. In particular, large banks or a large number of smaller identical banks
may trigger a major stress event. Banks anticipate such policies by growing
large and holding similar asset portfolios ex-ante.
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To deal with the negative social impact of such decisions, recent policy
reforms impose higher capital ratios, stimulate specialization of banks, and
implement a more careful supervision on banks that are “too-big-to-fail”. In
this study, we investigate the impact of capital structure, asset interdepen-
dence and size on social welfare in a theoretical model. In addition, we
evaluate policy interventions directly or indirectly designed towards these
characteristics.
We build an equilibrium model in which banks make management de-
cisions on capital and size with the following considerations. First, banks
determine their capital ratio by balancing the financing costs of debt and
equity. Following the corporate finance literature, the tax shield is a key fac-
tor that favours debt financing, while a high level of debt corresponds to a
high default probability. Second, large banks benefit from a more diversified
portfolio, and thus a lower risk of assets. However, large banks may suffer
from higher operational costs due to the complexity to manage such large
banks. Third, similar to Ibragimov et al. (2011) banks invest in correlated
assets in a myopic way. They do not take into account the adverse effect on
social welfare of correlated asset portfolios.
To evaluate the impact on social welfare, we consider two welfare mea-
sures. First, we define a welfare measure as the total surplus generated by
bank’s loans. Second, we define social welfare by subtracting from the former
welfare measure the potential cost of a systemic crisis. This cost depends
on the frequency of a systemic crisis defined as the probability that some
fraction of debt in the financial system is not repaid.
A key feature of our theoretical model is that the three characteristics
– capital ratio, asset interdependence and size – are endogenously interre-
lated. Importantly, this interrelation affects systemic risk and social welfare
in an ambiguous way. For example, large banks invest in a more diversified
portfolio of assets. Consequently the asset dependence between two large
banks tends to be higher which raises systemic risk. On the other hand,
systemic risk may also be smaller, as large banks bear less individual risk
due to their diversification benefits. Nonetheless, the smaller individual risk
of large banks gives more room to leverage. This partly offsets the potential
reduction in systemic risk due to diversification. This example demonstrates
that a system consisting of a few large banks that are well diversified but
also highly leveraged may or may not be more systemically risky. Indeed, an
equilibrium analysis is non-trivial due to the complexity generated by the in-
teraction between the three characteristics. Our theoretical model considers
this interaction and provides a corresponding equilibrium analysis for policy
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evaluations.
Our main findings are as follows. First, without any regulation banks
make a suboptimal decision on size and the capital ratio. Banks hold less
capital than is socially optimal while the size may be larger or smaller than
socially optimal. Second, if the bankruptcy costs are low, and financing costs
and taxes are high, imposing a higher capital requirement results in larger
banks. Nonetheless, imposing higher capital requirements always increases
social welfare. Restricting bank size is not necessarily welfare improving in
a crisis period where asset interdependence is high and investment opportu-
nities are scarce.
The policy implication is that capital requirements are the preferred pol-
icy measure during economic booms as well as during crisis periods. In
particular during economic booms where asset interdependence is low, cap-
ital requirements may have an additional mitigating effect on systemic risk
through its indirect effect on a smaller size.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to address the joint
impact of the three characteristics of banking on systemic risk and social
welfare. The recent paper of De Nicolò et al. (2014) is most related to our
approach. They calibrate a dynamic model to assess the effect of capital
requirements on social welfare. They find that capital requirements affect
both bank lending and social welfare with an inverted U-shape. Our model
complements this paper because we include size as an additional endogenous
factor, and allow for capital-size interaction effects. In addition, we calibrate
our model by considering more severe shocks exhibiting heavy tails.
Our model on the choice of capital structure is related to the corporate
finance literature on optimal capital structure. Starting with Modigliani
and Miller (1958), the theoretical corporate finance literature has studied
at length the determinants of an optimal capital structure, e.g., Kraus and
Litzenberger (1973), Brennan and Schwartz (1978), Bradley et al. (1984),
and Miao (2005) among many others. The main message of this literature
is that taxes and bankruptcy costs are the key determinants of the capital
structure.
Although our model is a static equilibrium model, this study can be
compared with the literature on the interrelation between the optimal capital
ratio and the business cycle, see, e.g., Angeloni and Faia (2013), and Repullo
and Suarez (2013). Our static equilibrium model can be interpreted as the
unconditional long-run effect. Alternatively, for a specific parameter choice
we interpret our model as conditional on some state of the business cycle.
The asset dependence between banks models the systemic risk in the fi-
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nancial system. This is in line with the literature relating systemic risk to
banks’ common exposure, see Acharya (2009), Wagner (2010), and Ibrag-
imov et al. (2011).1 Our setup of asset dependence is in the spirit of the
approach in Ibragimov et al. (2011) who also find that the similarity of fi-
nancial intermediaries has an adverse impact on systemic risk and hence
social welfare. This externality depends crucially on the distribution of the
shocks. Our approach is different by endogenizing the capital-size decision
in the presence of asset interdependence.
We do not explicitly model systemic risk generated by the liability side.
However, the potential for a bank run decreases the value of the assets of
all involved banks. Accordingly, the potential for a bank run is implicitly
modelled through the asset interdependence of different banks. Modelling
the bank run potential through an explicit effect of default probabilities on
asset interdependence would unnecessarily complicate the model. A similar
argument applies to systemic risk generated by the interbanking network.
Furthermore, the latter mechanism is currently an insignificant transmission
channel for a bank run in an advanced economy since banks can lend at
negligible rates from central banks.
Lastly, this study also contributes to the emerging literature on the im-
pact of bank size on banks’ financing decisions and risk taking, and eventually
systemic risk. On the one hand, Hughes and Mester (1993) find in an empir-
ical study that large banks have lower funding costs on uninsured deposits.
On the other hand, empirical evidence for the adverse effect of bank size
on systemic risk is documented in Pais and Stork (2013), and Laeven et al.
(2014). In addition, Davies and Tracey (2014) report that large banks do
not benefit from scale economies after a correction for the potential bailout
effect.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model. In Sec-
tion 4.3, we derive the optimal size and capital structure decision given the
risk profile of the bank, and we consider the existence of a general equilib-
rium. Section 4.4 defines the social welfare function. Section 4.5 provides
the setup on the asset dependence and the calibration of our model. Sec-
tion 4.6 concludes. The proofs of the analytical results are postponed to the
Appendix.
1Systemic risk is usually attributed to the following channels: direct linkages from
mutual exposures, indirect linkages from common exposures, and interdependence from
information contagion. We focus on the indirect linkage channel. Broad surveys on sys-
temic risk are in De Bandt and Hartmann (2000), Santos (2001), and Galati and Moessner
(2013).
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4.2 The model
The model is a one period model in a risk neutral world2 with a risk free rate
𝑟𝑓 .3 In this general equilibrium model, banks choose total assets 𝑥 (referred
to as size) and the equity to total assets ratio 𝑦 (referred to as capital ratio).
Consequently, a bank’s equity and debt is 𝐸 = 𝑥𝑦 and 𝐷 = 𝑥−𝐸 = 𝑥(1−𝑦),
respectively.
To ensure the existence of banks, we adopt the standard assumption that
investors in debt and equity cannot lend directly to entrepreneurs. This is
consistent with the theory of financial intermediation in Diamond (1984).
We assume that banks are perfectly competitive, as in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), and De Nicolò et al. (2014) among others.
Bank assets
The assets are loans to finance projects of entrepreneurs. A bank earns per
unit of assets a stochastic return
𝑅𝐴 = 𝜇+ 𝜎𝑋, (4.1)
with mean E[𝑅𝐴] = 𝜇, standard deviation 𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇), and 𝑋 a random variable
with zero mean and unit variance. We denote the probability density func-
tion and the distribution function of 𝑋 by 𝑓 and 𝐹 , respectively. The mean
asset return 𝜇 is endogenously determined by the competition between banks
(see section 4.3.2 for details). The standard deviation 𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇) is a function
of the size 𝑥 and the mean asset return 𝜇. It decreases with size due to
the potential diversification benefits, i.e., 𝜎1(𝑥, 𝜇) ≤ 0.4 Charging a higher
loan rate to entrepreneurs increases the probability on a loan restructuring.
In addition, a higher rate may particularly deter risk-averse entrepreneurs,
and less risky projects are possibly matched to a cheaper source of financing.
Hence, we assume that the standard deviation 𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇) is non-decreasing with
the mean asset return, i.e., 𝜎2(𝑥, 𝜇) ≥ 0.
2In this setting, random variables are considered under a risk neutral probability
measure. Risk neutral settings are also in Miao (2005), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007),
Repullo and Suarez (2013), and Allen et al. (2014).
3Throughout the paper, we denote a net interest rate with a lowercase 𝑟, and the
corresponding gross interest rate with an uppercase: 𝑅 = 1 + 𝑟.
4The partial derivative to the 𝑖th argument of a function 𝑓 is denoted by 𝑓𝑖 (𝑖 =
1, 2, . . .), while 𝑓𝑥 denotes the total derivative to a variable 𝑥.
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Operational cost
Bank operations have a cost function 𝑐(𝑥) that depends on size. We assume
that the operational cost and the mean operational cost 𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑐(𝑥)/𝑥 are
both convex in 𝑥 with 𝑐(𝑥) minimized at some 𝑥0 ≥ 0. Intuitively, at some
point there are diseconomies of scale in operational costs by inefficiencies
such as bureaucracy costs. This assumption is supported by the study in
Davies and Tracey (2014) that shows that large banks do not benefit from
scale economies. Empirical evidence for diseconomies of scale in banking is
in Allen and Rai (1996).
Debt financing
We abstract from banks’ maturity transformation function by assuming that
debt has a fixed maturity of one period. Equivalently, debt is automatically
rolled over at the end of the period. By assuming 𝑦 < 1, we rule out the
limiting case of no debt financing where 𝐷 = 0.
A bank promises to pay at the end of the period the gross contracted
interest rate 𝑅𝑐 on debt outstanding. It can only fulfil this promise if the
return on assets 𝑅𝐴 is sufficient. Namely, a low realization of 𝑅𝐴 results
into default if total cost exceeds total revenue: 𝑐(𝑥) + 𝑅𝑐𝐷 > 𝑅𝐴𝑥. In case
of a default, debt holders incur an additional deadweight bankruptcy cost
𝜂 > 0 on each unit of debt to recover their debt outstanding.5 In this risk
neutral setting, risk aversion is another interpretation of this bankruptcy
cost. Since holders of defaulting debt only receive 𝑅𝐴𝑥− 𝑐(𝑥)− 𝜂𝐷, instead
of the contracted 𝑅𝑐𝐷, the expected gross return on debt is
E[𝑅𝐷] = E
[︂
min
(︂
𝑅𝐴𝑥− 𝑐(𝑥)
𝐷
,𝑅𝑐
)︂]︂
− 𝜂PD , (4.2)
where the probability of default is
PD = P(𝑅𝐴𝑥 < 𝑐(𝑥) +𝑅𝑐𝐷) . (4.3)
Equity financing
The equity holders are the residual claimants who receive the after-tax profit
at the end of the period. The end-of-period equity value before taxes (𝐸𝐵𝑇 )
5A similar feature is in Strebulaev (2007) and De Nicolò et al. (2014). Our bankruptcy
cost differs from costs of illiquidity studied in Cifuentes et al. (2005) and Wagner (2011).
They model illiquidity costs by fire sale losses which is not a deadweight loss.
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equals revenues minus the sum of operational costs and costs of debt financ-
ing. Accordingly, the initial expectation of the end-of-period equity is
E[𝐸𝐵𝑇 ] = E
[︀
[𝑅𝐴𝑥− 𝑐(𝑥)−𝑅𝑐𝐷]+
]︀
(4.4)
where [𝑥]+ = max(𝑥, 0). The bank pays the corporate tax rate 𝜏 = 1 − 𝜏
on before-tax profits. Note that the cost of debt financing is tax deductible,
while the cost of equity financing is not.
4.3 Equilibrium analysis
This section provides an equilibrium analysis at two different levels. At the
bank level, we derive in section 4.3.1 the equilibrium borrowing and loan
rate of a single bank with given size and capital ratio. In section 4.3.2, we
obtain a general equilibrium result for banks in perfect competition.
4.3.1 Banking equilibrium
In the banking equilibrium, the risk neutrality of investors implies that eq-
uity holders and debt holders earn on average the risk free rate on their
investments. From these returns, we determine for given size 𝑥 and given
capital ratio 𝑦, the following three equilibrium values: (𝑖) the mean return
on assets (𝜇*), (𝑖𝑖) the probability of default (PD*), and (𝑖𝑖𝑖) the contracted
interest rate on debt (𝑅*𝑐).
Proposition 1. If an equilibrium exists for the size-capital ratio pair
(𝑥, 𝑦), then a banking equilibrium is the triple (𝜇*,PD*, 𝑅*𝑐) that satisfies
the following three equations
𝜇* = 1 + 𝑐(𝑥) +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
𝑦 + (𝑟𝑓 + 𝜂PD
*) (1− 𝑦) (4.5)
E
[︀
min
(︀
𝑋,𝐹−1 (PD*)
)︀]︀
= −(1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏) 𝑦
𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇*)
(4.6)
E
[︂
min
(︂
𝑅𝐴 − 𝑐(𝑥)
1− 𝑦 ,𝑅
*
𝑐
)︂]︂
= 𝑅𝑓 + 𝜂PD
* (4.7)
where 𝑅𝐴 = 𝜇* + 𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇*)𝑋 as in (4.1), and, as before, 𝑅𝑓 = 1 + 𝑟𝑓 is the
gross risk free rate.
Note that the three equations in Proposition 1 are interdependent, or
even more precisely 𝜇* and PD* can be solved simultaneously from (4.5)
and (4.6) and then 𝑅*𝑐 follows from (4.7).
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Substituting the extremal values PD* = 0 and PD* = 1 in (4.5) gives
that the expected gross return on assets 𝜇* satisfies
0 ≤ 𝜇* − 𝑐(𝑥)−𝑅𝑓 − 𝑟𝜏𝑦 ≤ 𝜂 (1− 𝑦) (4.8)
where 𝑟𝜏 := 𝑟𝑓
(︀
1
𝜏 − 1
)︀
.
Since 𝐹−1 is an increasing function, equation (4.6) can be rewritten as
PD* = 𝑔
(︂
𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇*)
(1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏) 𝑦
)︂
. (4.9)
where 𝑔 is some increasing function that depends on the given cdf 𝐹 and the
parameters 𝑟𝑓 and 𝜏 .
An implicit expression for PD* follows by substituting (4.5) into the RHS
in (4.9). The obtained equation has PD* as the single unknown value. In
fact, both hand sides of the obtained equation are increasing in PD*. This
indicates that multiple banking equilibriums might exist, or none exists. The
next proposition provides sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness
of the banking equilibrium.
Proposition 2.
Existence: For all (𝑥, 𝑦), a banking equilibrium (𝜇*,PD*, 𝑅*𝑐) satisfying
(4.5)–(4.7) exists if at least one of the following two conditions holds
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
≤ − inf(𝑋)min
?˜?,𝜇
𝜎(?˜?, 𝜇) (4.10)
𝜎2 ≡ 0 for all (𝑥,𝑦) (4.11)
Uniqueness: The equilibrium is unique if (4.11) holds.
An equilibrium may not exist if the sufficient existence conditions do not
hold. Debt holders prefer a small PD to maximize the payment on their debt.
The equity holders in turn may prefer for any asset return 𝜇 a strictly higher
PD to benefit from their limited liability. In such cases, (4.5) and (4.6) have
no common solution (𝜇*,PD*). As a consequence, the equityholders and
bondholders cannot agree upon an equilibrium (𝜇*,PD*, 𝑅*𝑐) such that an
equilibrium does not exist. The sufficient conditions in Proposition 2 exclude
this case. We will impose the condition 𝜎2 ≡ 0 in the calibration in Section
4.5.
Consider the impact of the financing cost 𝑟𝑓 and the operational cost
𝑐(𝑥) on the endogenous probability of default PD* if 𝜎2 ≡ 0 holds, i.e., 𝜎
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is invariant to the mean asset return 𝜇. In this case (4.9) implies that PD*
does not depend on 𝜇*. Thus, increasing 𝑟𝑓 has no feedback effect on PD*
through 𝜇*. Hence, we conclude from (4.9) that PD* decreases with respect
to the financing cost 𝑟𝑓 .
The mean operational cost 𝑐(𝑥) has no direct effect on PD* (see (4.9)).
Following the equilibrium equation (4.5), the asset return 𝜇* compensates
any effect of the operational cost on PD*. The random spread 𝑅𝐴 − 𝑐(𝑥) in
the equilibrium equation (4.7) is then unaffected by changes in the opera-
tional cost. Therefore, PD* (and 𝑅*𝑐 in (4.7)) is unaffected by the operational
cost.
To study the impact of taxes and bankruptcy costs on the equilibrium,
suppose that both are absent (𝜏 = 𝜂 = 0). Then, equation (4.8) shows that
𝜇* = 𝑐(𝑥) + 𝑅𝑓 , which says that the required marginal revenue on assets
equals its marginal cost. Having taxes and bankruptcy costs raises this
marginal cost, and, consequently, the marginal revenue 𝜇* in equilibrium.
4.3.2 General equilibrium
In this section we obtain general equilibrium results where the size 𝑥 and
capital 𝑦 are endogenously determined by the competitive setting. As in the
banking equilibrium in section 4.3.1, entrepreneurs are price takers since they
stick to the offered loan rate of the banks. Following Diamond (1984), we
assume information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and banks. Namely,
banks know the aggregate return distribution of projects, but not the return
distribution of a specific project. By contrast, entrepreneurs do have private
information on their project. An entrepreneur initiates a project provided
the lowest offered rate is below the project’s return in case the project is suc-
cesful. Consequently, the entrepreneur extracts all rents beyond the offered
loan rate.
In the perfectly competitive banking industry, the entrepreneurs force
banks to demand the lowest possible mean interest rate 𝜇𝑐. Only banks that
are able to demand this minimal rate survive in this perfectly competitive
setting. The competitive equilibrium (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) corresponds to the pair (𝑥, 𝑦)
with the minimal equilibrium mean asset return 𝜇𝑐. In this competitive
equilibrium, efficient banks choose (𝑖) the optimal size 𝑥𝑐 where the marginal
benefit of a smaller volatility (𝜎1 < 0) equals the marginal cost of a higher
mean operational cost (𝑐′ > 0), and (𝑖𝑖) the optimal capital level 𝑦𝑐 where the
marginal benefit of a smaller expected bankruptcy cost equals the marginal
cost of a smaller benefit from tax deductible debt financing.
The equilibrium values of the variables in the competitive equilibrium
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are denoted with a superscript 𝑐. We suppress asterisks for convenience. For
instance:
(𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) =
{︃
(𝑥, 𝑦)
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒ (𝑥, 𝑦) = argmin?˜?,𝑦 𝜇*(?˜?, 𝑦)
}︃
𝜇𝑐 = 𝜇*(𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) 𝜇𝑐1 =
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦)
⃒⃒⃒⃒
(𝑥=𝑥𝑐,𝑦=𝑦𝑐)
= 0
PD𝑐 = PD*(𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) PD𝑐1 =
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
PD*(𝑥, 𝑦)
⃒⃒⃒⃒
(𝑥=𝑥𝑐,𝑦=𝑦𝑐)
The definition of the partial derivatives PD𝑐2 and PD
𝑐
12, and the total deriva-
tives PD𝑐𝑥 and PD
𝑐
𝑦 is similar to the definitions above. The derivatives of
𝑥𝑐 and 𝑦𝑐 are similarly defined. The same applies to the derivatives with
respect to the model parameters 𝜎0, 𝜂, 𝑟𝑓 and 𝜏 .
We consider the impact of size 𝑥 and the capital ratio 𝑦 on the competitive
PD𝑐. Denote
𝑥𝑐(𝑦) = argmin
𝑥
𝜇(𝑥, 𝑦) 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) = argmin
𝑦
𝜇(𝑥, 𝑦) (4.12)
as the optimal (competitive) size 𝑥 and the optimal (competitive) capital
ratio 𝑦 conditional on the other variable.
To avoid clutter, we make the following mild technical assumptions on
the competitive equilibrium (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐). The global minimum 𝜇𝑐 = 𝜇*(𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) is
(𝑖) unique, (𝑖𝑖) an interior point, and (𝑖𝑖𝑖) the Hessian matrix of 𝜇* is not zero
at (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐). This ensures that 𝜇𝑐 is a strict global minimum, and the corre-
spondences 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) and 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) are properly defined functions in a neighborhood
of (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐). Note that we still allow for multiple local minimums.
We consider the following two conditions:
d𝑥𝑐(𝑦𝑐)
d𝑦
> 0
d𝑦𝑐(𝑥𝑐)
d𝑥
> 0 (C)
The conditions in (C) state that a higher capital ratio forces banks to choose
a larger size, and vice versa. In practice, the sign of the derivatives in (C)
is ambiguous. Concerning the impact of capital on size (d𝑥𝑐/d𝑦), a higher
capital ratio may result in a larger desire to enjoy diversification benefits by
increasing size. On the other hand, the more expensive equity financing may
make project investments too expensive, and hence reduce the bank size.
Our condition in (C) puts a higher weight on the former effect.
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For the impact of size on capital (d𝑦𝑐/d𝑥), a larger size may give banks an
incentive to choose a lower capital ratio by the larger diversification benefits.
On the other hand, a higher marginal operational cost from the larger size
could also induce large banks to choose a more safe operational setup by
choosing a higher capital ratio. The latter effect dominates in (C).
The following proposition gives the impact of 𝑥 and 𝑦 on PD in the
competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 3.
(𝑖) If 𝜎𝑐1 < 0, the partial and total derivatives of PD and 𝑐 at an interior
competitive equilibrium (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) are as given in Table 4.1.
(𝑖𝑖) If 𝜎𝑐1 = 0 then
d𝑦𝑐(𝑥𝑐)
d𝑥 =
d𝑥𝑐(𝑦𝑐)
d𝑦 = 0 and all derivatives in Table 4.1 are
zero at (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) except 𝜕𝜕𝑦PD
𝑐 = dd𝑦PD
𝑐 < 0.
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) The conditions in (𝐶) are equivalent to
(1− 𝑦𝑐)PD𝑐12 < PD𝑐1. (4.13)
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
d
d𝑥
𝜕
𝜕𝑦
d
d𝑦
PD𝑐 – –* – –*
𝑐𝑐 + 0 +**
Table 4.1: Derivatives of the default probability and the average
cost function.
The table reports the sign of the partial derivatives and the total derivatives of the default
probability PD*(𝑥, 𝑦) and the average cost function 𝑐(𝑥, 𝑦) with respect to size 𝑥 and
capital ratio 𝑦 at an interior competitive equilibrium that satisfies 𝜎𝑐1 < 0. The competitive
equilibrium (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) corresponds to the banking equilibrium (𝜇*, 𝑃𝐷*, 𝑅*𝑐) in (4.5)–(4.7)
where the mean asset return 𝜇* is minimal. * if (𝐶) holds. ** if and only if (𝐶) holds.
We remark that the conditions in (C) and the equivalent conditions in
(4.13) are not very stringent. Consider the decreasing function
ℎ (𝑧) = 𝑔
(︂
1
(1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏) 𝑧
)︂
,
with 𝑔 as in (4.9). From PD* = ℎ (𝑦/𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇*)) and
𝜕𝜎𝑐(𝑥, 𝜇)
𝜕𝑦
=
𝜕𝜎𝑐
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝜇𝑐
𝜕𝑦
= 0,
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which gives at the competitive equilibrium
PD𝑐1 = −
𝜎𝑐1𝑦
𝑐
(𝜎𝑐)2
ℎ′
(︂
𝑦𝑐
𝜎𝑐
)︂
PD𝑐12 = −
𝜎𝑐1
(𝜎𝑐)2
[︂
ℎ′
(︂
𝑦𝑐
𝜎𝑐
)︂
+
𝑦𝑐
𝜎𝑐
ℎ′′
(︂
𝑦𝑐
𝜎𝑐
)︂]︂
For 𝜎𝑐1 < 0, inequality (4.13) is then equivalent to
2𝑦𝑐 − 1
(1− 𝑦𝑐) 𝑦𝑐𝜎
𝑐 <
ℎ′′(𝑧)
ℎ′(𝑧)
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝑧=𝑦𝑐/𝜎𝑐
=
d
d𝑧
ln
[︀
ℎ′(𝑧)
]︀⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝑧=𝑦𝑐/𝜎𝑐
In other words, if 𝑦𝑐 < 12 and 𝜎
𝑐
1 < 0 both hold, a function ℎ that is concave
or limited convex at the competitive value 𝑦𝑐/𝜎𝑐 implies the conditions in
(C).
4.3.3 A numerical example
Proposition 3 gives us the effect of size and capital on the probability of
default under condition (C). If this condition does not hold, the total effects
on PD𝑐 depend on parameters that are relevant for policy intervention, such
as 𝜎0, 𝜂, 𝑟𝑓 and 𝜏 . A numerical example demonstrates how the sign of
the total derivatives 𝑥𝑐𝑦, 𝑦𝑐𝑥, PD
𝑐
𝑥, and PD
𝑐
𝑦 depends on the parameters if
condition (C) does not hold. For analytical convenience, we assume that
𝑋 follows a uniform distribution, similar to Acharya (2009), and Angeloni
and Faia (2013). In contrast, the calibration study in Section 4.4 uses a
𝑡-distribution.
Assume that 𝑋 ∼ 𝑈 [︀−√3,√3]︀, which satisfies the assumptions E[𝑋] =
0 and Var(𝑋) = 1. The mean operational cost is convex and given by
𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑥𝛾 with 𝛾 > 1, and the standard deviation of a unit of assets is6
𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇) =
1√
3
(︁𝜎0
𝑥𝛿
)︁2
(4.14)
Without loss of generality, we assume 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 14 by the following reason-
ing. If assets are completely dependent, the standard deviation of total assets
is linear in 𝑥. Then, the standard deviation per unit of assets is constant,
which corresponds to 𝛿 = 0 in (4.14). Since we assume that 𝛿 is strictly pos-
itive, we could choose a very small 𝛿 for this completely dependent case. At
the other extreme, assets are completely independent. This means that the
6The scaling term 1/
√
3 will cancel out later.
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standard deviation of total assets is proportional to
√
𝑥, which corresponds
to 𝛿 = 14 . The assumption 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 14 implies that the ratio 𝜁 := 𝛾/𝛿 exceeds
4.
Define the function
𝜑 (𝑦) :=
√
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)
⃒⃒⃒⃒
3
√
𝑦 − 1√
𝑦
⃒⃒⃒⃒𝜁−1
and the constants
?˜?𝑓 :=
√︂
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
(4.15)
𝑟𝜏 := 𝑟𝑓
(︂
1
𝜏
− 1
)︂
(4.16)
𝑦1 :=
1
3
+
2
3
√︃
𝜁 − 1
𝜁 + 2
(4.17)
𝜂𝑎 :=
𝑟𝜏
1− 12
(︁
1
𝜁𝜑 (𝑦1) ?˜?
𝜁
𝑓𝜎
−𝜁
0 𝑟𝜏
)︁ 1
𝜁−1
(4.18)
𝜂𝑏 :=
(2𝜎0)
𝜁𝜁
2𝜑 (𝑦1) ?˜?
𝜁
𝑓
(4.19)
?˜? :=
[︃
𝜑
(︂
𝜁
𝜁 + 2
)︂
𝜂
𝜁
⃒⃒⃒⃒
2− 2𝑟𝜏
𝜂
⃒⃒⃒⃒1−𝜁]︃1/𝜁
?˜?𝑓 (4.20)
𝑥max :=
(︃
[𝜂 − 𝑟𝜏 ] 𝜎0
?˜?2𝑓
)︃1/𝛿
(4.21)
The following proposition shows at the competitive equilibrium the relation
between size and capital, and also the impact of size and capital on the
probability of default. The restriction 𝜂 /∈ [𝜂𝑎, 𝜂𝑏] is only needed to exclude
a boundary equilibrium with 𝑦𝑐 = 1.
Proposition 4. At the competitive equilibrium, the size 𝑥𝑐, the capital ratio
𝑦𝑐 and the corresponding derivatives are as given in Table 4.2.
We start with the interrelation between size and capital. Proposition
4 states that size and capital are positively related if the bankruptcy cost
𝜂 is low. A low bankruptcy cost gives a low penalty on a higher default
probability from debt financing. This results in low capital ratios and large
marginal diversification benefits. That is, the effect of higher diversification
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𝜂 < 𝑟𝜏 𝜂 ≥ 𝑟𝜏 ∩ 𝜂 /∈ [𝜂𝑎, 𝜂𝑏]
𝜎0 < ?˜? 𝜎0 ≥ ?˜?
𝑥𝑐 [0, 𝑥max) [𝑥
𝑐(𝑦1), 𝑥max]
𝑥𝑐𝑦 + –
𝑦𝑐
[︀
0, 13
)︀ [︀
1
3 , 𝑦1
]︀
𝑦𝑐𝑥 + –
PD𝑐𝑥 –
PD𝑐𝑦 – +
Table 4.2: Total derivatives and intervals at the competitive equi-
librium.
This table presents the intervals of the size 𝑥, and the capital ratio 𝑦. In addition, it
presents the derivatives of 𝑥, 𝑦, and the default probability PD . The shocks follow a
uniform distribution, and risk as in (4.14) which satisfies 𝜎2(𝑥, 𝜇) ≡ 0. All statistics are at
an interior competitive equilibrium (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐). This corresponds to (𝑥, 𝑦) with the banking
equilibrium (𝜇*,PD*, 𝑅*𝑐) in (4.5)–(4.7) with the smallest 𝜇*. The parameters 𝜂 and 𝜎0
represent the bankruptcy cost and the uncertainty in the economy, respectively. The
definitions of 𝑟𝜏 , 𝑦1, 𝜂𝑎, 𝜂𝑏, ?˜?, and 𝑥max are in (4.16)–(4.21). A plus and a minus sign
indicate a positive and a negative total derivative, respectively.
benefits dominates the effect of a higher marginal operational cost if and
only if bankruptcy costs are low. Consequently, a higher capital ratio results
in larger banks in case capital ratios are below 13 .
The previous result indicates an important trade-off when implementing
a capital requirement when the actual levels of capital are low. In that case,
a more stringent capital requirement results into smaller individual default
probabilities, but larger banks. From the micro-prudential view of Table 4.2,
since PD𝑐1 ≤ 0 and PD𝑐2 ≤ 0 (see Proposition 3(𝑖)), the larger size reinforces
the direct reduction in PD from the larger capital requirements. From a
macro perspective, the upward effect on size counteracts the effect of the
smaller individual default probabilities on systemic risk by a crowding effect
on banks. Closed-form results are unavailable for this trade-off. Accordingly,
we will elaborate on this trade-off in a calibration in Section 4.5.
Next, we consider the total effect on the probability of default. In this
respect, we infer from Proposition 4 that large banks are preferred from
a micro-prudential point of view. More specifically, an upward cap on size
unambiguously increases the probability of default because PD𝑐𝑥 < 0. Again,
such a policy is only meaningful in a macro context which we discuss in
Section 4.5.
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The total effect of the capital ratio on the probability of default is ambigu-
ous. If bankruptcy costs 𝜂 and uncertainty 𝜎0 are both high, a higher capital
requirement results in a higher default probability. The high bankruptcy cost
results in a smaller marginal diversification benefit that is dominated by the
effect of the operational costs. This explains the negative relation between
size and capital (𝑥𝑐𝑦 < 0). Together with a high uncertainty, this results in
a dominant upward effect of the smaller size on the probability of default.
Hence, this case demonstrates that a larger capital requirement may fail
to achieve the micro-prudential goal of a smaller individual probability of
default.
The setup of this example case also enables us to derive the impact of
the policy parameters at the competitive equilibrium: the uncertainty 𝜎0,
the bankruptcy costs 𝜂, the financing costs 𝑟𝑓 , and the tax rate 𝜏 .
Proposition 5. Provided an interior equilibrium exists (a sufficient condi-
tion is 𝜂 /∈ [𝜂𝑎, 𝜂𝑏]), the sensitivities of size, capital ratio and PD to the
parameters 𝜎0, 𝜂, 𝑟𝑓 and 𝜏 are given in Table 4.3.
We discuss the impact of the parameters on size and capital in more
detail. In most of the discussion we refer to the endogenous relation between
size and capital. By Proposition 4, the competitive size and the competitive
capital have a positive association if and only if bankruptcy costs are low.
(𝑖) 𝜎0: When the uncertainty 𝜎0 in the economy is high, the diversification
benefit received by large banks is low. Therefore, the optimal bank
size is lower and closer to the size that minimizes the operational cost.
Because capital protects banks against unexpected shocks, banks tend
to hold more capital when the economy is more uncertain. However,
this relation is reversed when bankruptcy costs are low. In that case,
banks enjoy an initial low capital ratio due to the low cost of debt.
Such highly leveraged banks enjoy the potential upside shocks due to
the uncertainty in the economy. Therefore, with uncertainty increasing,
banks may leverage more to exploit the potential upward shocks.
(𝑖𝑖) 𝜂: A higher bankruptcy cost 𝜂 gives banks a stronger incentive to
reduce their default probability by means of diversification. The posi-
tive relation with size reflects this diversification effect. In addition, a
higher bankruptcy cost implies a higher marginal cost of debt. Banks
are then more willing to hold more capital and prefer the diversification
benefits of a larger size. However, such relations have to be considered
in conjunction with the endogenous relation between size and capital.
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𝜂 < 𝑟𝜏 𝑟𝜏 ≤ 𝜂 < 𝜁𝑟𝜏 𝜂 ≥ 𝜁𝑟𝜏
𝜎0 < ?˜? 𝜎0 ≥ ?˜? 𝜎0 < ?˜? 𝜎0 ≥ ?˜?
𝑥𝑐𝜎0 –
𝑥𝑐𝜂 + ? +
𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑓 ? +
𝑥𝑐𝜏 ? +
𝑦𝑐𝜎0 – +
𝑦𝑐𝜂 + –
𝑦𝑐𝑟𝑓 –
𝑦𝑐𝜏 –
PD𝑐𝜎0 + ? + ? +
PD𝑐𝜂 – ? –
PD𝑐𝑟𝑓 ? – ? –
PD𝑐𝜏 ? – ? –
Table 4.3: Comparative statics at the competitive equilibrium.
The table presents comparative statics in the competitive equilibrium for size 𝑥, the capital
ratio 𝑦, and the default probability PD with respect to the uncertainty 𝜎0, the bankruptcy
cost 𝜂, the risk free rate 𝑟𝑓 and the tax rate 𝜏 . The shocks follow a uniform distribution,
and risk is constant in return (𝜎2(𝑥, 𝜇) ≡ 0). All statistics are at the competitive equilib-
rium (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) which corresponds to (𝑥, 𝑦) with the the banking equilibrium (𝜇*,PD*, 𝑅*𝑐)
in (4.5)–(4.7) with the smallest 𝜇*. The parameter 𝜁 := 𝛾/𝛿 follows from the average cost
function 𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑥𝛾 and the standard deviation of each unit of assets 𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇) = 𝜎0𝑥−2𝛿.
The definitions of 𝑟𝜏 , 𝜂𝑎, 𝜂𝑏, and ?^? are in (4.16)–(4.20). A plus and a minus sign indicate
a positive and a negative total derivative, respectively.
Therefore, we observe for a low bankruptcy cost 𝜂 a positive impact of
this bankruptcy cost on the capital ratio, whereas for a high bankrup-
tcy cost the endogenous size effect dominates such that the impact of
the bankruptcy cost on capital is negative.
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑟𝑓 : A high risk free rate 𝑟𝑓 corresponds to a high expected return on
debt and equity. This makes debt relatively more attractive due to its
tax deductibility. As a consequence, the capital ratio decreases when
the risk free rate increases. Since a higher risk free rate results in more
expensive financing, the desired diversification is also higher, which
leads to larger banks. However, this result is only observed for a high
bankruptcy cost. Otherwise, the endogenous positive relation between
size and capital makes the relation between the risk free rate and size
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ambiguous.
(𝑖𝑣) The explanation for the effect of the tax rate is very similar to the
explanation with the risk free rate. Tax deductibility and costs of
financing are again the relevant channels.
The impact of the policy parameters on the probability of default PD are
mostly in line with the impact on size and the capital ratio. Namely, a high
uncertainty in the economy, a low bankruptcy cost, a low financing cost and
a low tax rate correspond to a high PD .
4.4 Social welfare
We study the effect of size, the capital ratio, and the policy parameters on
social welfare for a financial system consisting of a number of banks. Social
welfare is defined here as the total surplus generated by the banking system
discounted by a penalty for the associated systemic risk. We first define
measures for the two components total surplus and systemic risk. Then, we
calibrate the model to obtain the welfare effects of different policies on size
and the capital ratio.
4.4.1 Total surplus
By risk neutrality for the net return on equity and debt (E[𝑟𝐸 ] = E[𝑟𝐷] =
𝑟𝑓 ),7 and the tax effect of equity (E[𝑟𝐸 ] = 𝜏 (E[𝐸𝐵𝑇 ]− 𝐸) /𝐸), the opera-
tions of each bank generate the surplus
(E[𝐸𝐵𝑇 ]− 𝐸 − 𝑟𝑓𝐸) + (E[𝐷end]−𝐷 − 𝑟𝑓𝐷) =
(︂
1
𝜏
− 1
)︂
𝑟𝑓𝐸 + 0. (4.22)
where E[𝐷end] and E[𝐸𝐵𝑇 ] are the end-of-period values of debt and before-
tax equity, respectively. The left hand side (LHS) contains two end-of-period
values for the expected surplus: the before-tax surplus of the equity holders,
and the surplus of the debt holders.
Debt does not generate any surplus, while the taxation of equity gener-
ates a surplus. The right hand side (RHS) of (4.22) represents this surplus.
The surplus is zero if taxes are absent (𝜏 = 1 − 𝜏 = 1). Given the size of
equity, an increase in the corporate tax rate 𝜏 (a decrease in 𝜏) increases
the surplus since an increase in 𝜏 leads to a higher asset return 𝜇* on bank
7The expectations of the return distributions are of course under the risk neutral
measure.
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loans to entrepreneurs. Otherwise, banks cannot pay both the higher tax
and the required return of equity holders. The higher borrowing rate for
entrepreneurs (implied by the higher 𝜇*) results in a smaller number of initi-
ated projects, and may thus not be socially optimal. We model this trade-off
as follows.
The total amount of accepted loans depends on the mean return on assets
𝜇* as
𝑄(𝜇*) = 𝑎− 𝑏 (𝜇* − 1) , (4.23)
where 𝑎 and 𝑏 are some positive constants. Since 𝑄 is the aggregate amount
of assets in the economy, the number of banks equals 𝑛 = 𝑄(𝜇*)/𝑥.8 We
consider equilibria in which banks make identical management decisions on
size and capital. The banks differ ex-post as they are exposed to bank-
specific shocks that are correlated in a way that we will specify in section
4.4.3.9
Under a fixed number of banks (𝑛) the equilibrium 𝜇* is the minimal
mean asset return under the additional constraint 𝑥 = 𝑄(𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦))/𝑛. Thus,
size would no longer be part of a bank’s decision making. Consequently, our
main result that policies on capital are most important remains unaffected.
Importantly, a fixed 𝑛 violates the free entry assumption in our long-run
model with perfect competition. Therefore, we focus on the case with 𝑛
endogenous.
Entrepreneurs only initiate a project if the expected return exceeds the
offered loan rate. They earn on average a consumer surplus from the project:
CS =
ˆ 1+𝑎/𝑏
𝜇*
𝑄(?˜?)𝑑?˜? =
1
2𝑏
𝑄 (𝜇*)2 . (4.24)
The financiers do not earn a surplus by the risk neutrality of the equity
holders and debt holders. The government surplus follows from multiplying
the surplus in (4.22) by the number of banks,
GS = 𝑄(𝜇*)𝑟𝜏𝑦 (4.25)
where as before 𝑟𝜏 =
(︀
1
𝜏 − 1
)︀
𝑟𝑓 , 𝐸 = 𝑥𝑦, and 𝑛 = 𝑄(𝜇*)/𝑥. Figure 4.1
illustrates the concepts graphically. The total surplus on loans, TS , is the
sum of (4.24) and (4.25):
TS = 𝑄(𝜇*)
(︂
1
2𝑏
𝑄(𝜇*) + 𝑟𝜏𝑦
)︂
(4.26)
8We avoid clutter by allowing for non-integer 𝑛. This does not affect our main results.
9Ex-ante symmetric setups are also in Ibragimov et al. (2011), Repullo and Suarez
(2013), and De Nicolò et al. (2014), among others.
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Figure 4.1: Consumer surplus and government surplus.
The figure shows the consumer surplus CS from (4.24) and the government surplus𝐺𝑆
from (4.25). The parameter 𝑟𝜏 and the total amount of accepted loans 𝑄 are defined
in (4.16) and (4.23), respectively. The surfaces CS and GS are nonoverlapping by
(4.8) in Proposition 1.
We have four straightforward observations. First, perfect competition
among banks erodes the surplus of banks such that the entrepreneurs (CS )
and the government (GS ) share the total surplus on bank loans.
Second, the size 𝑥 is absent in (4.26). In other words, for given capital
ratio, the size has only an indirect effect on TS through 𝜇*. It follows
from 𝑄′(𝜇*) < 0 in (4.26) that 𝜕𝑇𝑆(𝜇*, 𝑦)/𝜕𝜇* < 0. This indicates that
maximizing TS conditional on 𝑦 is the same as minimizing 𝜇* conditional
on 𝑦. Therefore, the optimal size function 𝑥TS (𝑦) for total surplus is the
same function as 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) of the competitive equilibrium in Proposition 3.
Third, since the competitive equilibrium minimizes the mean asset return
𝜇* (see section 4.3.2) such that 𝜇𝑐𝑥 = 𝜇𝑐𝑦 = 0,
𝜕𝑄 (𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦))
𝜕𝑥
⃒⃒⃒⃒
(𝑥,𝑦)=(𝑥𝑐,𝑦𝑐)
=
𝜕𝑄 (𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦))
𝜕𝑦
⃒⃒⃒⃒
(𝑥,𝑦)=(𝑥𝑐,𝑦𝑐)
= 0.
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Consequently, we obtain from (4.26)
𝜕TS (𝑥, 𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
⃒⃒⃒⃒
(𝑥,𝑦)=(𝑥𝑐,𝑦𝑐)
= 𝑄 (𝜇𝑐) 𝑟𝜏 > 0.
Thus, the total surplus TS is strictly increasing in the capital ratio 𝑦 at
the competitive equilibrium. That is, the competitive equilibrium does not
maximize the total surplus.
Fourth, equation (4.26) does not imply that full equity financing (𝑦 = 1)
maximizes the total surplus. In that case, the required return 𝜇 exceeds the
competitive return 𝜇𝑐, which may lead to a lower TS .
4.4.2 Systemic risk
The total surplus analysis neglects the cost of replacing defaulting banks.
In particular, it neglects the nonlinear effect of a systemic crisis, i.e., having
multiple defaults simultaneously. We define such a systemic crisis as the
event where the amount of unpaid debt exceeds some fraction 𝛿𝑆 of total
assets. This is similar to the approach in Ibragimov et al. (2011). 10
Let PS (𝑥, 𝑦) represent the probability of a systemic crisis given the size
𝑥 and capital ratio 𝑦 of the individual banks
PS (𝑥, 𝑦) = P
(︂
unpaid debt
total assets in the economy
> 𝛿𝑆
)︂
(4.27)
Define 𝜆 > 0 as the loss due to a systemic crisis as a fraction of the total
surplus on banking operations (TS ). We define social welfare as
SW (𝑥, 𝑦) = (1− 𝜆PS (𝑥, 𝑦))TS (𝑥, 𝑦). (4.28)
Thus, a social planner needs to balance the total surplus with the probability
of a systemic crisis. The risk preference against a systemic crisis is more
pronounced if the parameter 𝜆 is high.
The bank size and capital ratio that maximize the total surplus does not
correspond to the social optimum, i.e., it does not maximize social welfare.
Since the probability on a systemic crisis increases in the default probability,
the PD that maximizes total surplus TS is too high for maximizing social
welfare. Hence, it is beneficial to have larger banks by their lower PD .
However, having larger banks implies that a smaller number of banks suffices
10Recall that banks are ex-ante identical, but differ ex-post by the bank-specific shocks.
Thus, some banks may default whilst others may not.
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to finance a given proportion of loans to the entrepreneurs. Consequently,
a smaller number of defaults can cause a systemic crisis when banks are
larger. These two counterbalancing effects determine the optimal bank size
that maximizes social welfare.
4.4.3 The distribution of banks’ asset values
Recall from (4.1) that we model the gross return per unit of assets of a
single bank 𝑖 by the random variable 𝑅𝐴 = 𝜇* + 𝑌𝑖, where 𝜇* is the equi-
librium mean asset return conditional on size 𝑥 and capital ratio 𝑦, while
𝑌𝑖 = 𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇
*)𝑋𝑖 is random noise with mean zero. For a banking system con-
sisting of 𝑛 banks, we model the joint distribution of (𝑌1, . . . , 𝑌𝑛) as follows.
We assume a symmetric banking system where each of the 𝑛 banks has a
market share 1/𝑛. Suppose there exists an infinite number of entrepreneurs
uniformly spread on a circle with unit circumference. The entrepreneurs 𝑡
and 𝑢 are parameterized by 𝑡, 𝑢 ∈ [0, 1] with distance
𝑑(𝑡, 𝑢) = min (|𝑢− 𝑡| , 1− |𝑢− 𝑡|) . (4.29)
The investment project of entrepreneur 𝑡 is exposed to the shock 𝑍(𝑡) ∼
𝑁(0, 1). The dependence between the shocks of entrepreneurs 𝑡 and 𝑢 is
given by11
Cov (𝑍(𝑡), 𝑍(𝑢)) = 𝜌𝑑(𝑡,𝑢).
Thus, the returns of two projects are at least √𝜌 and more correlated if the
projects are closer to each other.
In practice, asset backed securities are collateralized by assets having a
similar risk profile, such as mortgages within the same region. This moti-
vates us to assume that banks prefer adjacent projects. Indeed, such pref-
erences minimize the distance cost. Bank 𝑖 invests in the projects of the
entrepreneurs located on the interval [(𝑖− 1) /𝑛, 𝑖/𝑛]. The shock distribu-
tion per unit of assets of bank 𝑖 is given by
𝑌𝑖 = ?^?
√
𝑊𝑛
𝑖/𝑛ˆ
𝑡=(𝑖−1)/𝑛
𝑍(𝑡)𝑑𝑡, (4.30)
11Ibragimov et al. (2011) derive this result in a discrete setting with a large number 𝑚
of entrepreneurs. The shocks to projects of two adjacent entrepreneurs follow an AR(1)
process 𝑥𝑡 = 𝜌𝑚𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑤 with 𝑤 ∼ 𝑁
(︀
0, 1− 𝜌2𝑚
)︀
. We present the limiting case where
𝑚 → ∞. Notice that 𝑍(𝑡) is not a Wiener process because of 𝜌𝑚 < 1 and the circular
condition 𝑍(0) = 𝑍(1). Indeed, Cov (𝑍(𝑡), 𝑍(𝑢)) ̸= min (𝑡, 𝑢) which would be true for a
Wiener process.
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where 𝑊 ∼ 𝐼𝐺(𝜈2 , 𝜈2 ) follows an inverse gamma distribution with 𝜈 > 2,
and represents a common stochastic scaling factor that affects all 𝑌𝑖 simul-
taneously. The factor ?^? is a deterministic scaling factor for the standard
deviation of the common shock. An extreme outcome of 𝑊 increases the
likelihood that multiple banks face an extreme outcome simultaneously.
Using well-known properties of the 𝑡-distribution (see, e.g., McNeil et al.
(2010)), we have that the total shock 𝑌𝑖 to bank 𝑖 follows a scaled Student
𝑡(𝜈)-distribution with12
Var (𝑌𝑖) =
2𝜈?^?2𝑛2
𝜈 − 2
𝜌1/𝑛 − 1− 1𝑛 ln (𝜌)
ln2 (𝜌)
(4.31)
Consider banks 1 and 𝑖 that invest in projects on the intervals [0, 1/𝑛] and
[(𝑖− 1)/𝑛, 𝑖/𝑛], respectively. The covariance of their shocks 𝑌1 and 𝑌𝑖 is
Cov (𝑌1, 𝑌𝑖) =
𝜈
𝜈 − 2 ?^?
2Cov (𝑍1, 𝑍𝑖) (4.32)
where the covariance of the bank-specific shocks (excluding the common
shock 𝑊 ) is
Cov (𝑍1, 𝑍1+𝑖) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝜌(𝑖−1)/𝑛𝑛2
(︁
𝜌1/𝑛−1
ln(𝜌)
)︁2
𝑖+1
𝑛 ≤ 12
1
ln2(𝜌𝑠)
𝑓(𝑖, 𝑛, 𝜌) 𝑖𝑛 ≤ 12 ≤ 𝑖+1𝑛
𝑛2
ln2(𝜌)
𝑓 (𝑛− 𝑖, 𝑛, 𝜌) 𝑖−1𝑛 ≤ 12 ≤ 𝑖𝑛
𝜌1−(𝑖+1)/𝑛𝑛2
(︁
𝜌1/𝑛−1
ln(𝜌)
)︁2
1
2 ≤ 𝑖−1𝑛
with
𝑓(𝑖, 𝑛, 𝜌) = 𝜌
1
2 ln (𝜌)
(︂
2 (𝑖+ 1)
𝑛
− 1
)︂
+ 𝑛
√
𝜌𝑖−1 − 2 𝑛√𝜌𝑖 + 𝜌1−(𝑖+1)/𝑛
It is straightforward to generalize this result to an arbitrary pair of banks
by normalizing the project locations.
4.5 Calibration
Analytical results are unavailable for the impact of the size and the capital
ratio on social welfare. Therefore, we investigate this impact with a cali-
bration study. First, we discuss the implementation, then we present the
numerical results.
12The derivations of (4.31) and (4.32) are in the appendix.
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4.5.1 Implementation
We assume that the operational cost function has the form 𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑐0+𝑐1𝑥+
𝑐2𝑥
2 with 𝑐0, 𝑐2 ≥ 0. This implies a convex average cost function
𝑐(𝑥) =
𝑐0
𝑥
+ 𝑐1 + 𝑐2𝑥.
As discussed in section 4.4.2, we assume that a systemic crisis occurs if the
expected total loss on debt is at least 𝛿𝑆𝑄(𝜇*), where 𝛿𝑆 ∈ [0, 1] is a threshold
parameter. Since each default results in a dead weight loss of 𝐷𝜂, a systemic
crisis occurs if the number of defaults exceeds 𝑛𝐷 := 𝛿𝑆𝑄/(𝐷𝜂):
𝑃𝑆(𝑥, 𝑦) = P
(︂
#defaults ≥ 𝛿𝑆𝑄(𝜇
*(𝑥, 𝑦))
(1− 𝑦)𝑥𝜂
)︂
(4.33)
If the threshold 𝛿𝑆𝑄/(𝐷𝜂) is non-integer, we linearly interpolate the proba-
bility on a systemic crisis 𝑃𝑆(𝑥, 𝑦) by weighting the probabilities based on
the thresholds equal to the two nearest integers.
Table 4.4 presents the baseline parameter values. The rationale behind
the chosen values is as follows. The riskfree interest rate is set at 0.1 such
that our model represents a period of about 5 years. Our tax rate should
be read as the joint effect of the corporate tax rate and the tax on interest
income. Based on the estimates in Graham (1999), Strebulaev (2007) chooses
the marginal rate on interest income 22.9 percentage points higher than the
marginal rate on dividends. In our model, dividends are implicit in 𝑟𝐸 , which
is a total return that includes dividend distributions. Using a corporate
tax rate of 0.35, we choose the effective corporate tax parameter equal to
𝜏 = 1− (1− 0.35)(1− 0.229) ≈ 0.5.
𝑟𝑓 𝜏 𝜂 𝜈 ?^? 𝑐0 𝑐1 𝑐2 𝜌 𝑎 𝑏 𝛿𝑆 𝜆
0.1 0.5 0.1 4 0.05 10−3 0 10−3 0.5 25 25 0.1 1
Table 4.4: Baseline parameters.
This table reports baseline parameters of the risk free rate 𝑟𝑓 , the tax rate 𝜏 , the bankrup-
tcy cost 𝜂, the tail index 𝜈 of the shock distribution, the uncertainty ?^?, the cost function
parameters 𝑐0, 𝑐1, and 𝑐2, the asset dependence 𝜌, the parameters 𝑎 and 𝑏 in the asset
demand function 𝑄(𝜇*) = 𝑎− 𝑏(𝜇* − 1), the threshold parameter 𝛿𝑆 for a systemic crisis,
and the fraction 𝜆 of total surplus lost in case of a systemic crisis.
The bankruptcy cost parameter is set at 𝜂 = 0.1 to match the value in
De Nicolò et al. (2014). In addition, it satisfies 𝜂 = 𝑟𝑓 (1/𝜏 − 1) which is the
border case in Propositions 4 and 5. The tail index 𝜈 is set at 4 to match
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the estimates from the stock indices in Poon et al. (2004). This estimate is
also the middle of the three tail indices studied in Ibragimov et al. (2011).
The scaling factor of the volatility ?^? is half of the riskfree rate, which gives
reasonable default probabilities and matches the volatility-risk free rate ratio
in De Nicolò et al. (2014). We set 𝑐0 = 𝑐2 to set the average cost minimizing
size at one.
With the chosen correlation 𝜌 = 0.5, the asset portfolios of two banks
with maximal distance, i.e., opposite to each other on the unit circle, still
have a high correlation between 0.85 and 0.96 if the number of banks is
between 5 and 20. This high correlation represents the increased dependence
during crisis events. The values for the parameters 𝑎 = 25 and 𝑏 = 25 of
the demand function imply that the number of banks 𝑄/𝑥 is less than 25 if
all banks minimize operational costs at 𝑥 = 1. The number of banks equals
20 if the excess return 𝜇* − 𝑅𝑓 on assets equals the risk free rate 𝑟𝑓 . We
set the systemic crisis threshold 𝛿𝑆 at 0.10. That is, 10% of the banks in
distress represents a systemic crisis. By setting 𝜆 = 1, the surplus on banking
operations vanishes in case of a systemic crisis.
4.5.2 Numerical results: three optima
We run the optimization procedure on a two-dimensional grid with intervals
of 0.005. The first dimension corresponds to size and runs from 0.8 to 1.2,
which is centered around the average cost minimizing size of one. The second
dimension represents the capital ratio 𝑦 and runs from 5% to 40%.13
Table 4.5 reports the optimal results in the baseline setup. First, we con-
sider the size in each optimum. The competitive size is 5% larger than the
size of one that minimizes the average cost. In the total surplus optimum,
the optimal size is close to one because larger banks crowd out other banks
in financing projects. Having fewer banks would be suboptimal from a social
point of view. The social welfare optimum takes systemic risk into account.
This reduces the optimal size even further because more banks corresponds
to a more stable system. Although the socially optimal size is smaller than
in the total surplus optimum, the number of banks is also lower. This stems
from a stronger preference for profitable projects to increase the mean re-
turn on assets. The higher return reduces default probabilities, and hence
systemic risk.
Next, we consider the capital ratio. The capital ratio of the total surplus
optimum is substantially higher than the capital ratio in the competitive
13Our computations would extend the grid if the optimum is at a boundary point at
the initial grid.
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equilibrium. Since equity is not tax deductible, the total surplus is higher
for higher capital ratios. This result coincides with the direct impact of 𝑦 on
TS in (4.26). By taking into account the additional effect of the probability
of a systemic crisis, the capital ratio for maximal social welfare increases
further in order to reduce default probabilities. Notably, a higher capital
ratio in the three optima is associated with a smaller size.
Considering individual and systemic default probabilities, moving from
the optimum of CE to TS and from TS to SW shows that the probability of
default PD and systemic risk 𝑃𝑆 are both decreasing. Indeed, this ordering
corresponds to the different weight each equilibrium attaches to the stability
of the system.
The net contracted interest rate 𝑟𝑐 is close to the riskfree rate 𝑟𝑓 of 10%.14
This indicates that our results would not be materially affected by imposing
deposit insurance which would bring 𝑟𝑐 only marginally down to 𝑟𝑓 .15
The welfare measures TS and SW in the two bottom rows of Table 4.5
show that the competitive equilibrium has a lower social welfare that stems
from systemic risk effects. However, by comparing the TS and SW optimum
we find that maximizing total surplus increases capital ratios sufficiently such
that systemic risk is substantially reduced, even without taking systemic risk
explicitly into account.
4.5.3 Policy implications
We consider policies that limit size below the size of the competitive equilib-
rium, 1.05. Similarly, we study capital ratio requirements requiring a ratio
above the capital ratio of the competitive equilibrium (10.0%). We consider
the size and the capital ratio in the social welfare optimum, respectively 1.00
and 37.5%, as the other bound for such policies.
The results are shown in Figure 4.2. The top plots present for each of
the three optima the capital ratio that maximizes social welfare and the cor-
responding level of social welfare. The size varies between the competitive
equilibrium size and the size for optimal social welfare. The horizontal lines
in the figure suggest that a policy which restricts size is an ineffective policy.
More specifically, the optimal capital ratio for banks and society do both not
change under different size restrictions. This result is in line with Proposi-
tion 4 although the model assumptions differ from the conditions in this
14Recall that the corresponding horizon of our long-run model exceeds 5 years.
15In our model, more risk leads to a higher contracted interest rate on deposits without
affecting the expected return on deposits. This corresponds to an insurance scheme with
a fair insurance premium.
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CE TS SW
𝑥 size 1.050 1.005 1.000
𝑦(%) capital ratio 10 24 37.5
𝑛 number of banks 21.1 21.7 21.5
PD(%) probability of default 3.8 0.22 0.04
PS (%) probability of systemic crisis 7.8 0.46 0.08
𝑟𝐴(%) net mean asset return 11.5 12.6 14.0
𝑟𝑐(%) net contracted interest rate 10.0 10.1 10.1
TS total surplus on bank operations 10.0 10.1 10.1
SW social welfare on bank operations 9.2 10.0 10.1
Table 4.5: The three optimums in the baseline model.
This table reports several variables at the three different optimums. CE is the competitive
equilibrium (min𝑥,𝑦 𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦)), TS is the total surplus optimum (max𝑥,𝑦 TS), and SW is
the social welfare optimum (max𝑥,𝑦 SW ). The parameter values are in Table 4.4.
proposition. The condition 𝜂 = 𝑟𝜏 leads to the result that the competitive
capital ratio is insensitive to size. The level of social welfare appears to be
insensitive to size when optimizing social welfare.
By varying the imposed capital ratio 𝑦 in each of the three optima, the
bottom plots in Figure 4.2 show the size that maximizes social welfare and
the corresponding level of social welfare. The optimal size is shown to be
sensitive to the capital ratio. As such, policies that restrict the capital ratio
do affect the optimal size. For given capital ratio 𝑦, the optimal size is
the same in the competitive equilibrium and the optimum maximizing total
surplus. This is in line with our result that 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) = 𝑥TS (𝑦). Therefore,
differences in the optimal competitive size and the optimal size for social
welfare are explained by differences in systemic risk rather than total surplus.
With a low capital requirement, banks prefer a larger size than socially
optimal (left bottom plot). The intuition is that the default probability is
high under a low capital requirement. Then, it is important for individual
banks to utilize the diversification benefits. By contrast, it is for the social
optimum necessary to have a large number of banks to prevent a systemic
crisis. This leads to smaller banks in the social optimum. As the capital
requirement becomes more restrictive, i.e., a higher capital ratio closer to the
social optimum, the difference between the size of the two optima shrinks.
Nonetheless, the social welfare cost due to the size difference is always small
(right bottom plot). This is in line with the observation that policies on size
have small effects on social welfare. In any case, social welfare improves by
4.5. Calibration 85
1 1.05 1.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
x
y
1 1.05 1.1
9
9.5
10
x
S
W
0.1 0.2 0.3
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
y
x
0.1 0.2 0.3
9
9.5
10
y
S
W
CE
TS
SW
Figure 4.2: Size and capital restrictions.
The figure plots the optimal size 𝑥, the optimal capital ratio 𝑦 and social welfare SW as a
function of size and capital. CE is the competitive equilibrium (min𝑥,𝑦 𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦)), TS is the
total surplus optimum (max𝑥,𝑦 𝑇𝑆), and SW is the social welfare optimum (max𝑥,𝑦 𝑆𝑊 ).
The solid line and dashed line coincide in the two bottom plots with a restriction on capital
since 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) = 𝑥TS (𝑦). Parameter values are in Table 4.4.
a stricter capital requirement.
We highlight the following two observations from Figure 4.2. First, a
policy that raises capital ratios is more effective than a policy that restricts
size. Second, it is not necessary to raise the capital requirement to the
socially optimal level. In our calibration, a policy with a capital ratio at
18% instead of the social optimal 37.5% suffices to raise social welfare close
to its optimal value.
4.5.4 Sensitivity analysis
We check the robustness of our results by calibrating our model with different
parameter choices. This serves simultaneously as an investigation on the
impact of alternative policies.
The impact of asset dependence
It is generally acknowledged that correlations are higher during crisis periods.
Instead of the baseline choice 𝜌 = 0.5, we repeat the exercise using a low
correlation (𝜌 = 0.2) and a high correlation (𝜌 = 0.8). Table 4.6 shows
that the correlation has only a clear impact on the size in the competitive
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𝜌 = 0.2 𝜌 = 0.8
CE TS SW CE TS SW
𝑥 1.125 1.005 0.990 1.015 1.000 1.000
𝑦(%) 10 24 38.5 10 24 36
𝑛 19.7 21.7 21.7 21.8 21.8 21.5
PD(%) 3.6 0.21 0.04 3.9 0.22 0.05
𝑃𝑆(%) 9.6 0.54 0.08 6.1 0.36 0.08
𝑟𝐴(%) 11.5 12.6 14.1 11.5 12.6 13.8
𝑟𝑐(%) 10.6 10.0 10.0 10.6 10.1 10.0
TS 10.0 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.1 10.1
SW 9.1 10.0 10.1 9.4 10.0 10.1
Table 4.6: Sensitivity to asset dependence.
This table reports several variables at the three different optimums. Except for the asset
dependence 𝜌, the parameter values are as in Table 4.4. The definition of CE , TS , SW ,
and the variables in the rows is in Table 4.5.
equilibrium. The difference between the competitive size and the socially
optimal size is most pronounced in a prosperous economy where correlations
are low. The left plot in Figure 4.3 shows this effect for a wider range of 𝜌.
The left panel in Figure 4.3 indicates that a policy that restricts size is
potentially helpful for small 𝜌. The more substantial diversification benefits
with a small 𝜌 provokes banks to diversify more by growing large. In doing so,
they neglect the externality on the smaller number of banks in the economy.
Consequently, if the correlation 𝜌 is low, the loss in social welfare at the
competitive equilibrium is higher, and the level of social welfare is lower
(right plot). Nonetheless, a size restriction leads under 𝜌 = 0.2 again to a
suboptimal capital ratio and hence a suboptimal social welfare (not plotted).
The middle plot suggests a general opportunity for policy interventions
on the capital ratio. That is, the state of the economy as measured by the
asset dependence 𝜌 has hardly any effect on the optimal capital ratio and
the welfare gain of a policy that restricts the capital ratio. Our qualita-
tive conclusions regarding policies that restrict size or capital ratios remain
unchanged.
The impact of demand elasticity
We consider the effect of a bad economy where the amount of project in-
vestments is highly sensitive to the offered interest rate. In this setting, the
elasticity of demand 𝑏 is 100 rather than 𝑏 = 25. Consequently, the amount
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Figure 4.3: Sensitivity plots of the asset dependence.
The figure presents the optimal size 𝑥, the optimal capital ratio 𝑦, and social welfare
SW for several values of the asset dependence parameter 𝜌. The solid line is for the
competitive equilibrium (min𝑥,𝑦 𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦)), the dashed line is for maximal total surplus
(max𝑥,𝑦 𝑇𝑆), and the dotted line is for maximal social welfare (max𝑥,𝑦 𝑆𝑊 ). Baseline
parameter values are in Table 4.4.
of investments 𝑄 decreases dramatically. Figure 4.4 shows the impact of
policies on size and capital. Compared to Figure 4.2, the lower amount of
investments reduces social welfare substantially (right plots), and results in
a smaller number of banks (not plotted).
The qualitative result that the socially optimal capital ratio is insensitive
to the size remains unchanged (top left plot). Nevertheless, with the high de-
mand elasticity the socially optimal capital ratio is closer to the competitive
equilibrium capital ratio. This is because by the higher demand elasticity
a deviation from the competitive capital ratio leads to a higher penalty in
terms of written loans 𝑄. Still, social welfare of the competitive equilibrium
is again about 10% lower than the social optimum (top right plot).
Another robust result is that compared to size restrictions, capital re-
quirements are more effective in raising social welfare. For low capital ratios,
the probability of a systemic crisis is much higher due to the higher default
probabilities. With a less strict policy on the capital ratio, it turns out to be
socially optimal to reduce systemic risk by increasing diversification benefits
through larger banks (bottom left plot), at the expense of a smaller number
of banks. In other words, a small number of large banks is socially optimal
for small capital ratios.
By requiring a slightly higher capital ratio at about 12%, the optimal size
is aligned for both the competitive equilibrium and the social optimum. For
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Figure 4.4: Size and capital restrictions for a high demand elasticity.
The figure plots the optimal size 𝑥, the optimal capital ratio 𝑦 and social welfare SW as a
function of size and capital. CE is the competitive equilibrium (min𝑥,𝑦 𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦)), TS is the
total surplus optimum (max𝑥,𝑦 𝑇𝑆), and SW is the social welfare optimum (max𝑥,𝑦 𝑆𝑊 ).
The solid line and the dashed line coincide in the two bottom plots with a restriction on
capital since 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) = 𝑥𝑇𝑆(𝑦). Parameter values are in Table 4.4, except for 𝑏 = 100.
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Figure 4.5: Sensitivity plots.
This figure presents the optimal size 𝑥, the optimal capital ratio 𝑦, and social welfare SW
by varying the uncertainty ?^?, the bankruptcy cost 𝜂, the risk free rate 𝑟𝑓 , or the tax rate
𝜏 . The solid line is for the competitive equilibrium (min𝑥,𝑦 𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦)), the dashed line is
for maximal total surplus (max𝑥,𝑦 𝑇𝑆), and the dotted line is for maximal social welfare
(max𝑥,𝑦 𝑆𝑊 ). Baseline parameter values are in Table 4.4.
such capital ratios, social welfare is also raised to a comparable level (bottom
right plot). Again, it is not necessary to impose a capital requirement close
to the social optimum. A capital requirement of 15% brings social welfare
already close to the social optimum.
The impact of other parameters
Figure 4.5 reports the impact of the parameters ?^?, 𝜂, 𝑟𝑓 and 𝜏 at the optima.
The discussion focuses on the competitive equilibrium (solid line) and the
social optimum (dotted line). First, the result that banks tend to prefer a
larger size and a lower capital ratio than socially optimal is robust for all
parameters. Thus, policies on size and capital have at least some welfare
enhancing effect.
Second, focusing on the uncertainty parameter ?^? (the top row), the com-
petitive size increases with the uncertainty which is in contrast to Proposition
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5. The reason is that the fat-tailed shocks considered here have a different
impact on the probability of default than the uniform shocks considered in
the proposition. The welfare loss at the competitive equilibrium is maximal
for a high uncertainty (right plot), because banks overdiversify to overcome
the high uncertainty. The policy implications in an economy with a high
uncertainty are similar to the low correlation case (Figure 4.3). That is, a
general need for capital policies regardless of the business cycle.
Third, a low bankruptcy cost 𝜂 corresponds to the highest welfare loss
in the competitive equilibrium. For any bankruptcy cost, raising capital
requirements improves social welfare. Hence, bankruptcy costs do not play
a key role in policy discussions.
Fourth, the impact of the risk-free rate 𝑟𝑓 is similar to the analytical
results in Table 4.3: When 𝑟𝑓 is low, competitive banks are smaller and
hold more capital. A low 𝑟𝑓 moves the focus from minimizing the financing
costs towards minimizing the average operational cost. In addition, a low 𝑟𝑓
reduces the tax benefit of debt financing relative to equity financing. As a
consequence, banks prefer a smaller size and hold somewhat more capital.
Society prefers even smaller banks in order to reduce the probability on a
systemic crisis. In general, the welfare loss at the competitive equilibrium
does not depend on 𝑟𝑓 since welfare decreases in both optimums with a
similar magnitude. In our risk-neutral setting, this financing cost 𝑟𝑓 is the
only parameter that materially affects the optimal level of social welfare. The
intuition is that a higher financing cost for banks results in a higher required
asset return, which results in a drop in the number of financed projects and
hence a lower social welfare. The difference between the socially optimal
capital ratio and the competitive capital ratio is maximal when 𝑟𝑓 is low.
This indicates that when monetary policy is loosening, it is important to
tighten prudential policy.
Lastly, concerning the tax rate 𝜏 , a high tax leads to a large welfare loss.
The higher marginal tax rate amplifies the effect of the lower capital ratio
on the surplus in (4.22), and thus social welfare. Therefore, a policy on the
capital ratio is most effective when taxes are high.
4.5.5 Summary
Overall, we draw the following robust conclusions from our calibration.
(𝑖) Size preferences of banks and society are more aligned than capital
preferences. Consequently, policy should target at capital ratios. A
capital policy may endogenously lead to smaller bank sizes which makes
a policy aiming at smaller banks obsolete.
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(𝑖𝑖) Optimal social welfare is approximately obtained when maximizing
total surplus. In conjunction with the fact that 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) = 𝑥𝑇𝑆(𝑦), a
capital requirement is effective in optimizing social welfare. It is not
necessary to raise capital requirements close to the social optimum. In
our calibration, it suffices to choose a capital requirement close to the
average of the capital ratios of the competitive equilibrium and the
social optimum.
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) Policy interventions are particularly helpful if the correlation 𝜌 is low,
the uncertainty ?^? is high, the bankruptcy cost (or risk aversion) 𝜂 is
low, and taxes 𝜏 are high. This corresponds to periods with major
innovations and stringent tax regimes.
(𝑖𝑣) The difference between the socially optimal capital ratio and the com-
petitive capital ratio is maximal when 𝑟𝑓 is low. Thus, a less stringent
monetary policy should be accompanied with a more stringent pruden-
tial policy.
(𝑣) Although the optimal level of social welfare is constant in most of the
parameters, the optimal capital requirement to attain this level may
change substantially when the parameters change. This suggests a
contingent policy on capital requirements.
4.6 Conclusion
We have studied the joint effect of bank size, capital structure, and asset de-
pendence on social welfare. Our analysis takes into account the interaction
between size and capital. Namely, higher capital requirements simultane-
ously result in larger banks if bankruptcy costs are low, and financing costs
and taxes are high. We studied policies on size, capital as well as other policy
parameters.
Without any regulation, banks take a suboptimal size-capital decision.
Banks tend to hold insufficient capital while the size may be too low or
too high (e.g., if the demand elasticity is low). Thus, a policy imposing a
higher capital ratio always helps to increase social welfare. By contrast, a
restriction on bank size has a minor impact particularly in a bad economy
where correlations are high.
Our main conclusion is that capital requirements are more effective than
policy measures on size. Capital requirements may have an additional chan-
nel to limit systemic risk through its effect on size. This effect is relevant
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in economies where dependencies are low, uncertainty is high, bankruptcy
costs (or risk aversion) is low, and taxes are high.
Our study contributes to the policy debate in at least the following two re-
lated directions. First, our results support the countercyclical capital buffer
in Basel III. Building up capital during a good economy (low asset depen-
dence) is more effective for social welfare. Instead, a strict capital require-
ment in bad times with high asset dependence is not particularly effective.
Second, our result illustrates the joint welfare effect of monetary pol-
icy and prudential policy. The financing cost is the only parameter that
materially affects the optimal level of social welfare. It indicates that a
less stringent monetary policy should be accompanied with a more stringent
prudential policy.
Appendix
Appendix
4.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Risk neutrality (E[𝑅𝐷] = 𝑅𝑓 ), together with 𝐷 = 𝑥(1− 𝑦) and (4.2) implies
(4.7). Applying (4.7) to (4.4) yields
E[𝐸𝐵𝑇 ] = E
[︀
[𝑅𝐴𝑥− 𝑐(𝑥)−𝑅𝑐𝐷]+
]︀
= 𝑥E[[𝑅𝐴 − 𝑐(𝑥)− (1− 𝑦)𝑅𝑐]−min (𝑅𝐴 − 𝑐(𝑥)− (1− 𝑦)𝑅𝑐, 0)]
= 𝑥E[𝑅𝐴 − 𝑐(𝑥)−min (𝑅𝐴 − 𝑐(𝑥), (1− 𝑦)𝑅𝑐)]
= 𝑥 [𝜇− 𝑐(𝑥)− (𝑅𝑓 + 𝜂PD) (1− 𝑦)] .
Consequently, the expected after-tax return on the bank’s equity equals
E[𝑟𝐸 ] =
𝜏 (E[𝐸𝐵𝑇 ]− 𝐸)
𝐸
=
𝜏
𝑦
(𝜇− 𝑐(𝑥)− 1− (𝑟𝑓 + 𝜂PD) (1− 𝑦)) (4.34)
We now obtain equation (4.5) from the risk neutrality condition E[𝑟𝐸 ] = 𝑟𝑓 .
Next, we prove the remaining equilibrium equation (4.6). Define the
default threshold of 𝑋
ℎ(𝜇,𝑅𝑐;𝑥) =
𝑐(𝑥) +𝑅𝑐(1− 𝑦)− 𝜇
𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇)
(4.35)
such that a default corresponds to the event {𝑋 < ℎ}. In the following
derivation, we suppress the fixed argument 𝑥 for convenience.
By using 𝑅𝐴 = 𝜇* + 𝜎*𝑋 in the banking equilibrium, we rewrite (4.7)
and (4.5) as respectively
E[min (𝑋,ℎ)] =
𝑐(𝑥)− 𝜇* + (1− 𝑦) + (𝑟𝑓 + 𝜂P(𝑋 < ℎ)) (1− 𝑦)
𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇*)
(4.36)
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0 =
𝑐(𝑥)− 𝜇* + 1 + 𝑟𝑓𝜏 𝑦 + (𝑟𝑓 + 𝜂P(𝑋 < ℎ)) (1− 𝑦)
𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇*)
(4.37)
Subtracting (4.37) from (4.36) results in
E[min (𝑋,ℎ)] = − 𝑦
𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇*)
(︁
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
)︁
(4.38)
Equation (4.6) follows by noting that the equilibrium mean asset return 𝜇*
solves the equilibrium equation (4.38), and 𝐹−1(PD) is another expression
for the default threshold ℎ.
Proof of Proposition 2
We find conditions for existence and uniqueness of the banking equilibrium
(𝑅*𝑐 , 𝜇*,PD
*). Following the proof of Proposition 1, ℎ refers to the default
threshold for 𝑋. Given 𝜇* and 𝑥, the function ℎ : R → R in (4.35) is a
bijection of the gross contracted interest rate on debt (𝑅𝑐) to the default
threshold ℎ. As such, we find conditions for existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium (ℎ*, 𝜇*).
Existence
By (4.38), an equilibrium necessarily satisfies
−1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏
𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇*)
𝑦 ≤ ℎ (𝜇*) ≤ sup(𝑋) (4.39)
By 𝜎2 ≥ 0, it suffices for existence to have
−1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏
𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇𝑙)
𝑦 ≥ inf(𝑋) (4.40)
Hence, the condition in (4.10) is sufficient since 𝑦 ≤ 1.
Next, we derive the sufficient condition for existence in (4.11). Since
𝜎2 ≡ 0, we have ?˜?(𝑥) := 𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇(𝑥, 𝑦)) such that ?˜?(𝑥) is not affected by 𝑅*𝑐
through 𝜇. Substituting (4.1) and (4.5) into (4.7), we get
E
[︁
min
(︁
?˜?(𝑥)𝑋 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
𝑦, (1− 𝑦) (𝑅*𝑐 − 𝑟𝑓 − 𝜂PD)− 1
)︁]︁
= −𝑦 (4.41)
For 𝑅*𝑐 = 0, the right hand side (RHS) exceeds the left hand side (LHS)
since
LHS|𝑅*𝑐=0 < − (1− 𝑦) (𝑟𝑓 + 𝜂PD)− 1 < −1 < −𝑦 = RHS|𝑅*𝑐=0
4.A. Proofs 95
while for 𝑅*𝑐 → ∞ the LHS exceeds the RHS. The continuity in 𝑅*𝑐 of the
LHS of (4.41) implies that (4.41) has a solution in 𝑅*𝑐 . This implies the
sufficient condition in (4.11).
Uniqueness
Under (4.11), the RHS of (4.6) is constant which pins down PD* uniquely.
Then, 𝜇* and 𝑅*𝑐 are also unique by (4.5) and (4.7), respectively.
Proof of Proposition 3
The competitive equilibrium is the special case of the banking equilibrium
where the mean asset return 𝜇* is minimal. The corresponding variables are
denoted with a superscript 𝑐.
(𝑖) We find from (4.9), 𝜇𝑐1 = 𝜇𝑐2 = 0, 𝜎1(𝑥, 𝜇) < 0 and 𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇) > 0, the
partial derivatives of PD*(𝑥, 𝑦) at the competitive equilibrium:
PD𝑐1 =
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
PD*(𝑥, 𝑦)
⃒⃒⃒⃒
(𝑥,𝑦)=(𝑥𝑐,𝑦𝑐)
(4.42)
=
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
𝑔
(︂
𝜎(𝑥, 𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦))
(1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏) 𝑦
)︂⃒⃒⃒⃒
(𝑥,𝑦)=(𝑥𝑐,𝑦𝑐)
(4.43)
= (𝑔′)𝑐
𝜎1(𝑥, 𝜇
𝑐) + 𝜎2(𝑥, 𝜇
𝑐)𝜇𝑐1
(1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏)𝑦𝑐
< 0 (4.44)
PD𝑐2 = (𝑔
′)𝑐
𝜕
𝜕𝑦
𝜎(𝑥𝑐, 𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦))
(1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏)𝑦
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝑦=𝑦𝑐
= −(𝑔′)𝑐𝜎(𝑥
𝑐, 𝜇𝑐)/𝑦𝑐 + 𝜎2(𝑥
𝑐, 𝜇𝑐)𝜇𝑐2
(1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏)𝑦𝑐
< 0 (4.45)
The inequalities in (4.44) and (4.45)) imply under (C)
PD𝑐𝑥 = PD
𝑐
1 +
d𝑥𝑐(𝑦𝑐)
d𝑦
PD𝑐2 < 0
PD𝑐𝑦 =
d𝑦𝑐(𝑥𝑐)
d𝑥
PD𝑐1 + PD
𝑐
2 < 0
For the operational cost function 𝑐(𝑥), it immediately follows that
𝜕
𝜕𝑦 𝑐(𝑥) = 0. Taking the partial derivative of (4.5) to 𝑥 and using
𝜇𝑐1 = 0 and (4.44) gives 𝑐′(𝑥𝑐) > 0. Thus, (C) is equivalent to
d
d𝑦
𝑐(𝑥𝑐(𝑦)) = 𝑐′(𝑥𝑐)
d𝑥𝑐(𝑦𝑐)
d𝑦
> 0
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(𝑖𝑖) The claim on the derivatives in case of 𝜎𝑐1 = 0 is straightforward from
the representation of PD in (4.6) in Proposition 1.
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) Because 𝜇𝑐 = 𝜇*(𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) has a positive definite Hessian matrix at
(𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐):
𝜇𝑐11𝜇
𝑐
22 − (𝜇𝑐12)2 > 0 𝜇𝑐11 > 0 𝜇𝑐22 > 0 (4.46)
Let 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) as in (4.12), which means 𝜇*2(𝑥, 𝑦𝑐(𝑥)) = 0 for all 𝑥. Differ-
entiating to 𝑥,
d
d𝑥
𝜇*2(𝑥, 𝑦
𝑐(𝑥)) = 𝜇*12(𝑥, 𝑦
𝑐(𝑥)) + 𝜇*22(𝑥, 𝑦
𝑐(𝑥))
d𝑦𝑐
d𝑥
= 0
Evaluating this expression at 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑐,
d𝑦𝑐(𝑥𝑐)
d𝑥
= −𝜇
𝑐
12
𝜇𝑐22
. (4.47)
Similarly, 𝜇*1(𝑥𝑐(𝑦), 𝑦) ≡ 0 leads to
d𝑥𝑐(𝑦𝑐)
d𝑦
= −𝜇
𝑐
12
𝜇𝑐11
(4.48)
The cross partial derivative of 𝜇(𝑥, 𝑦) at 𝜇𝑐 follows from (4.5):
𝜇𝑐12 = [(1− 𝑦𝑐)PD𝑐12 − PD𝑐1] 𝜂 (4.49)
By (4.49) and 𝜂 > 0, the inequality in (4.13) is equivalent to 𝜇𝑐12 < 0.
By (4.46)− (4.48), this is equivalent to condition (C).
Proof of Proposition 4 and 5
We combine the proofs of Proposition 4 and 5 because of the similar structure
of the derivations. Existence and uniqueness of the banking equilibrium
follows from 𝜎2(𝑥, 𝜇) ≡ 0 in Proposition 2. From the cdf of 𝑋,
𝐹 (𝑥) =
1
2
√
3
(︁
𝑥+
√
3
)︁
−
√
3 ≤ 𝑥 ≤
√
3,
we define for PD* ∈ [0, 1]
𝐹−1(PD*) =
√
3 (2PD* − 1) .
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Using P
(︀
𝑋 < 𝐹−1 (PD*)
)︀
= PD*,
E
[︀
min
(︀
𝑋,𝐹−1 (PD*)
)︀]︀
= 𝐹−1(PD*)(1− PD*) + 𝐹
−1(PD*)−√3
2
PD*
= 𝐹−1(PD*)
(︂
1− PD
*
2
)︂
−
√
3
2
PD*
=
√
3
2
[(2PD* − 1) (2− PD*)− PD*]
= −
√
3 (PD* − 1)2
Substitution of (4.6), (4.14), and PD* ≤ 1 yields for the banking equilibrium
of a given (size, capital)-pair (𝑥, 𝑦):
PD*(𝑥, 𝑦) = 1−
√︃
(1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏) 𝑦
𝜎20𝑥
−2𝛿 = 1− 𝑤(𝑥)
√
𝑦 (4.50)
where we have defined for brevity the positive and increasing function
𝑤(𝑥) :=
√︂
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
𝑥𝛿
𝜎0
(4.51)
with, as before, 𝑟𝑓 ≥ 0, 𝜏 ∈ (0, 1], 𝜎0 > 0 and 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 14 . The partial
derivatives up to the second order of PD* in (4.50) are
PD*1(𝑥, 𝑦) = −𝑤′(𝑥)
√
𝑦 ≤ 0 (4.52)
PD*2(𝑥, 𝑦) = −
𝑤(𝑥)
2
√
𝑦
≤ 0 (4.53)
PD*11(𝑥, 𝑦) = −𝑤′′(𝑥)
√
𝑦 (4.54)
PD*12(𝑥, 𝑦) = −
𝑤′(𝑥)
2
√
𝑦
(4.55)
PD*22(𝑥, 𝑦) =
𝑤(𝑥)
4𝑦
√
𝑦
(4.56)
Differentiating (4.5), and substituting (4.52)-(4.56)
𝜇*1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑐
′(𝑥)− 𝜂𝑤′(𝑥)√𝑦 (1− 𝑦) (4.57)
𝜇*2(𝑥, 𝑦) = −𝜂
[︂
1
2
√
𝑦
𝑤(𝑥)− 3
2
√
𝑦𝑤(𝑥) + 1
]︂
+ 𝑟𝑓
(︂
1
𝜏
− 1
)︂
(4.58)
𝜇*11(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑐
′′(𝑥)− 𝜂𝑤′′(𝑥)√𝑦 (1− 𝑦) (4.59)
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𝜇*12(𝑥, 𝑦) =
1
2
𝜂𝑤′(𝑥)
1√
𝑦
(3𝑦 − 1) (4.60)
𝜇*22(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝜂𝑤(𝑥)
(︂
1 + 3𝑦
4𝑦
√
𝑦
)︂
(4.61)
The results above are for the banking equilibrium of any given (𝑥, 𝑦). Next,
we apply these results to the competitive equilibrium (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐), which is the
special case where the mean asset return 𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦) is minimal. As before, we
denote the corresponding variables with a superscript 𝑐. The first and second
order derivative of 𝑤(𝑥) at 𝑥𝑐 are denoted by 𝑤𝑐1 and 𝑤𝑐11, respectively. We
adopt a similar notation for 𝑐𝑐, the average cost function 𝑐(𝑥) at 𝑥𝑐.
The inequality (4.13) in Proposition 3 holds if and only if 𝑦𝑐 < 13 . To see
this, use (4.52) and (4.55) to find for 𝑦𝑐 < 13 ,
(1− 𝑦𝑐)PD𝑐12 =
(︂
1− 1
𝑦𝑐
)︂
𝑤𝑐1
√
𝑦𝑐
2
< −𝑤𝑐1
√
𝑦𝑐 = PD𝑐1
Thus, by Proposition 3(𝑖𝑖𝑖), the capital ratio increases in the size (𝑦𝑐𝑥 > 0)
and the size increases in the capital ratio (𝑥𝑐𝑦 > 0) if and only if 𝑦𝑐 <
1
3 .
In line with our technical assumption, the choice 𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑥𝛾 with 𝛾 > 1
leads to properly defined functions 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) and 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) near the competitive
equilibrium. More specifically, (𝑖) 𝜇* is convex in 𝑥 along (𝑥, 𝑦𝑐(𝑥)), and
(𝑖𝑖) 𝜇* is convex in 𝑦 along (𝑥𝑐(𝑦), 𝑦). Statement (𝑖) follows from isolating
𝜂
√
𝑦(1 − 𝑦) in (4.57) with 𝜇𝑐1 = 0, and substituting this result into (4.59)
with the imposed restriction 𝛿 < 𝛾:
𝜇𝑐11 = 𝛾 (𝛾 − 1)𝑥𝛾−2 − 𝛾 (𝛿 − 1)𝑥𝛾−2 > 0
Statement (𝑖𝑖), the convexity of 𝜇* in 𝑦 at (𝑥𝑐(𝑦), 𝑦), is straightforward from
𝜇*22 in (4.61). This confirms that 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) and 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) lead to the unique minimum
of 𝜇* conditional on 𝑦 and 𝑥, respectively.
Next, we find the unique pair (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) of the competitive equilibrium in
terms of the parameters. The size 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) minimizes 𝜇 given the capital ratio
𝑦. From 𝜇1(𝑥𝑐(𝑦), 𝑦) = 0, (4.15), (4.51) and (4.57), we obtain
𝑥𝑐(𝑦) =
(︃
𝜂?˜?𝑓𝛿
𝛾𝜎0
√
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)
)︃1/(𝛾−𝛿)
. (4.62)
The function 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) has an inverted U-shape for the optimal size 𝑥 as a
function of the capital ratio 𝑦. This optimal size is zero if 𝑦 = 0 or 𝑦 = 1,
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and maximal at 𝑦 = 13 , i.e.,
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) ≤
(︃
2𝜂?˜?𝑓𝛿
3
√
3𝛾𝜎0
)︃1/(𝛾−𝛿)
:= 𝑥max.
The capital ratio 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) minimizes 𝜇* given the size 𝑥. From 𝜇2(𝑥, 𝑦𝑐(𝑥)) = 0,
(4.15), (4.16), (4.51) and (4.58), we obtain
0 =
1
2𝜎0
𝜂?˜?𝑓𝑥
𝛿
(︃
1√︀
𝑦𝑐(𝑥)
− 3
√︀
𝑦𝑐(𝑥)
)︃
+ 𝜂 − 𝑟𝜏 (4.63)
which gives
𝑥𝛿 =
2 (𝜂 − 𝑟𝜏 )𝜎0
𝜂?˜?𝑓
(︂
3
√︀
𝑦𝑐(𝑥)− 1√
𝑦𝑐(𝑥)
)︂ 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) ̸= 1
3
(4.64)
Equation (4.64) defines 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) implicitly. The denominator always increases
with 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) and switches sign at 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) = 13 , which implies lim𝑥→∞ 𝑦
𝑐(𝑥) = 13 .
This corresponds to 𝜇12 = 0 in (4.60), and 𝑥𝑐𝑦 = 𝑦𝑐𝑥 = 0. As a consequence,
the sign of the numerator in (4.64) has an important effect. It indicates if
the size and the capital ratio move in the same direction. This has impor-
tant implications for the effect of the parameters. Based on the sign of the
numerator of (4.64), we distinguish three cases:
(𝑖) 𝜂 > 𝑟𝜏 :
The positive numerator in (4.64) and 𝑥𝛿 ≥ 0 imply 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) > 13 , and 𝑦𝑐(𝑥)
decreases in 𝑥. Capital ratios 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) ≤ 13 are excluded because no 𝑥 ≥ 0
corresponds to such 𝑦𝑐(𝑥). Thus, 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) is a decreasing function with
𝑦𝑐
(︂(︁
(𝜂−𝑟𝜏 )𝜎0
𝜂?˜?𝑓
)︁1/𝛿)︂
= 1 and asymptotic lower bound lim𝑥→∞ 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) =
1
3 . From 𝑦
𝑐 > 13 , we know that 𝑦
𝑐
𝑥 < 0 and 𝑥𝑐𝑦 < 0 hold.
(𝑖𝑖) 𝜂 = 𝑟𝜏
The terms with
√︀
𝑦𝑐(𝑥) in (4.63) sum to zero. As a consequence,
{(𝑥, 𝑦𝑐(𝑥)) : 𝑥 ≥ 0} is a horizontal line with 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) ≡ 13 and 𝑦𝑐𝑥 ≡ 0.
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝜂 < 𝑟𝜏 :
The negative numerator in (4.64) and 𝑥𝛿 ≥ 0 give 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) < 13 and
𝑦𝑐(𝑥) increases in 𝑥. Here, capital ratios 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) ≥ 13 are excluded as
no 𝑥 ≥ 0 corresponds to such 𝑦𝑐(𝑥). Now, 𝑦𝑐 is an increasing function
with asymptotic bounds lim𝑥↓0 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) = 0 and lim𝑥→∞ 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) = 13 . From
𝑦𝑐 < 13 , we obtain 𝑦
𝑐
𝑥 > 0 and 𝑥𝑐𝑦 > 0.
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Figure 4.6:
Phase diagram of 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) and the three possible shapes for 𝑦𝑐(𝑥).
The figure shows the optimal size curve 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) and three possible shapes for 𝑦𝑐(𝑥). The
parameters 𝑦1 and 𝑥max are defined in (4.17) and (4.21). The curves are defined in (4.62)
and (4.64). The shape of 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) is determined by the bankruptcy cost 𝜂, the risk free rate
𝑟𝑓 , and the tax rate 𝜏 = 1 − 𝜏 . Horizontal and vertical arrows indicate changes towards
the optimal size 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) and the optimal capital ratio 𝑦𝑐(𝑥), respectively.
The phase diagram in Figure 4.6 shows an example for each of the three
possible cases. The competitive equilibrium (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) is determined by the
cutting points of 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) and 𝑦𝑐(𝑥). In case (𝑖), there are at most two intersec-
tion points (𝐴 and 𝐵 in Figure 4.6), while there exists a unique intersection
point in cases (𝑖𝑖) and (𝑖𝑖𝑖), the points 𝐶 and 𝐷, respectively. We show this
formally by studying the analytical properties of the cutting points of the
curves 𝑥𝑐(𝑦) and 𝑦𝑐(𝑥), in respectively (4.62) and (4.64).
It is most instructive to consider the curves in (
√
𝑥, 𝑦)-space. Rewriting
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the equilibrium equations (4.62) and (4.64) produces
√
𝑥 =
(︃
𝜂?˜?𝑓𝛿
𝛾𝜎0
√
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)
)︃ 1
2(𝛾−𝛿)
(4.65)
√
𝑥 =
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒ 2𝜎0 [𝜂 − 𝑟𝜏 ]
𝜂?˜?𝑓
(︁
3
√
𝑦 − 1√𝑦
)︁
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒⃒
1
2𝛿
. (4.66)
We first show that the RHS of (4.65) is concave in 𝑦. After some algebra,
the second order derivative to 𝑦 is
d2
d𝑦2
(
√
𝑦 (1− 𝑦))𝑎 = 𝑎 (√𝑦 (1− 𝑦))𝑎 𝑛𝑎(𝑦)
4 (𝑦 − 1)2 𝑦2
where 𝑎 := 12(𝛾−𝛿) ∈
(︀
0, 23
)︀
and
𝑛𝑎(𝑦) := 3 (3𝑎− 2) 𝑦2 − 2 (3𝑎− 2) 𝑦 + 𝑎− 2.
The denominator is nonnegative, while the numerator 𝑛𝑎(𝑦) has an ex-
tremum at 𝑦 = 13 . At 𝑦 ∈
{︀
0, 13 , 1
}︀
, the numerator is given by respectively
𝑛𝑎(0) = 𝑎− 2 < 0
𝑛𝑎
(︂
1
3
)︂
=
1
3
(3𝑎− 2)− 2
3
(3𝑎− 2) + 𝑎− 2 = −4
3
< 0
𝑛𝑎(1) = 3 (3𝑎− 2)− 2 (3𝑎− 2) + 𝑎− 2 = 4𝑎− 4 < 0
This implies that the numerator is negative for all 𝑦 ∈ (0, 1), and so √︀𝑥𝑐(𝑦)
is a strictly concave function at the interval (0, 1).
Next, we show that the RHS of (4.66) is convex in 𝑦, notice that
d2
d𝑦2
⃒⃒⃒⃒
3
√
𝑦 − 1√
𝑦
⃒⃒⃒⃒𝑏
= 𝑏
⃒⃒⃒⃒
3𝑦 − 1√
𝑦
⃒⃒⃒⃒𝑏 𝑛𝑏(𝑦)
4𝑦2 (3𝑦 − 1)2 (4.67)
where 𝑏 := − 12𝛿 < −2 and
𝑛𝑏(𝑦) = 9 (𝑏− 2) 𝑦2 + 6 (𝑏− 2) 𝑦 + 2 + 𝑏.
The numerator term 𝑛𝑏(𝑦) in (4.67) is decreasing if 𝑦 ∈ (0, 1) with maximum
𝑛𝑏(0) = 2 + 𝑏 < 0. The last denominator term in (4.67) is positive on
(0, 1]∖{13}. The second order derivative of the RHS in (4.66) is equal to
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(4.67) scaled by a certain positive constant if 𝜂 ̸= 𝑟𝜏 . This means that
the second order derivative of (4.66) is positive for each 𝑦 ∈ [0, 1]∖{︀13}︀.
Therefore, the curve (
√
𝑥, 𝑦𝑐(𝑥)) is convex in 𝑦 if 𝜂 ̸= 𝑟𝜏 .
Since a convex line and a concave line share at most two points of inter-
section, it follows that the curves
(︁√︀
𝑥𝑐(𝑦), 𝑦
)︁
and (
√
𝑥, 𝑦𝑐(𝑥)) have at most
two intersection points if 𝜂 ̸= 𝑟𝜏 . For 𝜂 = 𝑟𝜏 (case (𝑖𝑖)), this follows from
𝑦𝑐(𝑥) ≡ 13 . A monotonic transformation from (
√
𝑥, 𝑦)-space back to (𝑥, 𝑦)-
space will, of course, not change the number of intersection points. For the
three different cases, we have
(𝑖) 𝜂 > 𝑟𝜏 : In this case, 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) > 13 , and the curves have either zero, one,
or two points of intersection. The arrows point in the direction of a
lower 𝜇*. In case of no intersection point, it is straightforward from the
direction of the arrows that the optimum 𝜇𝑐 (the minimal 𝜇*) is the
boundary point (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) = (0, 1). In case of a single intersection point,
any deviation from this point results into an increase in 𝜇*. Thus, this
single intersection point is the minimizer of 𝜇*. Two intersection points
produce an additional unstable equilibrium. The arrows in Figure 4.6
suggest that the equilibrium 𝐴 in the Northwest with the smaller size
𝑥 and the higher capital ratio 𝑦 is the unstable equilibrium. Moving
towards the Southeast equilibrium 𝐵 decreases 𝜇*. Hence, the unique
minimum of 𝜇* is at 𝐵.
(𝑖𝑖) 𝜂 = 𝑟𝜏 : The pair (𝑥𝑐
(︀
1
3
)︀
, 13) is the unique point of intersection 𝐶 in
Figure 4.6.
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝜂 < 𝑟𝜏 , we have 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) < 13 . From
𝑑
d𝑦𝑥
𝑐(0) → ∞, lim𝑥→∞ 𝑦𝑐(𝑥) = 13 ,
and the intersection point 𝑥𝑐(0) = 𝑦𝑐(0) = 0, we obtain that a unique
interior competitive equilibrium (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) exists that satisfies (4.62) and
(4.64), simultaneously. The arrows in Figure 4.6 indicate that this
interior solution 𝐷 is the minimizer of 𝜇*.
Hence, the competitive equilibrium is unique in each of the three cases.
Next, we express the optimal solution (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) in terms of the parameters.
Substitution of (4.62) in (4.64) and using the positive sign of 𝑥𝛿 gives
⃒⃒⃒⃒
3
√
𝑦𝑐 − 1√
𝑦𝑐
⃒⃒⃒⃒ (︃
𝜂?˜?𝑓𝛿
𝛾𝜎0
√
𝑦𝑐 (1− 𝑦𝑐)
)︃𝛿/(𝛾−𝛿)
=
𝜎0
?˜?𝑓
⃒⃒⃒⃒
2− 2𝑟𝜏
𝜂
⃒⃒⃒⃒
(4.68)
Define 𝜁 := 𝛾/𝛿 > 4 which gives for any 𝑦𝑐 ∈ (0, 1)∖{13} an important
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expression in terms of the model parameters:
√
𝑦𝑐 (1− 𝑦𝑐)
⃒⃒⃒⃒
3
√
𝑦𝑐 − 1√
𝑦𝑐
⃒⃒⃒⃒𝜁−1
=
𝜁
𝜂
𝜎𝜁0(︀
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
)︀𝜁/2
⃒⃒⃒⃒
2− 2𝑟𝜏
𝜂
⃒⃒⃒⃒𝜁−1
(4.69)
where we used (4.15). Define for the LHS and RHS of (4.69), respectively:
𝜑(𝑦; 𝜁) :=
√
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)
⃒⃒⃒⃒
3
√
𝑦 − 1√
𝑦
⃒⃒⃒⃒𝜁−1
(4.70)
𝜓 (𝜂; 𝑟𝑓 , 𝜎0, 𝜏 , 𝜁) :=
𝜁
𝜂
𝜎𝜁0(︀
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
)︀𝜁/2
⃒⃒⃒⃒
2− 2𝑟𝜏
𝜂
⃒⃒⃒⃒𝜁−1
(4.71)
The left panel in Figure 4.7 sketches the shape of 𝜑 as a function of 𝑦. The
competitive capital ratio must satisfy 𝜑(𝑦𝑐) = 𝜓. As discussed before, 𝑦𝑐− 13
has the same sign as 𝜂 − 𝑟𝜏 . Thus, the left panel in Figure 4.7 provides at
most two solutions for the equation 𝜑(𝑦) = 𝜓. When two solutions exist,
which may occur if 𝜂 > 𝑟𝜏 , we have shown that the smallest solution on(︀
1
3 , 1
)︀
corresponds to the global minimum (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) of 𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦). To find an
upper bound for this solution, we derive an explicit expression for the point
𝑦1 ∈
(︀
1
3 , 1
)︀
that satisfies 𝜑′(𝑦1) = 0.
To formally study the shape and derivative of 𝜑, it is convenient to con-
sider a monotonic transform of 𝜑:
𝜑(𝑦) := ln (𝜑(𝑦; 𝜁)) (4.72)
= ln (
√
𝑦) + ln (1− 𝑦) + (𝜁 − 1) ln
⃒⃒⃒⃒
3
√
𝑦 − 1√
𝑦
⃒⃒⃒⃒
The derivatives of 𝜑(𝑦) and 𝜑(𝑦) have the same sign if 𝜑(𝑦) > 0, i.e. if 𝑦 ̸= 13 .
Hence, 𝑦1 is also a zero of 𝜑′. The latter derivative is
𝜑′(𝑦) =
3(𝜁 + 2)𝑦2 − 2(𝜁 + 2)𝑦 + 2− 𝜁
2𝑦(𝑦 − 1)(3𝑦 − 1)
For 𝑦𝑐 > 13 , 𝜑
′(𝑦𝑐) > 0 is equivalent to
ℎ(𝑦𝑐) := 3 (𝜁 + 2) (𝑦𝑐)2 − 2 (𝜁 + 2) 𝑦𝑐 + 2− 𝜁 < 0
Similarly, if 𝑦𝑐 < 13 then 𝜑
′ is positive if and only if ℎ(𝑦𝑐) > 0. The zeros of
ℎ and so 𝜑′ are at
𝑦0 =
1
3 − 23
√︁
𝜁−1
𝜁+2 < 0 𝑦1 =
1
3 +
2
3
√︁
𝜁−1
𝜁+2 < 1 (4.73)
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Figure 4.7: The functions 𝜑(𝑦), 𝜓(𝜂), and 𝑟(𝜂).
The figure shows the functions 𝜑(𝑦), 𝜓(𝜂), and 𝑟(𝜂) which are defined in respectively
(4.70), (4.71), and (4.74).
The function ℎ satisfies ℎ(0) = 2 − 𝜁 < 0 and ℎ(1) = 4. It has a global
minimum ℎ(13) =
4
3 (1− 𝜁) < 0. Considering 𝑦𝑐 ∈ [0, 1], the function ℎ is
only positive at the interval (𝑦1, 1]. Hence, the function 𝜑 decreases on the
interval 𝐼0 :=
(︀
0, 13
)︀ ∪ (𝑦1, 1], and increases on 𝐼1 := (︀13 , 𝑦1)︀. The extremal
points of the continuous 𝜑 are
𝜑(0; 𝜁)→∞ 𝜑(𝑦1; 𝜁) = √𝑦1 (1− 𝑦1)
(︁
3
√
𝑦1 − 1√𝑦1
)︁𝜁−1
> 0
𝜑
(︀
1
3 ; 𝜁
)︀
= 0 𝜑(1; 𝜁) = 0
The preceding results imply the following results on the competitive equi-
librium (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) with minimal 𝜇*(𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) = 𝜇𝑐:
(𝑖) 𝜂 ≤ 𝑟𝜏 :
a unique equilibrium with 𝑦𝑐 ≤ 13 and 𝑥𝑐 ≤ 𝑥max
(𝑖𝑖) 𝜂 > 𝑟𝜏 and 𝜑 (𝑦1) ≥ 𝜓 (𝜂; 𝑟𝑓 , 𝜎0, 𝜏 , 𝜁):
a unique equilibrium with 𝑦𝑐 ∈ (︀13 , 𝑦1]︀ and 𝑥𝑐 < 𝑥max
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝜂 > 𝑟𝜏 and 𝜑 (𝑦1) < 𝜓 (𝜂; 𝑟𝑓 , 𝜎0, 𝜏 , 𝜁):
a boundary solution (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) = (0, 1)
where 𝑥max =
(︁
2𝜂?˜?𝑓
3
√
3𝜎0𝜁
)︁1/(𝛾−𝛿)
and 𝑦1 = 13 +
2
3
√︁
𝜁−1
2+𝜁 .
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To guarantee an interior solution in case (𝑖𝑖𝑖), we derive a sufficient con-
dition which ensures 𝜑 (𝑦1) ≥ 𝜓 (𝜂; 𝑟𝑓 , 𝜎0, 𝜏 , 𝜁). Define 𝜂 := 1𝜂 , and
𝑎 := 2
(︃
𝜁𝜎𝜁0
(1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏)
𝜁/2
)︃ 1
𝜁−1
> 0
𝑟(𝜂) := 𝜓
1
𝜁−1 = 𝑎𝜂
1
𝜁−1 (1− 𝑟𝜏𝜂) (4.74)
The right panel in Figure 4.7 sketches the shape of 𝜓 and 𝑟 as a function
of 𝜂. As we are considering case (𝑖𝑖𝑖), it follows that 𝜂 < 1/𝑟𝜏 holds. The
condition 𝜑 (𝑦1) ≥ 𝜓 is thus equivalent to
𝜑 (𝑦1)
1
𝜁−1 ≥ 𝑟(𝜂). (4.75)
Notice that 𝑟(0) = 𝑟
(︁
1
𝑟𝜏
)︁
= 0, and
𝑟′(𝜂) = 𝑎𝜂
1
𝜁−1
(︂
1
𝜁 − 1
(︂
1
𝜂
− 𝑟𝜏
)︂
− 𝑟𝜏
)︂
=
𝑎
𝜁 − 1𝜂
2−𝜁
𝜁−1 (1− 𝜁𝑟𝜏𝜂)
𝑟′
(︂
1
𝜁𝑟𝜏
)︂
= 0
𝑟′′(𝜂) = − 𝑎
𝜁 − 1𝜂
2−𝜁
𝜁−1
(︂
𝜁 − 2
𝜁 − 1
1
𝜂
+ 𝜁𝑟𝜏
)︂
< 0
Thus, the function 𝑟 attains its maximum on [0, 1𝑟𝜏 ] at
1
𝜁𝑟𝜏
. Therefore, (4.75)
holds with equality for some 𝜂 if and only if
max
𝜂
𝑟(𝜂) = 𝑟
(︂
1
𝜁𝑟𝜏
)︂
≥ 𝜑 (𝑦1)
1
𝜁−1 . (4.76)
If condition (4.76) holds strictly then two distinct 𝜂 at
(︁
0, 1𝑟𝜏
)︁
solve 𝑟(𝜂) =
𝜑(𝑦1)
1
𝜁−1 . One solution 𝜂0 ∈
(︁
0, 1𝜁𝑟𝜏
)︁
and another solution 𝜂1 ∈
(︁
1
𝜁𝑟𝜏
, 1𝑟𝜏
)︁
. In
addition, 𝑟(𝜂) > 𝜑(𝑦1)
1
𝜁−1 is equivalent to 𝜂 ∈ (𝜂0, 𝜂1) because 𝑟′′ < 0. Then,
no equilibrium exists on the interval (𝜂0, 𝜂1) between the two solutions. For
such 𝜂, we obtain the boundary solution (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) = (0, 1). Thus, an interior
equilibrium exists if and only if 𝜂 = 1𝜂 ∈ [0, 𝜂0] ∪ [𝜂1, 1/𝑟𝜏 ].
We first study a lower bound for 𝜂0. After that, we provide an upper
bound for 𝜂1. Together, the bounds give a sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of an interior equilibrium (𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐).
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An upper bound on 𝑟 in (4.74) is given by 𝑟𝑈0 (𝜂) := 𝑎𝜂
1
𝜁−1 , which produces
the following lower bound of 𝜂0 on
(︁
0, 1𝜁𝑟𝜏
)︁
𝜂𝐿0 =
𝜑 (𝑦1)
𝑎𝜁−1
Indeed, 𝑟(𝜂) < 𝑟𝑈 (𝜂) < 𝜑 (𝑦1)
1
𝜁−1 for all 𝜂 ∈ (0, 𝜂𝐿0 ) such that (4.75) is
satisfied.16
For an upper bound on 𝜂1, notice that 𝜂
1
𝜁−1 ≤ (1/𝑟𝜏 )
1
𝜁−1 since 𝜂 ≤ 1/𝑟𝜏
holds in the relevant case (𝑖𝑖𝑖). Therefore, an upper bound on 𝑟(𝜂) at the
interval [0, 1/𝑟𝜏 ] is given by
𝑟𝑈1 (𝜂) := 𝑎 (1/𝑟𝜏 )
1
𝜁−1 (1− 𝑟𝜏𝜂)
Letting 𝑟𝑈1
(︀
𝜂𝑈1
)︀
= 𝜑 (𝑦1)
1
𝜁−1 implies the following upper bound on 𝜂1
𝜂𝑈1 =
1
𝑟𝜏
(︂
1− 1
𝑎
[𝑟𝜏 𝜑 (𝑦1)]
1
𝜁−1
)︂
The upper bound 𝜂𝑈1 is an upper bound for the solution 𝜂1 of the original
equation 𝑟 (𝜂) = 𝜑 (𝑦1)
1
𝜁−1 . Since this solution is above 1𝜁𝑟𝜏 , the upper bound
𝜂𝑈1 is on
(︁
1
𝜁𝑟𝜏
, 1𝑟𝜏
)︁
.17
All 𝜂 ≤ 𝜂𝐿0 and all 𝜂 ≥ 𝜂𝑈1 satisfy (4.75). Provided (4.76) holds, a
sufficient condition for 𝜑 (𝑦1) ≥ 𝜓 is 𝜂 /∈ [𝜂0, 𝜂1] ⊂ [𝜂𝐿0 , 𝜂𝑈1 ]. In terms of
𝜂 = 1/𝜂, it follows that a sufficient condition is 𝜂 /∈ [𝜂𝑎, 𝜂𝑏] where
𝜂𝑎 :=
1
𝜂𝑈1
=
𝑟𝜏
1− 𝜑 (𝑦1)
1
𝜁−1 𝑟
1
𝜁−1
𝜏
𝑎
=
𝑟𝜏
1− 12
(︁
1
𝜁𝜑 (𝑦1) ?˜?
𝜁
𝑓𝜎
−𝜁
0 𝑟𝜏
)︁ 1
𝜁−1
𝜂𝑏 :=
1
𝜂𝐿0
=
(2𝜎0)
𝜁𝜁
2𝜑 (𝑦1) (1 + 𝑟𝑓/𝜏)
𝜁/2
16By 𝑟′(0) → ∞, the solution 𝜂0 could be small such that is corresponds to a very
high 𝜂. Bounds 𝜂𝐿0 ≤ 1 have no practical interpretation since 𝜂 = 1/𝜂 pertains to the
bankruptcy cost on each unit of debt.
17One can show that linearizing 𝑟 around 𝜂 = 1/𝑟𝜏 produces the same upper bound
𝜂𝑈1 .
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This proves that 𝜂 /∈ [𝜂𝑎, 𝜂𝑏] is sufficient to guarantee the existence of an
interior equilibrium.
The bound 𝜂𝑎 exceeds 𝑟𝜏 = 𝑟𝑓
(︀
1
𝜏 − 1
)︀
, which means that the correspond-
ing equilibrium capital ratio 𝑦𝑐 ∈ (︀13 , 1]︀ where the restriction 𝜑 (𝑦𝑐) ≥ 𝜓 may
bind (case (𝑖𝑖𝑖)). Using (4.69), the bound 𝜂𝑏 exceeds 𝜁𝑟𝜏 . This proves Propo-
sition 4 except for the sign of the derivative of PD . We find the latter jointly
with the comparative statics in Proposition 5.
To study the marginal effect of the parameters 𝜎𝜁0 , 𝜂, 𝑟𝑓 , and 𝜏 on 𝑦
𝑐,
use 𝜑(𝑦𝑐) := ln (𝜑(𝑦𝑐; 𝜁)) from (4.72), and
𝜓 (𝜂; 𝑟𝑓 , 𝜎0, 𝜏 , 𝜁) := ln (𝜓 (𝜂; 𝑟𝑓 , 𝜎0, 𝜏 , 𝜁))
where 𝜑 and 𝜓 are as in (4.70) and (4.71), respectively. The identity 𝜑(𝑦𝑐) =
𝜓 from (4.69) implies for any parameter 𝑝 ∈ {𝜎0, 𝜂, 𝑟𝑓 , 𝜏}
d𝑦𝑐
d𝑝
=
(︃
d𝜑(𝑦𝑐)
d𝑦
)︃−1
d𝜓
d𝑝
=
𝜓𝑝
𝜑𝑐𝑦
(4.77)
As argued after (4.73), 𝜑𝑦(𝑦𝑐)) < 0 is equivalent to 𝑦𝑐 < 13 , which is the
same as 𝜂 < 𝑟𝜏 = 𝑟𝑓 (1/𝜏 − 1). Therefore,
𝜑𝑦(𝑦
𝑐)
{︃
< 0 if 𝜂 < 𝑟𝜏
> 0 if 𝜂 > 𝑟𝜏
(4.78)
We assess the effect of the parameters on 𝜓, and derive the total effect on 𝑦𝑐
by combining (4.77) and (4.78). We assume an interior minimum of 𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦),
or equivalently 𝜑 (𝑦1) ≥ 𝜓 when 𝜂 > 𝑟𝜏 .
(𝑖) 𝜎0: Because 𝜓𝜎0 > 0, we find from (4.77) that the capital ratio 𝑦𝑐
increases with the volatility scalar 𝜎0 if and only if 𝜂 > 𝑟𝜏 .
(𝑖𝑖) 𝜂: Differentiation to 𝜂 yields
d𝜓
d𝜂
=
d
d𝜂
[︂
− ln (𝜂) + (𝜁 − 1) ln
⃒⃒⃒⃒
2− 2𝑟𝜏
𝜂
⃒⃒⃒⃒]︂
=
1
𝜂
𝜂 − 𝜁𝑟𝜏
𝑟𝜏 − 𝜂
Therefore, 𝜓𝜂 > 0 if and only if one of the following two conditions
holds:
(𝑎) 𝑟𝜏 < 𝜂 < 𝜁𝑟𝜏
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(𝑏) 𝜁𝑟𝜏 < 𝜂 < 𝑟𝜏
We exclude case (𝑏) since 𝜁 ≥ 4. Hence, 𝜓𝜂 > 0 if and only if
𝜂 ∈ (𝑟𝜏 , 𝜁𝑟𝜏 ). This indicates 𝑦𝑐𝜂 = 𝜓𝜂/𝜑𝑦 > 0 if and only if 𝜂 ∈ [0, 𝜁𝑟𝜏 ).
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑟𝑓 : Differentiating 𝜓 to 𝑟𝑓 ,
d𝜓
d𝑟𝑓
=
d
d𝑟𝑓
[︂
−𝜁
2
ln
(︁
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
)︁
+ (𝜁 − 1) ln
⃒⃒⃒⃒
2− 2𝑟𝜏
𝜂
⃒⃒⃒⃒]︂
= −1
2
𝜁
𝑟𝑓 + 𝜏
− (𝜁 − 1) (1/𝜏 − 1)
𝜂 − 𝑟𝜏
The denominator of the second term changes sign at 𝜂 = 𝑟𝜏 . We have
𝜓𝑟𝑓 < 0 if 𝜂 > 𝑟𝜏 . From 𝜓𝑟𝑓 > 0 for 𝜂 = 0 and
d
d𝜂𝜓𝑟𝑓 > 0 for 𝜂 ∈ [0, 𝑟𝜏 ),
it follows that 𝜓𝑟𝑓 > 0 for all 𝜂 ∈ [0, 𝑟𝜏 ). Now (4.77) gives that the
capital ratio decreases with 𝑟𝑓 : 𝑦𝑐𝑟𝑓 = 𝜓𝑟𝑓 /𝜑𝑦 < 0 for all 𝜂.
(𝑖𝑣) 𝜏 : We study the effect of the complement 𝜏 = 1− 𝜏 . Differentiating 𝜓
to 1𝜏 ,
d𝜓
d (1/𝜏)
=
d
d (1/𝜏)
[︂
−𝜁
2
ln
(︁
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
)︁
+ (𝜁 − 1) ln
⃒⃒⃒⃒
2− 2𝑟𝜏
𝜂
⃒⃒⃒⃒]︂
= −1
2
𝜁𝑟𝑓𝜏
𝜏 + 𝑟𝑓
− (𝜁 − 1) 𝑟𝑓
𝜂 − 𝑟𝜏
The denominator of the second term changes sign at 𝜂 = 𝑟𝜏 . Along
similar lines as 𝜓𝑟𝑓 , it can be shown that 𝜓1/𝜏 < 0 if 𝜂 > 𝑟𝜏 , and
𝜓1/𝜏 > 0 if 𝜂 < 𝑟𝜏 . This gives that for all 𝜂 that the capital ratio
decreases with 1𝜏 , which gives 𝑦
𝑐
𝜏 < 0.
Collecting the previous results gives the sensitivity results of 𝑦𝑐.
We do a similar sensitivity analysis on 𝑥𝑐. Using 𝜁 = 𝛾/𝛿, we find from
equation (4.62)
(𝜁 − 1) ln
(︁
𝑥𝑐(𝑦)𝛿
)︁
= ln
(︃
𝜂?˜?𝑓
𝜁𝜎0
√
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)
)︃
with derivatives
(𝜁 − 1) d
d𝑦
ln
(︁
𝑥𝑐(𝑦)𝛿
)︁
=
1
2
1− 3𝑦
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)
4.A. Proofs 109
(𝜁 − 1) d
d𝜎0
ln
(︁
𝑥𝑐(𝑦)𝛿
)︁
= − 1
𝜎0
+
1
2
1− 3𝑦
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)𝑦𝜎0
(𝜁 − 1) d
d𝜂
ln
(︁
𝑥𝑐(𝑦)𝛿
)︁
=
1
𝜂
+
1
2
1− 3𝑦
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)𝑦𝜂
(𝜁 − 1) d
d𝑟𝑓
ln
(︁
𝑥𝑐(𝑦)𝛿
)︁
=
1
?˜?𝑓
d?˜?𝑓
d𝑟𝑓
+
1
2
1− 3𝑦
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)𝑦𝑟𝑓
=
1
2 (𝜏 + 𝑟𝑓 )
+
1
2
1− 3𝑦
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)𝑦𝑟𝑓
(𝜁 − 1) d
d𝜏
ln
(︁
𝑥𝑐(𝑦)𝛿
)︁
=
1
?˜?𝑓
d?˜?𝑓
d𝜏
+
1
2
1− 3𝑦
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)𝑦𝜏
= − 𝑟𝑓
2𝜏 (𝜏 + 𝑟𝑓 )
+
1
2
1− 3𝑦
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)𝑦𝜏
where we used ?˜?𝑓 :=
√︁
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏 . Combining this with the results on 𝑦
𝑐 gives
the sensitivity results of 𝑥𝑐.
Next, we consider the effects on PD𝑐. Regardless of 𝑐(𝑥), the sign of the
total derivative of PD𝑐 to 𝑥 is always negative for the chosen functional form
of 𝑤(𝑥):
PD𝑐𝑥 = PD
𝑐
1 +
d𝑦𝑐(𝑥)
d𝑥
PD𝑐2
= −𝑤′(𝑥𝑐)√𝑦𝑐 +
1
2𝜂𝑤
′(𝑥𝑐) (3𝑦𝑐 − 1) /√𝑦𝑐
𝜂𝑤(𝑥𝑐)
(︁
1+3𝑦𝑐
4𝑦𝑐
)︁
/
√
𝑦𝑐
𝑤(𝑥𝑐)
2
√
𝑦𝑐
= − 2
3𝑦 + 1
𝑤𝑐1
√
𝑦𝑐 < 0
where we used (4.47), (4.52), (4.53), (4.60), and (4.61). In other words, a
possible positive indirect effect through capital is dominated by the direct
effect of size on PD .
The total derivative of PD to the capital ratio 𝑦 does depend on 𝑐 through
𝜁. Notice first from (4.50), (4.51), and (4.62) that in any banking equilibrium
(𝑥𝑐(𝑦), 𝑦):
PD*(𝑥𝑐(𝑦), 𝑦) = 1− ?˜?𝑓
𝜎0
√
𝑦𝑥𝑐(𝑦)𝛿 (4.79)
= 1− ?˜?𝑓
𝜎0
√
𝑦
(︃
𝜂?˜?𝑓
𝜁𝜎0
√
𝑦 (1− 𝑦)
)︃1/(𝜁−1)
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= 1−
(︃
?˜?𝑓
𝜎0
√
𝑦
)︃𝜁/(𝜁−1)(︂
𝜂
𝜁
(1− 𝑦)
)︂1/(𝜁−1)
After some rewriting,
(𝜁 − 1) ln (1− PD*) = ln (𝜂)− ln (𝜁) + 𝜁 ln
(︂√︂
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
)︂
− 𝜁 ln (𝜎0)
+
𝜁
2
ln (𝑦) + ln (1− 𝑦)
with derivatives
d
d𝑦
(𝜁 − 1) ln (1− PD*) = 𝜁
2𝑦
− 1
1− 𝑦
d
d𝜎0
(𝜁 − 1) ln (1− PD*) = − 𝜁
𝜎0
+
(︂
𝜁
2𝑦
− 1
1− 𝑦
)︂
𝑦𝜎0
d
d𝜂
(𝜁 − 1) ln (1− PD*) = 1
𝜂
+
(︂
𝜁
2𝑦
− 1
1− 𝑦
)︂
𝑦𝜂
d
d𝑟𝑓
(𝜁 − 1) ln (1− PD*) = 𝜁
2 (𝜏 + 𝑟𝑓 )
+
(︂
𝜁
2𝑦
− 1
1− 𝑦
)︂
𝑦𝑟𝑓
d
d𝜏
(𝜁 − 1) ln (1− PD*) = − 𝜁𝑟𝑓
2𝜏 (𝜏 + 𝑟𝑓 )
+
(︂
𝜁
2𝑦
− 1
1− 𝑦
)︂
𝑦𝜏
Since dd𝑝(𝜁 − 1) ln (1− PD*) and PD*𝑝 have opposite sign for any parameter
𝑝, and 𝜁2+𝜁 >
1
3 , we obtain at the competitive equilibrium
(𝑖) PD𝑐𝑦 < 0 if and only if 𝑦𝑐 ∈
[︁
0, 𝜁2+𝜁
]︁
.
(𝑖𝑖) PD𝑐𝜎0 > 0 if (𝑎) 𝜂 ≤ 𝑟𝜏 , or (𝑏) 𝑦𝑐 ∈
[︁
𝜁
2+𝜁 , 𝑦1
]︁
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) PD𝑐𝜂 < 0 if (𝑎) 𝑦𝑐 ∈
[︁
0, 𝜁2+𝜁
]︁
and 𝜂 < 𝜁𝑟𝜏 , or (𝑏) 𝑦𝑐 ∈
[︁
𝜁
2+𝜁 , 𝑦1
]︁
and
𝜂 > 𝜁𝑟𝜏 .
(𝑖𝑣) PD𝑐𝑟𝑓 < 0 if 𝑦
𝑐 ∈
[︁
𝜁
2+𝜁 , 𝑦1
]︁
(𝑣) PD𝑐𝜏 > 0 if 𝑦𝑐 ∈
[︁
𝜁
2+𝜁 , 𝑦1
]︁
The sign of the partial derivatives is ambiguous outside these intervals. Using
(4.69) and 𝜁2+𝜁 < 𝑦1, the condition 𝑦
𝑐 ∈
[︁
0, 𝜁2+𝜁
]︁
is equivalent to 𝜑
(︁
𝜁
𝜁+2
)︁
≥
𝜓. Rewriting the latter inequality gives 𝜎0 ≤ ?˜? with ?˜? as in (4.20).
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Proof of equation (4.31): Using (4.29) and (4.30), the shock 𝑌𝑖 ∼ 𝑐 (𝑠) 𝑡(𝜈)
of a bank with market share 𝑠 := 1/𝑛 follows a scaled univariate Student
𝑡(𝜈)-distribution with scaling factor 𝑐 and standard deviation 𝜎𝑌 :
𝑐 (𝑠) = ?^?
1
𝑠
⎛⎜⎝ 𝑖𝑠ˆ
𝑡=(𝑖−1)𝑠
𝑖𝑠ˆ
𝑢=(𝑖−1)𝑠
𝜌𝑑(𝑡,𝑢) d𝑡d𝑢
⎞⎟⎠
1/2
=
?^?
ln (𝜌𝑠)
√︀
2 (𝜌𝑠 − 1− ln (𝜌𝑠)) (4.80)
𝜎𝑌 (𝑠) =
√︂
𝜈
𝜈 − 2𝑐(𝑠) (4.81)
The standard deviation 𝜎𝑌 is a function of size 𝑥 and the mean asset return
𝜇* since 𝑠(𝑥, 𝜇*) = 𝑥/𝑄(𝜇*). We thus write 𝜎𝑌 (𝑠) and 𝜎𝑌 (𝑥, 𝜇) interchange-
ably to refer to the standard deviation of 𝑌 . At the competitive equilib-
rium, the capital ratio has no effect on the market share 𝑠𝑐 = 𝑠(𝑥𝑐, 𝑦𝑐) since
𝜕𝑠𝑐
𝜕𝑦 =
𝜕𝑠𝑐
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝜇𝑐
𝜕𝑦 = 0.
The bank-specific shock for a bank that invests in projects on the interval
[0, 𝑠] with 𝑠 ≤ 12 is
Var (𝑍) =
1
𝑠2
ˆ 𝑠
𝑢=0
ˆ 𝑠
𝑡=0
Cov (𝑍 (𝑡) , 𝑍 (𝑢)) d𝑡 d𝑢
=
2
𝑠2
ˆ 𝑠
𝑢=0
ˆ 𝑢
𝑡=0
𝜌min(𝑢−𝑡,1−|𝑢−𝑡|)d𝑡d𝑢
=
2
𝑠2
ˆ 𝑠
𝑢=0
ˆ 𝑢
𝑡=0
𝜌𝑢−𝑡d𝑡 d𝑢
=
2 (𝜌𝑠 − 1− ln (𝜌𝑠))
ln2 (𝜌𝑠)
The total shock 𝑌 = 1𝑠
´ 𝑠
𝑡=0 𝑌 (𝑡) d𝑡 =
?^?
√
𝑊
𝑠
´ 𝑠
𝑡=0 𝑍 (𝑡) d𝑡 that includes the
macro shock is a scaled univariate Student 𝑡(𝜈)-distribution with
Var (𝑌 )= ?^?2Var
(︃√
𝑊
𝑠
ˆ 𝑠
𝑡=0
𝑍 (𝑡) d𝑡
)︃
= ?^?2E[W]Var (𝑍)
=
2𝜈?^?2
𝜈 − 2
𝜌𝑠 − 1− ln (𝜌𝑠)
ln2 (𝜌𝑠)
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=
2𝜈?^?2𝑛2
𝜈 − 2
𝜌𝑠 − 1− 1𝑛 ln (𝜌)
ln2 (𝜌)
Proof of equation (4.32): It is more convenient to derive the shocks for
banks 1 and 1+ 𝑖. The covariance of the shocks, including the macro shock,
is
Cov (𝑌1, 𝑌1+𝑖) = Cov
(︁
?^?
√
𝑊𝑍1, ?^?
√
𝑊𝑍1+𝑖
)︁
= ?^?2E[𝑊 ] Cov (𝑍1, 𝑍1+𝑖)
=
𝜈
𝜈 − 2 ?^?
2Cov (𝑍1, 𝑍1+𝑖)
To find the covariance of the bank-specific shocks 𝑍1 and 𝑍1+𝑖, notice that
banks 1 and 1+𝑖 invest in projects on the intervals [0, 1/𝑛] and [𝑖/𝑛, (1+𝑖)/𝑛],
respectively. Letting 𝑠 = 1/𝑛, the covariance of the bank-specific shocks,
excluding the macro-shock 𝑊 , is
Cov (𝑍1, 𝑍1+𝑖)
=
1
𝑠2
Cov
(︃ˆ 𝑠
𝑡=0
𝑍 (𝑡) d𝑡,
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
𝑍 (𝑢) d𝑢
)︃
=
1
𝑠2
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
ˆ 𝑠
𝑡=0
Cov (𝑍(𝑡), 𝑍(𝑢)) d𝑡d𝑢
=
1
𝑠2
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
ˆ 𝑠
𝑡=0
𝜌min(|𝑢−𝑡|,1−|𝑢−𝑡|)d𝑡 d𝑢
= 1
𝑠2
´ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
´ 𝑠
𝑡=min(max(𝑢− 12 ,0),𝑠)
𝜌𝑢−𝑡d𝑡 d𝑢
+ 1
𝑠2
´ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
´ min(max(𝑢− 12 ,0),𝑠)
𝑡=0 𝜌
1−(𝑢−𝑡)d𝑡d𝑢
(4.82)
where we used
min
𝑡<𝑢
(|𝑢− 𝑡| , 1− |𝑢− 𝑡|) =
{︃
𝑢− 𝑡 𝑡 ≥ 𝑢− 12
1− (𝑢− 𝑡) 𝑡 < 𝑢− 12
We use (4.82) to work out three different cases.
(𝑖) If (𝑖+ 1) 𝑠 ≤ 12 , then all projects of banks 1 and 1+ 𝑖 are on
[︀
0, 12
]︀
such
that the shortest distance between projects 𝑡 and 𝑢 is 𝑢− 𝑡:
Cov (𝑍1, 𝑍1+𝑖) =
1− 𝜌−𝑠
𝑠2 ln(𝜌)
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
𝜌𝑢d𝑢 =
𝜌(𝑖−1)𝑠 (1− 𝜌𝑠)2
ln2(𝜌𝑠)
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(𝑖𝑖) If 𝑖𝑠 ≥ 12 + 𝑠, each project 𝑡 of bank 1 is on [0, 𝑠] while each project 𝑢
of bank 𝑖 is on [𝑠+ 12 , 1]. The shortest distance is then 𝑡+ 1− 𝑢:
Cov (𝑍1, 𝑍1+𝑖)
=
1
𝑠2
𝜌 (𝜌𝑠 − 1)
ln(𝜌)
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
𝜌−𝑢d𝑢
=
𝜌1−(𝑖+1)𝑠 (1− 𝜌𝑠)2
ln2(𝜌𝑠)
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) In the intermediate case, the projects of bank 1 + 𝑖 cover either 12 or
1
2 + 𝑠. If the projects cover
1
2 ,
𝑖𝑠 ≤ 1
2
< (𝑖+ 1) 𝑠 ≤ 1
2
+ 𝑠 (4.83)
Starting from (4.82),
𝑠2Cov (𝑍1, 𝑍1+𝑖)
=
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
ˆ min(max(𝑢− 12 ,0),𝑠)
𝑡=0
𝜌𝑡+(1−𝑢)d𝑡d𝑢
+
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
ˆ 𝑠
𝑡=min(max(𝑢− 12 ,0),𝑠)
𝜌𝑢−𝑡d𝑖 d𝑢
=
ˆ 1/2
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
ˆ 0
𝑡=0
𝜌𝑡+(1−𝑢)d𝑡 d𝑢+
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢= 1
2
ˆ 𝑢− 1
2
𝑡=0
𝜌𝑡+(1−𝑢)d𝑡d𝑢
+
ˆ 1/2
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
ˆ 𝑠
𝑡=0
𝜌𝑢−𝑡d𝑡d𝑢+
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢= 1
2
ˆ 𝑠
𝑡=𝑢− 1
2
𝜌𝑢−𝑡d𝑖 d𝑢
= 𝜌
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢= 1
2
𝜌−𝑢
ˆ 𝑢− 1
2
𝑡=0
𝜌𝑡d𝑡 d𝑢+
ˆ 1/2
𝑢=𝑖𝑠
𝜌𝑢
ˆ 𝑠
𝑡=0
𝜌−𝑡d𝑡 d𝑢
+
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢= 1
2
𝜌𝑢
ˆ 𝑠
𝑡=𝑢− 1
2
𝜌−𝑡d𝑡d𝑢
= 𝜌
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢= 1
2
𝜌−𝑗
(︃
𝜌𝑢−
1
2 − 1
ln (𝜌)
)︃
d𝑢+
(︁
𝜌
1
2 − 𝜌𝑖𝑠
)︁
(1− 𝜌−𝑠)
ln2 (𝜌)
+
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢= 1
2
𝜌𝑢
(︃
𝜌
1
2
−𝑢 − 𝜌−𝑠
ln (𝜌)
)︃
d𝑢
=
1
ln2 (𝜌)
[︃
𝜌
ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢= 1
2
(︃
𝜌−
1
2 − 𝜌−𝑢
ln (𝜌)
)︃
d𝑢+
(︁
𝜌
1
2 − 𝜌𝑖𝑠
)︁ (︀
1− 𝜌−𝑠)︀]︃
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+
1
ln2 (𝜌)
[︃ˆ (𝑖+1)𝑠
𝑢= 1
2
(︃
𝜌
1
2 − 𝜌𝑢−𝑠
ln (𝜌)
)︃
d𝑢
]︃
=
1
ln2 (𝜌)
[︁
𝜌
1
2 ln (𝜌) (2𝑠 (1 + 𝑖)− 1) +
(︁
𝜌
1
2 − 𝜌𝑖𝑠
)︁ (︀
1− 𝜌−𝑠)︀]︁
+
1
ln2 (𝜌)
[︁
−
(︁
𝜌
1
2 − 𝜌1−(𝑖+1)𝑠
)︁
−
(︁
𝜌𝑖𝑠 − 𝜌 12−𝑠
)︁]︁
=
1
ln2 (𝜌)
[︁
𝜌
1
2 ln (𝜌) (2𝑠 (1 + 𝑖)− 1) + 𝜌(𝑖−1)𝑠 − 2𝜌𝑖𝑠 + 𝜌1−(𝑖+1]𝑠
]︁
(4.84)
If the projects of bank 1 + 𝑖 cover 12 + 𝑠,
1
2
≤ 𝑖𝑠 < 1
2
+ 𝑠 ≤ (𝑖+ 1) 𝑠.
Let ?˜?𝑠 = 1− 𝑖𝑠,
1
2
≤ 1− ?˜?𝑠 < 1
2
+ 𝑠 ≤ 1− ?˜?𝑠+ 𝑠
such that
?˜?𝑠 ≤ 1
2
< (˜𝑖+ 1)𝑠 ≤ 1
2
+ 𝑠.
This is similar to (4.83). Hence, the expression for the covariance of 𝑍1
and 𝑍1+𝑖 follows by substituting 𝑖 = 1𝑠 − ?˜? for 𝑖 in (4.84), and 𝑠 = 1/𝑛.
In all cases, the correlation decreases by a factor 𝜌𝑖𝑠 when 𝑖 is moving away
from [0, 𝑠]. Further, 𝑖 = 1 and 𝑖 = 1𝑠 −1 produce the same result if 𝑠 ≤ 14 , as
required by the symmetry of the intervals [𝑠, 2𝑠] and [1− 𝑠, 1] with respect
to [0, 𝑠].
4.B Estimation procedure
We adopt the following procedure to find for a given pair (𝑥, 𝑦) the corre-
sponding equilibrium (PD*, 𝜇*, 𝑅*𝑐). The scaled Student 𝑡(𝜈)-distribution
𝑌 = 𝜎(𝑠, 𝑦)𝑋 with density 𝑔 and cdf 𝐺 has a default threshold equal to
𝐺−1 (PD). Rewrite (4.6) as
E
[︀
min
(︀
𝑌,𝐺−1 (PD)
)︀]︀
= −𝑦
(︁
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
)︁
(4.85)
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where we use that 𝑋 has variance one. The shock 𝑌 has an unbounded
negative tail which implies that the sufficient existence and uniqueness con-
ditions of an equilibrium in Proposition 1 are both satisfied. Indeed, the left
hand side in (4.85) tends to −∞ if PD → 0, increases in PD , and it tends to
E[𝑌 ] = 0 if PD → 1, while the right hand side in (4.85) is constant in PD .
The left hand side in (4.85) is equal to
P
(︀
𝑌 < 𝐺−1 (PD)
)︀
E
[︀
𝑌
⃒⃒
𝑌 < 𝐺−1 (PD)
]︀
+ P
(︀
𝑌 ≥ 𝐺−1 (PD))︀ 𝐺−1 (PD)
Substitution in (4.85) leads to
PD E
[︀
𝑌
⃒⃒
𝑌 < 𝐺−1 (PD)
]︀
+ (1− PD) 𝐺−1 (PD) = −𝑦
(︁
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
)︁
(4.86)
Since 𝑌 has standard deviation 𝜎(𝑠, 𝜇), it follows that 𝑌 = 𝜎(𝑠, 𝜇)
√︁
𝜈−2
𝜈 𝑇
with 𝑇 ∼ 𝑡(𝜈) a standard, i.e., unscaled, Student 𝑡(𝜈)-distribution which has
variance 𝜈/(𝜈 − 2). Let 𝑓𝑇 and 𝐹𝑇 represent the density function and cdf of
𝑇 , respectively. Rewriting (4.86) in terms of 𝑇 ,
PD E
[︀
𝑇
⃒⃒
𝑇 < 𝐹−1𝑇 (PD)
]︀
+(1− PD) 𝐹−1𝑇 (PD) = −
𝑦
𝜎(𝑠, 𝜇)
√︂
𝜈
𝜈 − 2
(︁
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
)︁
(4.87)
For the conditional loss of 𝑇 (see equation (2.27) in McNeil et al. (2010))
E
[︀
𝑇
⃒⃒
𝑇 < 𝐹−1𝑇 (PD)
]︀
= −𝑓𝑇
(︀
𝐹−1𝑇 (PD)
)︀
PD
(︃
𝜈 +
(︀
𝐹−1𝑇 (PD)
)︀2
𝜈 − 1
)︃
(4.88)
Substituting (4.88) in (4.87) indicates that we are looking for the solution
PD* of
− 𝑓𝑇
(︀
𝐹−1𝑇 (PD)
)︀(︃𝜈 + (︀𝐹−1𝑇 (PD))︀2
𝜈 − 1
)︃
+ (1− PD) 𝐹−1𝑇 (PD)
=− 𝑦
𝜎(𝑠, 𝜇)
√︂
𝜈
𝜈 − 2
(︁
1 +
𝑟𝑓
𝜏
)︁
(4.89)
We adopt an iterative procedure to find for given 𝑥 and 𝑦 the equilibrium
(PD*(𝑥, 𝑦), 𝜇*(𝑥, 𝑦), 𝑅*𝑐(𝑥, 𝑦)):
(𝑖) Initialize 𝜇 at the mean of its bounds in (4.8)
(𝑖𝑖) Compute 𝜎 in (4.31) using 𝑠 = 𝑥/𝑄(𝑥, 𝜇)
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) Find the unique PD that solves (4.89)
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(𝑖𝑣) Compute 𝜇 in (4.5)
(𝑣) Stop if some stopping criterium is satisfied, otherwise go to ii.
After convergence, we find the contracted interest rate 𝑅*𝑐(𝑥, 𝑦) as follows.
By (4.3),
PD*(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝐹𝑇
(︂√︂
𝜈
𝜈 − 2
𝑐(𝑥) + (1− 𝑦)𝑅*𝑐(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝜇*
𝜎(𝑠, 𝜇*)
)︂
from which we obtain 𝑅*𝑐(𝑥, 𝑦)
𝑅*𝑐(𝑥, 𝑦) =
1
1− 𝑦
(︃
𝜇* − 𝑐(𝑥) + 𝜎 (𝑠, 𝜇*)
√︂
𝜈 − 2
𝜈
𝐹−1𝑇 (PD
*)
)︃
The concavity of 𝜇 in 𝑥 and 𝑦 ensures that we do not need to compute 𝜇
for each possible (𝑥, 𝑦) to find the minimum of 𝜇. Instead, we run over a
numerical grid of (𝑥, 𝑦) by moving in a direction where 𝜇 decreases.
The social welfare 𝑆𝑊 (𝑥, 𝑦) in (4.28) follows from the total surplus in
(4.26), and 𝑃𝑆 in (4.33). The probability 𝑃𝑆 is based on the expressions in
(4.31), (4.32) and (4.33).18
18The Matlab package mvtcdf evaluates the multivariate Student 𝑡-distribution in Mat-
lab. This package however turned out to be slow, or inaccurate in computing the joint
default probability of a high dimensional Student 𝑡-distribution. We resolved this by im-
plementing Algorithm 2 in Han and Wu (2010) with the following four modifications.
First, our indicator function is
∑︀
𝑖 1(𝑋𝑖 < 0) ≥ 𝑛𝐷 since we define a systemic crisis by
a minimal number 𝑛𝐷 of defaults instead of a simultaneous default of all banks. Second,
rather than directly setting 𝜇* = Σ−1𝐶, we iterate beforehand over a set of candidates
for 𝜇* to test numerically on the variance of each candidate. Each candidate is a multiple
of the all ones vector, because our setting is completely symmetric. Third, to take the
different definition of 𝜇* into account, we substitute 𝐴𝑇𝜇* from Lemma 2 in Han and
Wu (2010) for 𝐴−1𝐶. Fourth, as follows from the proof of Lemma 2, our 𝑊 (𝑖) has mean√︀
𝑌/𝜈𝐴−1𝐶 without a minus sign.
Numerical tests on small dimensional problems confirm that our algorithm is accurate.
Compared to the mvtcdf package, it produces for high dimensions, i.e., a large number of
banks, faster and more stable estimates for the systemic default probability 𝑃𝑆.
Chapter 5
Risk allocation and the Shapley value
5.1 Introduction
A large literature on systemic risk measures has evolved since the recent
financial crisis.1 Attributing systemic risk to individual institutions is akin
to a problem already addressed by game theorists. Noble Laureate Lloyd
Shapley developed in Shapley (1953) an allocation methodology where the
player’s worth (value) equals the average of his marginal contribution to the
value created by all possible subsets of other players. This results in a fair
allocation of the total value in the sense that the value created jointly by
two players is split equally between the players.
Several papers have implemented the Shapley value to allocate systemic
risk to banks, see, e.g., Tarashev et al. (2013), Drehmann and Tarashev
(2013), and Cao (2014). Nonetheless, both the widely used allocation mea-
sures MES and ΔCoVaR do not fit the Shapley value allocation. Adjust-
ments of the two measures to satisfy the Shapley axioms lead to more (𝑂(2𝑛))
computations and a less transparent allocation.
The contribution of this paper is that we provide a general class of simple
risk allocation measures that are Shapley values, and demonstrate that two
measures in the literature fit into this class.
5.2 Shapley value
Since we apply the Shapley value to risk measures of banks, we refer to
banks as players in game theory. Let 𝑁 = {1, . . . , 𝑛} denote the set of
all banks, and let 𝐵𝑖 denote a binary variable which is one if bank 𝑖 fails,
I am very grateful to Gerard van der Laan for comments on an earlier version.
1The survey in Bisias et al. (2012) discusses 31 systemic risk measures.
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and zero otherwise. The total number of failing banks in the subset 𝑆 is
𝜅𝑆 =
∑︀
𝑖∈𝑆 𝐵𝑖, and 𝜅 := 𝜅𝑁 is the total number of failing banks. The
characteristic function 𝑣 is a function defined on each 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁 and satisfies
𝑣(∅) = 0.
The Shapley value assigned to bank 𝑖 is given by
𝜑𝑖(𝑣) =
∑︁
{𝑆:𝑖/∈𝑆}
|𝑆|!(𝑛− |𝑆| − 1)!
𝑛!
(𝑣(𝑆 ∪ 𝑖)− 𝑣(𝑆))
That is, a bank’s portion of the total value 𝑣(𝑁) equals the average of this
bank’s marginal contribution to all possible subsets of other banks. For
𝑣(𝑆) = 𝑎𝑤(𝑆) + 𝑏 𝑧(𝑆) (𝑎, 𝑏 ≥ 0), it follows immediately that the Shapley
value is linear in the characteristic functions 𝑤 and 𝑧:
𝜑(𝑣) = 𝑎𝜑(𝑤) + 𝑏 𝜑(𝑧) 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁
The Shapley value is fair in the sense that it satisfies several axiomati-
zations.2 For instance, Myerson (1980) shows that the Shapley value is the
unique allocation that satisfies the following two axioms:
(𝑖) Efficiency: The allocated values sum to the total value:∑︁
𝑖∈𝑁
𝜑𝑖(𝑣) = 𝑣(𝑁)
(𝑖𝑖) Balanced contributions: For any 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁 and any pair of banks 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆,
the loss that bank 𝑖 incurs when removing bank 𝑗 equals the loss that
bank 𝑗 incurs when removing bank 𝑖:
𝜑𝑖(𝑣|𝑆)− 𝜑𝑖(𝑣|𝑆∖𝑗) = 𝜑𝑗(𝑣|𝑆)− 𝜑𝑗(𝑣|𝑆∖𝑖) (5.1)
where 𝑣|𝑀 is the restriction of 𝑣 to the subsets of 𝑀 .
The following proposition enables us to obtain the Shapley value in 𝑂(𝑛)
computations for a special class of characteristic functions.
Proposition 1. Suppose the characteristic function 𝑣 has the functional
form 𝑣(𝑆) = 𝜅𝑆𝑓 (𝜅𝑆) with 𝑓 finite for any 𝜅𝑆.
(𝑖) The Shapley value assigned to bank 𝑖 equals 𝜑𝑖(𝑣) = 𝐵𝑖𝑓(𝜅).
2see Winter (2002) for an overview.
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(𝑖𝑖) The weighted Shapley value of Kalai and Samet (1987) is not linear in
𝑓 as in (𝑖), except for the special case 𝑤1 = . . . = 𝑤𝑛 ̸= 0.
Proof. (𝑖) We show that the allocation 𝜑𝑖(𝑣) = 𝐵𝑖𝑓(𝜅) satisfies the efficiency
axiom as well as the balanced contributions axiom. It is easy to see that 𝜑(𝑣)
satisfies the efficiency axiom because∑︁
𝑖∈𝑁
𝜑𝑖(𝑣) =
∑︁
𝑖∈𝑁
𝐵𝑖𝑓(𝜅) = 𝜅𝑓(𝜅) = 𝑣(𝑁)
For any distinct 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 with 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁 , we have 𝜑𝑖(𝑣|𝑆) = 𝐵𝑖𝑓(𝜅𝑆) and
𝜑𝑖(𝑣|𝑆∖𝑗) = 𝐵𝑖𝑓(𝜅𝑆 − 𝐵𝑗) such that the balanced contributions axiom is
necessarily satisfied if
𝐵𝑖𝑓(𝜅𝑆)−𝐵𝑖𝑓(𝜅𝑆 −𝐵𝑗) = 𝐵𝑗𝑓(𝜅𝑆)−𝐵𝑗𝑓(𝜅𝑆 −𝐵𝑖)
Obviously, this equation holds for any of the four possibilities of the pair
(𝐵𝑖, 𝐵𝑗). This implies that 𝜑(𝑣) satisfies the balanced contributions axiom,
as required.
(𝑖𝑖) For an arbitrary nonzero weight vector 𝑤 ∈ R𝑛, the balanced contri-
butions axiom (5.1) changes for weighted Shapley values into (see Kalai and
Samet (1987)):
𝑤𝑗
[︁
𝜑𝑖(𝑣𝑆)− 𝜑𝑖(𝑣|𝑆∖𝑗)
]︁
= 𝑤𝑖
[︁
𝜑𝑗(𝑣𝑆)− 𝜑𝑗(𝑣|𝑆∖𝑖)
]︁
(5.2)
Write the allocation in the desired linear form in 𝑓 : 𝜑𝑖(𝑣|𝑆) = 𝛾𝑆𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑓(𝜅𝑆)
with 𝛾𝑆𝑖 unknown. Using 𝑣(𝑆) = 𝜅𝑆𝑓(𝜅𝑆) and the efficiency axiom on the
subgame (𝑆, 𝑣𝑆) implies ∑︁
𝑖∈𝑆
𝛾𝑆𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝐵𝑖 = 𝜅𝑆
Therefore, we need that one of the following equations holds true for all
𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁 :
𝛾𝑆𝑖 =
1
𝑤𝑖
(5.3)
𝛾𝑆𝑖 =
𝜅𝑆∑︀
𝑘∈𝑆 𝑤𝑘𝐵𝑘
(5.4)
The balanced contributions axiom (5.2) is satisfied for a pair (𝑖, 𝑗) with
(𝐵𝑖, 𝐵𝑗) = (1, 1) if for all 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁
𝑤𝑗𝑤𝑖
[︁
𝛾𝑆𝑖 𝑓(𝜅𝑆)− 𝛾𝑆∖𝑗𝑖 𝑓(𝜅𝑆 − 1)
]︁
= 𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗
[︁
𝛾𝑆𝑗 𝑓(𝜅𝑆)− 𝛾𝑆∖𝑖𝑗 𝑓(𝜅𝑆 − 1)
]︁
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Since in general 𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗 ̸= 0:[︀
𝛾𝑆𝑖 − 𝛾𝑆𝑗
]︀
𝑓(𝜅𝑆) =
[︁
𝛾
𝑆∖𝑗
𝑖 − 𝛾𝑆∖𝑖𝑗
]︁
𝑓(𝜅𝑆 − 1) for all 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁
The latter equation is only satisfied for any function 𝑓 if 𝛾𝑆𝑖 = 𝛾
𝑆
𝑗 and
𝛾
𝑆∖𝑗
𝑖 = 𝛾
𝑆∖𝑖
𝑗 . Thus, 𝛾
𝑆
𝑖 does neither depend on 𝑖, nor on 𝑆. This implies
that (5.3) and (5.4) are both inappropriate, except for the special case 𝑤1 =
. . . = 𝑤𝑛 ̸= 0 that corresponds to Proposition 1(𝑖).
Proposition 1 implies that the Shapley value assigned to bank 𝑖 equals
the fraction 𝐵𝑖/𝜅 of the total value 𝑣(𝑁) = 𝜅𝑓(𝜅). By the linearity of the
Shapley value, and the linearity of the expectations operator, the proposition
is easily extended to characteristic functions of the type 𝑣(𝑆) = E[𝜅𝑆𝑓 (𝜅𝑆)]
with 𝜅𝑆 a random variable.
5.3 Systemic risk measures
The two most common measures to allocate systemic risk are the marginal
expected shortfall (MES ) from Acharya et al. (2012) and ΔCoVaR from
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). We briefly discuss both measures. Let 𝑅𝑖
denote the loss of bank 𝑖, and 𝑅 the weighted loss of a portfolio of banks in
the banking network:
𝑅 =
∑︁
𝑖∈𝑁
𝑤𝑖𝑅𝑖
The MES of bank 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 is the marginal expected shortfall with respect to
the weight 𝑤𝑖 given that 𝑅 is above some typically high threshold 𝑞:
MES 𝑖 =
𝜕
𝜕𝑤𝑖
E [𝑅 |𝑅 ≥ 𝑞 ] = E [𝑅𝑖 |𝑅 ≥ 𝑞 ]
For a given probability 𝑝, let VaR𝑖(𝑝) denote the 𝑝% quantile of bank 𝑖. The
measure ΔCoVaRi of bank 𝑖 is the difference in some given quantile of 𝑅,
between (i) 𝑅𝑖 is at its 𝑝% quantile return, and (ii) 𝑅𝑖 is at its median:
ΔCoVaR𝑖 = CoVaR
𝑅𝑖=VaR𝑖(𝑝)
𝑖 − CoVaR𝑅𝑖=VaR𝑖(50%)𝑖
where CoVaR𝑖 satisfies for given 𝑝 and 𝑥
𝑝 = P
(︁
𝑅 ≥ CoVaR𝑅𝑖=VaR𝑖(𝑝)𝑖 |𝑅𝑖 = 𝑥
)︁
.
Benoit et al. (2013) discuss several properties of both measures.
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Using theMES orΔCoVaR as a characteristic function does not result in
a useful Shapley value (see Drehmann and Tarashev (2013), and Cao (2014)).
More specifically, the marginal contribution of a bank to a subset of banks
does not depend on the subset. Using an interbank network, Drehmann and
Tarashev (2013) show that such a measure allocates the risk generated by an
interbank link solely to the lender. By contrast, a risk measure based on the
Shapley value treats both involved banks of an interbank link symmetrically
and, as a consequence, splits the associated risk equally between the lender
and the borrower. In addition, the construction of the Shapley value from
marginal contributions mitigates the impact of model risk by (i) errors in
the total loss 𝑅 by e.g. neglecting banks, and (ii) idiosyncratic losses that
do not reflect systemic risk.
To overcome the disadvantages above, a related characteristic function
is available for both measures. Adding a conditional event extends both
measures to subsets of banks. The characteristic function for the expected
shortfall measure MES is (see Drehmann and Tarashev (2013))
𝑣MES (𝑆) = E
[︃∑︁
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑅𝑖
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒∑︁
𝑖∈𝑆
𝑅𝑖 ≥ 𝑞
]︃
, for all 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁.
We get the following characteristic function for ΔCoVaR:3
𝑣ΔCoVaR(𝑆) = CoVaR
𝑅𝑖=VaR𝑖(𝑝)
𝑆 − CoVaR𝑅𝑖=VaR𝑖(50%)𝑖𝑆 , for all 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁
where CoVaR𝑅𝑖=VaR𝑖(𝑝)𝑆 follows from 𝑅 =
∑︀
𝑖∈𝑁 𝑅𝑖 and
P
(︁
𝑅 ≥ CoVaR𝑅𝑖=𝑥𝑖𝑆 |𝑅𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆
)︁
= 𝑝.
Using the adjusted characteristic functions, the marginal contribution of a
bank depends on the subset 𝑆 of banks, i.e., 𝑣(𝑆 ∪ 𝑖) − 𝑣(𝑆) depends on
𝑆. The risk allocation according to the Shapley value is obtained when we
allocate the risk to bank 𝑖 by averaging marginal contributions of all subsets
𝑆 that do not contain bank 𝑖.
The downside of this procedure is that the characteristic function must
be computed for each subset of banks. Since the number of subsets grows
exponentially in the number of banks (𝑛), the number of evaluations also
grows exponentially (𝑂(2𝑛)). In addition, the intuition behind the allocated
risk is less straightforward than by using the original risk measures.
We show that the following two allocation measures directly generate a
Shapley value:
3A similar extension of ΔCoVaR is in Cao (2014).
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(𝑖) The conditional probability of at least one extra bank failure, given
that bank 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 fails
PAO 𝑖 = P (∃𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ∖ 𝑖 such that 𝐵𝑗 = 1 |𝐵𝑖 = 1)
=
P
(︁
𝐵𝑖
[︁
1−∏︀𝑗∈𝑁∖𝑖 (1−𝐵𝑗)]︁ = 1)︁
P(𝐵𝑖 = 1)
=
P(𝐵𝑖1 (𝜅 > 1) = 1)
P(𝐵𝑖 = 1)
,
where 1(𝑥) is the indicator function which is one if 𝑥 is true and zero
otherwise.
(𝑖𝑖) The systemic impact index defined as the expected number of failures,
given that bank 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 fails
SII 𝑖 = E [𝜅 |𝐵𝑖 = 1]
=
E[𝐵𝑖𝜅]
P(𝐵𝑖 = 1)
.
The previously discussed MES and ΔCoVaR use returns or, alterna-
tively, another additive performance measure. The measures PAO and SII
simply consider extreme events without quantifying the magnitude of an ex-
treme shock to an individual bank. In other words, the latter two measures
are linkage measures by focusing on interbank linkages, and refrain from
assessing the magnitude on individual banks.
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) define the linkage measures PAO and
SII as the banking stability index (BSI ) and the probability of cascading
events (PCE ), respectively. Zhou (2010) implements these two measures in
an extreme value theory setting to test if size is a valid proxy for systemic
importance.
Under a VaR approach, each failure probability P(𝐵𝑖 = 1) equals some
fixed probability 𝑝. Then, the characteristic functions
𝑣PAO(𝑆) =
1
𝑝
E[𝜅𝑆1 (𝜅𝑆 > 1)] , for all 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁
𝑣SII (𝑆) =
1
𝑝
E
[︀
𝜅2𝑆
]︀
, for all 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑁.
generate the Shapley allocations PAOi and SIIi , respectively. Namely, Propo-
sition 1 shows that
𝜑𝑖(𝑣
PAO) =
1
𝑝
E
[︂
𝐵𝑖
𝜅
𝜅1 (𝜅 > 1)
]︂
=
1
𝑝
P(𝐵𝑖1 (𝜅 > 1) = 1) = PAO 𝑖
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𝜑𝑖(𝑣
SII ) =
1
𝑝
E
[︂
𝐵𝑖
𝜅
𝜅2
]︂
=
1
𝑝
E[𝐵𝑖𝜅] = SII 𝑖
The total risk (value) of the banking system is
𝑣PAO(𝑁) =
1
𝑝
E[𝜅1 (𝜅 > 1)]
𝑣SII (𝑁) =
1
𝑝
E
[︀
𝜅2
]︀
Thus PAO corresponds to total risk that linearly increases in the number
of failures, while SII corresponds to a quadratic increase in the number of
failures.
5.4 Conclusion
Under a VaR approach where each bank faces a failure probability 𝑝, we
have shown that the bank-specific measures PAO 𝑖 and SII 𝑖 are Shapley
value allocations of a more complicated characteristic function. Since a sep-
arate evaluation of each possible marginal contribution is redundant, the
computation of both measures grows only linearly in the number of banks.
The total risk of a banking system with PAO and SII equals the linear
E[𝜅1 (𝜅 > 1)] /𝑝 and the quadratic E
[︀
𝜅2
]︀
/𝑝, respectively. The well-known
risk measures MES and ΔCoVaR do not correspond to a Shapley value with
the number of computations growing linearly in the number of banks.
More general, Proposition 1 shows that any risk measure that solely
depends on the total number of failures 𝜅 is the Shapley value allocation of
some underlying characteristic function that solely varies in 𝜅. This obviates
the need to iterate over all 𝑂(2𝑛) possible marginal contributions.

Chapter 6
A new evaluation method for the
multivariate normal distribution
6.1 Introduction
Consider a Gaussian random vector 𝑍 in R𝑑, and the probability that 𝑍 is in
a region 𝑇 = (𝑎1, 𝑏1)× . . .× (𝑎𝑑, 𝑏𝑑). Without loss of generality, 𝑍 has mean
0, covariance matrix Σ with ones at the diagonal, and each lower bound 𝑎𝑖
is finite. The upper bounds 𝑏𝑖 are allowed to be infinite. We evaluate the
multivariate integral
P(𝑍 ∈ 𝑇 ) = 1
(2𝜋|Σ|)𝑑/2
ˆ 𝑏1
𝑥1=𝑎1
. . .
ˆ 𝑏𝑑
𝑥𝑑=𝑎𝑑
exp
(︂
−x
′Σ−1x
2
)︂
d𝑥1 . . . d𝑥𝑑
(6.1)
Genz and Bretz (2009) provide an extensive overview of methods to evaluate
this integral. The method of Genz (1992) is the standard method in the
software packages R and Matlab. This method transforms the integration
region in (6.1) in three steps to a unit hypercube. The resulting integral
is numerically integrated by means of a simulation procedure. Nonetheless,
this method is not for all parameters in (6.1) the optimal method in terms of
accuracy or speed, see, e.g., Fayed and Atiya (2014) for the bivariate case. In
particular, the focus on a small absolute error of the method in Genz (1992)
may give an inaccurate estimate for the ratio 𝑝1/𝑝2 = P(𝑍 ∈ 𝑇1)/𝑃 (𝑍 ∈ 𝑇2)
if 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are both small. The estimated ratio (𝑝1 + 𝜀1)/(𝑝2 + 𝜀2) is then
close to the error ratio 𝜀1/𝜀2.
Our method bounds the probability in (6.1) by combining a change of
measure with a Taylor expansion. We truncate the expansion, and bound the
I am very grateful to Ludolf Meester for extensive discussions and comments on earlier
versions. I thank Jan Brinkhuis and John Geweke for useful suggestions.
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remainder by using a transformation to spherical coordinates. The relative
error of the bounds declines in the true probability. This ensures an estimate
of the probability ratio (𝑝1+ 𝜀1)/(𝑝2+ 𝜀2) close to the true ratio 𝑝1/𝑝2, even
if both 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are small.
We are not the first to use a Taylor expansion. For instance, Moran
(1983) evaluates (6.1) by performing a Taylor expansion with an implicit
change of measure that affects the covariance matrix. A sufficient conver-
gence condition for the series expansion is that the sum of the absolute par-
tial correlations is for each variable smaller than one. Hashorva and Hüsler
(2003) use Jensen’s inequality, and the smallest and largest eigenvalue of
Σ to derive analytically simple lower and upper bounds for (6.1). While a
Taylor series expansion is absent, they implicitly apply a change of measure
by changing the mean and covariance matrix. We find that their measure
provides suboptimal bounds.
Our method is neither the first to evaluate (6.1) with an importance
sampling approach. For example, Glasserman and Li (2005) compute loss
quantiles of a credit portfolio by applying importance sampling. The loss
distribution is a weighted summation of Bernoulli variables indicating de-
faults. They perform a Monte Carlo simulation using importance sampling
to change the mean of the multivariate normal distribution. Phinikettos and
Gandy (2011) employ Monte Carlo simulation using an importance sampler
with a fixed mean and a flexible, though identical, variance for each vari-
able. Using some additional techniques to reduce the variance simulation,
their method tends to be more accurate than the method of Genz (1992) if
the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix are more dispersed.
Nomura (2014) numerically integrates over a spherical coordinate sys-
tem. Rather than adopting importance sampling, the integration region is
transformed such that the first principle axis of the probability distribution
is along the first axis. The method still faces an exponential increase in
computation time when the dimension increases, even with a dimension re-
duction technique. This is similar to the combinatorial explosion that our
Taylor series expansion faces.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing study that combines a
Taylor series expansion with an importance sampling approach. In addition,
our bounds are for at least some specific cases more accurate than any other
bound in the literature.
Section 6.2 describes our method. We give convergence criteria in Section
6.3. Error bounds are in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 discusses possible impor-
tance samplers. Section 6.6 illustrates the accuracy of our method with some
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examples. Conclusions are in Section 6.7.
6.2 The method
6.2.1 The series expansion
We apply a change of measure such that 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁 (0,Σ) is transformed into
𝑍 ∼ 𝑁 (𝜇,Ω) under the new measure. Here, the vector 𝜇 and the matrix
Ω are arbitrary, except that Ω is positive definite and symmetric. The new
measure enables a more efficient calculation to estimate the probability in
(6.1). We have
P(a ≤ 𝑍 ≤ b) = E[1a≤𝑍≤b] (6.2)
= E˜[𝐿(𝑍)1a≤𝑍≤b] (6.3)
where E˜ indicates an expectation under the new probability measure, and
𝐿(z) is the likelihood ratio of the original density relative to the new density:
𝐿(z) =
√︃
|Ω|
|Σ| exp
(︂
−1
2
z′
(︀
Σ−1 −Ω−1)︀ z− 𝜇′Ω−1z+ 1
2
𝜇′Ω−1𝜇
)︂
(6.4)
Substitution of (6.4) into (6.3) yields
P(a ≤ 𝑍 ≤ b)
=
√︃
|Ω|
|Σ|𝑒
1
2
𝜇′Ω−1𝜇E˜
[︂
exp
(︂
−1
2
𝑍 ′
(︀
Σ−1 −Ω−1)︀𝑍 − 𝜇′Ω−1𝑍)︂ 1a≤𝑍≤b]︂
= 𝑐0E˜
[︂
exp
(︂
−1
2
𝑍 ′A𝑍 −w′𝑍
)︂
1a≤𝑍≤b
]︂
(6.5)
= 𝑐0𝑒
1
2
𝜈′A𝜈E˜
[︂
exp
(︂
−1
2
(𝑍 − 𝜈)′A (𝑍 − 𝜈)
)︂
1a≤𝑍≤b
]︂
(6.6)
where
𝑐0 =
√︃
|Ω|
|Σ|𝑒
1
2
𝜇′Ω−1𝜇 A = Σ−1 −Ω−1 w = Ω−1𝜇
and 𝜈 solves
A𝜈 = −w. (6.7)
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Equivalently, (︀
I−ΩΣ−1)︀ 𝜈 = 𝜇 (6.8)
If A is singular and w /∈ Im(A) then (6.7) has no solution and, as
a consequence, the representation in (6.6) does not exist. Therefore, we
impose that A is nonsingular. Equivalently, ΩΣ−1 has no eigenvalue equal
to 1. Under this condition,
𝜈 =
(︀
I−ΩΣ−1)︀−1 𝜇 (6.9)
Different choices of 𝜇 and Ω lead to different expressions in (6.6). It will
turn out that a diagonal structure of Ω ensures that the integration region is
rectangular under the new measure. Therefore, we impose that Ω is diagonal
with positive diagonal entries. Let D be the diagonal matrix with positive
entries for which Ω = D2.
Moran (1983) chooses 𝜇 = 0 and for Ω a diagonal matrix with Ω𝑖𝑖 =
1/(Σ−1)𝑖𝑖. In this case 𝜈 = 0 always solves (6.7) regardless if I −ΩΣ−1 is
nonsingular. Using the same Ω, Hashorva and Hüsler (2003) derive bounds
from (6.5) for the case b = ∞1. To determine 𝜇, they first obtain x^ =
argminx≥a x′Σ−1x, and derive for 𝜇: If ?^?𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖, then 𝜈𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 which gives
𝜇𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑖, otherwise 𝜇𝑖 = 𝜈𝑖 = ?^?𝑖 > 𝑎𝑖.
Let x˜ = D−1(x−𝜈) for any vector x. Under the new probability measure,
we find
𝑍 = D−1(𝑍 − 𝜈) ∼ 𝑁(D−1(𝜇− 𝜈), I) = 𝑁(𝜇, I).
where using (6.8) and (6.9),
𝜇 = D−1(𝜇− 𝜈)
= −D−1ΩΣ−1𝜈
= −DΣ−1𝜈 (6.10)
= −DΣ−1 (︀I−ΩΣ−1)︀−1 𝜇
=
(︀
I−D−1ΣD−1)︀−1D−1𝜇 (6.11)
Rewriting (6.6), and using D𝑖𝑖 > 0
P(a ≤ 𝑍 ≤ b)
= 𝑐1E˜
[︂
exp
(︂
−1
2
(𝑍 − 𝜈)′D−1DADD−1 (𝑍 − 𝜈)
)︂
1D−1(a−𝜈)≤𝑍≤D−1(b−𝜈)
]︂
= 𝑐1E˜
[︂
exp
(︂
1
2
𝑍 ′B𝑍
)︂
1a˜≤𝑍≤b˜
]︂
(6.12)
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= 𝑐1
∞∑︁
𝑘=0
1
𝑘!
E˜
[︃(︂
1
2
(︁
𝑍1a˜≤𝑍≤b˜
)︁′
B
(︁
𝑍1a˜≤𝑍≤b˜
)︁)︂𝑘
1a˜≤𝑍≤b˜
]︃
(6.13)
= 𝑐1
⎛⎝ 𝑑∏︁
𝑗=1
(︁
Φ(?˜?𝑗 − ?˜?𝑗)− Φ(?˜?𝑗 − ?˜?𝑗)
)︁
+
∞∑︁
𝑘=1
1
𝑘!
E˜
[︃(︂
𝑈 ′B𝑈
2
)︂𝑘]︃⎞⎠ (6.14)
where 𝑐1 = 𝑐0𝑒
1
2
𝜈′A𝜈 , B = −DAD = I − DΣ−1D, a˜ = D−1(a − 𝜈),
b˜ = D−1(b − 𝜈), 𝑈 = 𝑍1a˜≤𝑍≤b˜, and Φ(𝑥) = P(𝑍0 ≤ 𝑥) is the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) of the univariate standard normal distribution
𝑍0 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1).
6.2.2 Restrictions on the new measure
The left panel in Figure 6.1 illustrates an example where 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(0,Σ) is a
bivariate normal distribution with correlation parameter 𝜌 = 0.7. The right
panel shows the same distribution under the new measure. More specifically,
it represents (6.12) by plotting iso-probability curves of 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, I) and iso-
value curves of exp(𝑍 ′B𝑍/2). The latter is a weighting function which is
one at the origin and, by the identity z˜′Bz˜ = (−z˜)′B(−z˜), symmetric with
respect to the origin. For the specific case in Figure 6.1, the weight from
exp(𝑍 ′B𝑍/2) is maximal at the Northwest corner and the Southeast corner.
This is because the one-dimensional eigenspace of the maximal eigenvalue
of B points from the origin towards these directions. Under the original
measure in (6.2), i.e., the left panel in Figure 6.1, a weighting function is
absent, thus the weighting function is implicitly uniform.
Define x^ = D−1x such that x˜ = D−1(x − 𝜈) = x^ − 𝜈 for any vector x.
This gives the following 𝑑-dimensional vectors
a˜ = a^− 𝜈 b˜ = b^− 𝜈 𝜇 = −DΣ−1D𝜈 𝜈 = 0
where we used (6.10) for 𝜇.
The new measure is completely determined by the set
{︁
𝜇, a˜, b˜
}︁
as 𝜈 = 0
always holds (see for instance the right panel in Figure 6.1). Both the vector
𝜇 and the diagonal matrix D with positive diagonal elements can be chosen
arbitrarily, which gives a total of 𝑑+ 𝑑 = 2𝑑 free parameters. Therefore, we
can choose at most 2𝑑 parameters from a total of 3𝑑 parameters in the set{︁
𝜇, a˜, b˜
}︁
. For instance, if one needs specific values for each of the elements
in the vectors 𝜇 and a˜, then the available 2𝑑 degrees of freedom of 𝜇 and D
are used by pinning down 𝜇 and a˜. This means that both b˜ and B follow
from the implied values of 𝜇 and D.
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Not all values are possible for the vectors in
{︁
𝜇, a˜, b˜
}︁
. For instance, the
non-negativity of D−1 implies that the ranking of ?^?𝑖, ?^?𝑖, and ?^?𝑖 corresponds
to the ranking of 𝑎𝑖, 𝜇𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 with 𝑖 = {1, . . . , 𝑑}. After subtracting 𝜈𝑖 from
?^?𝑖, ?^?𝑖, and ?^?𝑖, the ranking of ?˜?𝑖, ?˜?𝑖, and ?˜?𝑖 is of course still the same. Hence,
we cannot freely choose this ranking. An additional restriction ?˜?𝑖 = ∞
applies to all 𝑖 with 𝑏𝑖 =∞.
Figure 6.1: Change of measure.
From bivariate normal 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(0,Σ) with correlation parameter 𝜌 = 0.7 and zero means
to 𝜇 = (1, 1)′ and Ω = 0.5I. Left panel: Integration region 𝑇 , and iso-probability curves
of 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(0,Σ). Right panel: Integration region 𝑇 , iso-probability curves of
𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, I), and iso-value curves of exp(𝑍′B𝑍/2).
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We truncate the infinite series in (6.14) after 𝑛 terms, and estimate the
sum of the remaining terms. The series may diverge however for certain ma-
trices B, and hence for certain Ω = D2. Therefore, we derive necessary and
sufficient convergence conditions in Section 6.3. This restricts the available
D, and so restricts the length |?˜?𝑖 − ?˜?𝑖| = (D𝑖𝑖)−1|𝑏𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖| of the integration
region along each dimension 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑑} under the new probability mea-
sure. Next, we describe a procedure similar to Moran (1983) to obtain the
moments of 𝑈 ′B𝑈/2 in (6.14). From now on, we simply write E to refer to
E˜.
6.2.3 The summants
We discuss the computation of the elements (𝑈 ′B𝑈/2)𝑘 of the series in (6.14).
The expansion of (𝑈 ′B𝑈)𝑘 is a summation over 𝑑2𝑘 different paths of ex-
pectations. Each path contains 𝑘 elements of the matrix B. The symmetry
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of B reduces the maximal number of different expectations over all paths to
(𝑑(𝑑 + 1)/2)𝑘. In addition, the expectation of a certain path only depends
on the number of times each nonzero element in B appears in the path. In
other words, the ordering of appearance is irrelevant such that a path is
characterized by a 𝑑× 𝑑 upper triangular matrix M with Σ𝑖,𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑗 = 𝑘 where
𝑚𝑖𝑗 represents the number of times element 𝑏𝑖𝑗 is present in the path. For
instance, if 𝑘 = 2
E[𝑈1𝑏12𝑈2𝑈1𝑏13𝑈3] =E[𝑈2𝑏12𝑈1𝑈1𝑏13𝑈3] =E[𝑈1𝑏12𝑈2𝑈3𝑏13𝑈1]
=E[𝑈2𝑏12𝑈1𝑈3𝑏13𝑈1] =E[𝑈1𝑏13𝑈3𝑈1𝑏12𝑈2] =E[𝑈3𝑏13𝑈1𝑈1𝑏12𝑈2]
=E[𝑈1𝑏13𝑈3𝑈2𝑏12𝑈1] =E[𝑈3𝑏13𝑈1𝑈2𝑏12𝑈1] =𝑏12𝑏13E
[︀
𝑈21𝑈2𝑈3
]︀
All 8 paths are characterized by the 𝑑 × 𝑑 upper triangular matrix M with
elements 𝑚12 = 𝑚13 = 1, and 𝑚𝑖𝑗 = 0 else.
More general, considerM with 𝑘0 =
∑︀𝑑
𝑖=1𝑚𝑖𝑖 selected diagonal elements
ofB. By the symmetry ofB, we have for any path (a multiple of) 2𝑘−𝑘0 paths
with an identical representation M. Accordingly, we reduce the number
of identical paths by a factor 2𝑘−𝑘0 by using the matrix B¯ defined as the
sum of the upper triangular matrix of B without the diagonal, and half
the diagonal of B. The elements of the diagonal of B¯ are thus ?¯?𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖𝑖/2.
This compensates for the double counting of paths that contain 𝑈𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑖,
and implies B = B¯ + B¯′. Let the function 𝑐(M) represent the number of
paths that share a given M. This number equals the multinomial coefficient
(𝑘!/ (𝑚11!𝑚12! . . .𝑚𝑑𝑑!)). Using some straightforward manipulations,
1
𝑘!
E
[︃(︂
𝑈 ′B𝑈
2
)︂𝑘]︃
=
1
𝑘!
E
[︁(︀
𝑈 ′B¯𝑈
)︀𝑘]︁
=
1
𝑘!
∑︁
∑︀
𝑖≤𝑗 𝑚𝑖𝑗=𝑘
𝑐(M)?¯?𝑚1111 ?¯?
𝑚12
12 . . . ?¯?
𝑚𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑 E
[︀
𝑈𝑚11 . . . 𝑈
𝑚𝑑
𝑑
]︀
=
∑︁
∑︀
𝑖≤𝑗 𝑚𝑖𝑗=𝑘
?¯?𝑚1111 ?¯?
𝑚12
12 . . . ?¯?
𝑚𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑
𝑚11!𝑚12! . . .𝑚𝑑𝑑!
E[𝑈𝑚11 ] . . .E
[︀
𝑈𝑚𝑑𝑑
]︀
(6.15)
The number (𝑚𝑖) of times each 𝑈𝑖 appears in a particular combination M
is a simple summation over the elements corresponding to element 𝑖: 𝑚𝑖 =∑︀
𝑗≥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑗 +
∑︀
𝑗≤𝑖𝑚𝑗𝑖. Indeed, this summation counts 𝑚𝑖𝑖 twice to account
for the double appearance of 𝑈𝑖 in 𝑈𝑖?¯?𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑖.
Equation (6.15) sums over a product of univariate moments. The mo-
ments of a truncated univariate standard normal distribution 𝑉 = 𝑍01𝑙≤𝑍0≤𝑢
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with 𝑍0 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1) follow from the well-known recursion
E
[︀
𝑉 𝑖
]︀
= (𝑖− 1)E[︀𝑉 𝑖−2]︀+ 𝑙𝑖−1𝜙 (𝑙)− 𝑢𝑖−1𝜙 (𝑢)
with initial conditions
E
[︀
𝑉 0
]︀
= Φ(𝑢)− Φ(𝑙) E[︀𝑉 1]︀ = ˆ 𝑢
𝑙
𝜉𝜙 (𝑥) d𝑥 = 𝜙 (𝑙)− 𝜙(𝑢) (6.16)
where the functions 𝜙 and Φ denote for a standard normal distribution the
probability density function and the cdf, respectively.
Rather than the moments of 𝑉 , we need the moments of each 𝑈𝑖 =
𝑍1a˜≤𝑍≤b˜ in (6.14) with 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇𝑖, 1). Equivalently, we need the moments
of the univariate random variables 𝑈𝑖 = (𝑍0 + ?˜?𝑖)1𝑙𝑖≤𝑍0≤𝑢𝑖 with 𝑙𝑖 = ?˜?𝑖 − ?˜?𝑖
and 𝑢𝑖 = ?˜?𝑖 − ?˜?𝑖. The moments of 𝑈𝑖 follow by applying (6.15) and (6.16)
on
E
[︁
𝑈𝑘𝑖
]︁
= E
[︁
(𝑍0 + ?˜?𝑖)
𝑘1𝑙𝑖≤𝑍0≤𝑢𝑖
]︁
=
𝑘∑︁
𝑗=0
(︂
𝑘
𝑗
)︂
?˜?𝑘−𝑗𝑖 E
[︀
𝑉 𝑗
]︀
(6.17)
where 𝑘 = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
6.3 Convergence conditions
The following theorem gives necessary and sufficient conditions for conver-
gence of the series in (6.15), and thus (6.14).
Theorem 1. Define 𝑋 = 12𝑍
′B𝑍1a≤𝑍≤b with
· 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, I)
· B = I−DΣ−1D with both the matrices D and Σ positive definite
· the vector a satisfies |𝑎𝑖| <∞
Further, let 𝐼 = {𝑖 : 𝑏𝑖 =∞}, 𝑑 = |𝐼|, B^ = B𝐼𝐼 , and ?^?(^s) = s^′B^s^.
The series expansion
∑︀∞
𝑘=0 E
[︀
𝑋𝑘/𝑘!
]︀
of E[exp(𝑋)] converges if one of
the following conditions is true
(𝑖) 𝜇𝑖 /∈ [𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖] for some 𝑖 /∈ 𝐼
(𝑖𝑖) the set 𝒮 = {s^ ∈ R𝑑 : ?^?(𝑠) ≤ −1, ‖s^‖ = 1, s^ ≥ 0} is empty
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) the set 𝐼 is empty
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(𝑖𝑣) the eigenvalues of B^ are larger than −1
(𝑣) the dominant eigenvalue of B^ is smaller than 1
(𝑣𝑖) the absolute row sum
∑︀𝑑
𝑗=1 |B^𝑖𝑗 | is for each 𝑖 smaller than 1
(𝑣𝑖𝑖) any of the conditions (iv)-(vi) above holds with B in place of B^ = B𝐼𝐼
The series expansion
∑︀∞
𝑘=0 E
[︀
𝑋𝑘/𝑘!
]︀
of E[exp(𝑋)] diverges if the set 𝒮
has nonzero measure.
The crucial point of Theorem 1 is that a convergent series is available for
any Σ. For instance, D = 𝛿I with
0 < 𝛿 <
√︁
2min
𝑖
𝜆𝑖(Σ) =
√︃
2
max𝑖 𝜆𝑖(Σ−1)
ensures
min
𝑖
𝜆𝑖(B) = min
𝑖
𝜆𝑖(I− 𝛿2Σ−1) > min
𝑖
𝜆𝑖
(︂
I− 2Σ
−1
max𝑖 𝜆𝑖(Σ−1)
)︂
= −1
which produces by 1(𝑖𝑣) and (𝑣𝑖𝑖) in Theorem 1 a convergent series E
[︀
𝑋𝑘/𝑘!
]︀
.
Moran (1983) provides condition (𝑣𝑖) as a sufficient convergence condi-
tion. The absolute value of each eigenvalue is necessarily smaller than one
if this sufficient condition is satisfied. Thus, our condition (𝑖𝑣) is less strict.
The following example illustrates that the sufficient conditions in Theorem
1(𝑖𝑖𝑖)-(𝑣𝑖𝑖) are not necessary for convergence.
Example Let a = 0, b =∞, and define the positive definite matrix
Σ =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
1 0.864 0.964 −0.966
1 0.938 −0.933
1 −0.983
1
⎞⎟⎟⎠
where we neglect the symmetric lower triangular part for convenience. Fol-
lowing Moran (1983), choose Ω = D2 = (diag(Σ−1))−1. This gives
B =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
0 −0.549 0.495 −0.510
0 0.501 −0.404
0 −0.394
0
⎞⎟⎟⎠
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In this case, B = I−DΣ−1D has zero diagonal and the off-diagonal elements
contain the partial correlation coefficients. This matrix B has an eigenvalue
−1.14 which is smaller than −1. Thus, the matrix does not satisfy any of
the sufficient conditions (𝑖𝑣)-(𝑣𝑖𝑖) in Theorem 1.
The dominant eigenvector of B that corresponds to the eigenvalue −1.14
is given by (0.610, 0.590,−0.405, 0.340). This vector has a negative entry
which means that this eigenvector is not in 𝒮. The unit vectors s in the posi-
tive orthant do satisfy 𝜆(s) > −1 since the vector s* = (0.609, 0.568, 0, 0.554)
solves
min
{s:‖s‖=1,s>0}
𝜆(s)
and admits 𝜆(s*) = s*′Bs* = −0.978 > −1. This implies that the set 𝒮 in
Theorem 1(𝑖𝑖) is empty such that the series E
[︀
(𝑍 ′B𝑍/2)𝑘
]︀
/𝑘! converges for
any 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, I)).
6.4 Error bounds
A truncation of the expansion in (6.14) after 𝑛 terms leads to a truncation
error equal to the remainder 𝑐1
∑︀∞
𝑘=𝑛+1
1
𝑘! E˜[𝑈
′B𝑈/2]𝑘. In this section we
find upper and lower bounds for this remainder. First, we introduce some
notation.
Let 𝑋 be a random variable with distribution function 𝐹 . Unless indi-
cated otherwise, we assume P(𝑋 < 0) > 0, and P(𝑋 > 0) > 0. Denote the
positive and negative parts of𝑋 by𝑋+ = max(𝑋, 0) and𝑋− = max(−𝑋, 0),
respectively. Let 𝜇𝑛 represent the 𝑛-th moment of 𝑋, and define the mo-
ment ratio 𝑚𝑛 = 𝜇𝑛/𝜇𝑛−1. Let 𝜇+𝑛 , 𝜇−𝑛 , 𝑚+𝑛 and 𝑚−𝑛 refer to the moments
and moment ratios of the positive parts and the negative parts, respectively.
Notice that 𝜇𝑛 = 𝜇+𝑛 + (−1)𝑛𝜇−𝑛 , and, if 𝑛 even, 𝜇𝑛 > 0.
For 𝜇𝑛 > 0, let 𝑋(𝑛) represent the random variable with cumulative
distribution function 𝐹 (𝑛) that satisfies
d𝐹 (𝑛)(𝑥) =
{︃
1
𝜇𝑛
𝑥𝑛d𝐹 (𝑥) 𝑥 ≥ 0
0 𝑥 < 0
(6.18)
This defines a distribution function since d𝐹 (𝑛)(𝑥) ≥ 0 and ´ d𝐹 (𝑛)(𝑥) = 1.
It follows that the 𝑖-th moment of 𝑋(𝑛) equals
𝜇
(𝑛)
𝑖 =
𝜇𝑛+𝑖
𝜇𝑛
(6.19)
We use the operator ≤st and the term dominance to refer to first order
stochastic dominance.
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The basic idea is to estimate the remainder of exp(𝑋) = exp (𝑈 ′B𝑈/2)
in (6.14) after 𝑛 terms by bounding
∞∑︁
𝑖=𝑛+1
E
[︀
𝑋𝑖
]︀
𝑖!
=
∞∑︁
𝑖=𝑛+1
E
[︀
(𝑋−)𝑖
]︀
+ E
[︀
(𝑋+)𝑖
]︀
𝑖!
= 𝜇−𝑛 𝑠𝑛(𝑋
−
𝑛 ) + 𝜇
+
𝑛 𝑠𝑛(𝑋
+
𝑛 ) (6.20)
where
𝑠𝑛(𝑋
−
𝑛 ) =
1
𝜇−𝑛
∞∑︁
𝑖=𝑛+1
𝜇−𝑖
𝑖!
𝑠𝑛(𝑋
+
𝑛 ) =
1
𝜇+𝑛
∞∑︁
𝑖=𝑛+1
𝜇+𝑖
𝑖!
We bound each of the four elements in the right-hand side of (6.20). Bounds
on 𝜇−𝑛 and 𝜇+𝑛 are in section 6.4.1, whilst section 6.4.2 contains bounds on
𝑠𝑛(𝑋
−) and 𝑠𝑛(𝑋+). They jointly provide a lower and upper bound on the
remainder
∑︀∞
𝑖=𝑛+1 E
[︀
𝑋𝑖
]︀
/𝑖!.
6.4.1 Bounds on 𝜇−𝑛 and 𝜇+𝑛
This section starts with five lemmas. We end this section with Theorem 7
that summarizes the algorithm to bound 𝜇−𝑛 and 𝜇+𝑛 .
Lemma 2. (𝑖) For nonnegative 𝑋 and 𝑛 ≥ 2, or for arbitrary 𝑋 and even
𝑛 ≥ 2
𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑛−2 − 𝜇2𝑛−1 ≥ 0
(𝑖𝑖) For nonnegative 𝑋 with 𝜇1 > 0
0 < 𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚2 ≤ 𝑚3 ≤ . . .
The inequalities are all strict if and only if 𝑋 is nondegenerate.
The next lemma provides preliminary bounds on 𝜇𝑠𝑖 and𝑚
𝑠
𝑖 (𝑠 ∈ {+,−}).
Lemma 3. For 𝑖 ≥ 1, even 𝑛 ≥ 2 and 𝑠 ∈ {+,−}, we have
𝜇𝑠𝑖 ,𝑚
𝑠
𝑖 ≥ 0 𝑚𝑠1 = 𝜇𝑠1 𝑥𝑠 ≤ 𝑚𝑠𝑖+1 ≤ ?¯?𝑠 (6.21)
𝜇𝑠𝑛 ≤ 𝜇𝑛 (6.22)
𝜇+𝑛−1 ≥ 𝜇𝑛−1
1
𝑚+𝑛
≥ 1
𝑚𝑛
𝑚+𝑛−1 ≥ 𝑚𝑛−1 (6.23)
𝜇−𝑛−1 ≥ −𝜇𝑛−1
1
𝑚−𝑛
≥ − 1
𝑚𝑛
𝑚−𝑛−1 ≥ −𝑚𝑛−1 (6.24)
136 A new evaluation method for the multivariate normal distribution
where the support [𝑥𝑠, ?¯?𝑠] of 𝑋𝑠 (𝑠 ∈ {+,−}) on the positive half-line (0,∞)
is given by
𝑥𝑠 = inf (𝑥 |P(𝑋𝑠 ≤ 𝑥) > P(𝑋𝑠 = 0)) ?¯?𝑠 = min (𝑥 |P(𝑋𝑠 ≤ 𝑥) = 1)
(𝑖) The nonnegativity constraints on 𝜇𝑠𝑖 and 𝑚
𝑠
𝑖 hold with equality if and
only if 𝑋𝑠 ≡ 0.
(𝑖𝑖) The bounds 𝑥𝑠 ≤ 𝑚𝑠𝑖+1 ≤ ?¯?𝑠 hold with equality if and only if 𝑋𝑠 is
degenerate on (0,∞).
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) The bounds on 𝜇+𝑖 and 𝑚
+
𝑖 in (6.22)–(6.24) hold with equality if and
only if 𝑋− ≡ 0.
(𝑖𝑣) The bounds on 𝜇−𝑖 and 𝑚
−
𝑖 in (6.22)–(6.24) hold with equality if and
only if 𝑋+ ≡ 0.
The next lemma enables us to bound 𝜇𝑠𝑖 in terms of the bounds on 𝑚
𝑠
𝑖 .
The required moments and upper bounds will be available in our application
of the lemma.
Lemma 4. Consider 𝑋 with known moments 𝜇𝑛−2, 𝜇𝑛−1, 𝜇𝑛 (𝑛 even).
Upper and lower bounds on 𝑚𝑠𝑛−1 and 𝑚𝑠𝑛 are known (𝑠 ∈ {+,−}) and
denoted by lower and upper bars, respectively. Let
𝑎𝑛 = 𝜇𝑛 −
𝜇2𝑛−1
𝜇𝑛−2
𝑏𝑛 =
𝜇𝑛
𝜇𝑛−2
(6.25)
𝑢+𝑛 (𝑥) =
𝑎𝑛
𝑏𝑛/𝑥− 2𝑚𝑛−1 + 𝑥 𝑢
−
𝑛 (𝑥) =
𝑎𝑛
𝑏𝑛/𝑥+ 2𝑚𝑛−1 + 𝑥
(6.26)
𝑣𝑠𝑛 (𝑐, 𝑑) =
⎧⎨⎩
𝑢𝑠𝑛(𝑐)
√
𝑏𝑛 < 𝑐
𝑢𝑠𝑛(
√
𝑏𝑛) 𝑐 ≤
√
𝑏𝑛 ≤ 𝑑
𝑢𝑠𝑛(𝑑)
√
𝑏𝑛 > 𝑑
The moments of 𝑋𝑠 are bounded by
𝜇𝑠𝑛−2 ≤
𝑢𝑠𝑛(𝑚
𝑠
𝑛−1)
𝑚𝑠𝑛−1
𝜇𝑠𝑛−1 ≤ min
(︀
𝑣𝑠𝑛 (𝑚
𝑠
𝑛, ?¯?
𝑠
𝑛) , 𝑣
𝑠
𝑛
(︀
𝑚𝑠𝑛−1, ?¯?
𝑠
𝑛−1
)︀)︀
𝜇𝑠𝑛 ≤ ?¯?𝑠𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑛(?¯?𝑠𝑛)
The bounds on 𝜇𝑠𝑛−2 and 𝜇𝑠𝑛 are (𝑖) strictly tighter if the bounds 𝑚𝑠𝑛−1 and
?¯?𝑠𝑛 are tighter, and (𝑖𝑖) strict if and only if |𝑋| is nondegenerate.
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To implement possible improvements in the bounds, the next lemma
applies 𝜇𝑠𝑖 = 𝑚
𝑠
𝑖𝜇
𝑠
𝑖−1 and 𝜇𝑖 = 𝜇
+
𝑖 + (−1)𝑖𝜇−𝑖 on the bounds in Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. Let 𝑛 even, 𝑠 ∈ {+,−}, then for 𝑖 = 2, 3, 4, . . .
𝜇𝑠𝑖 ≥ max
⎛⎜⎝
(︁
𝜇𝑠
𝑖−1
)︁2
?¯?𝑠𝑖−2
,
(︁
𝜇𝑠
𝑖+1
)︁2
?¯?𝑠𝑖+2
,𝑚𝑠𝑖𝜇
𝑠
𝑖−1,
𝜇𝑠
𝑖+1
?¯?𝑠𝑖+1
⎞⎟⎠
𝜇𝑠𝑖 ≤ min
(︂√︁
?¯?𝑠𝑖−1?¯?
𝑠
𝑖+1, ?¯?
𝑠
𝑖 ?¯?
𝑠
𝑖−1,
?¯?𝑠𝑖+1
𝑚𝑠𝑖+1
)︂
𝜇+𝑛−1 ≥ 𝜇−𝑛−1 + 𝜇𝑛−1 𝜇+𝑛−1 ≤ ?¯?−𝑛−1 + 𝜇𝑛−1
𝜇−𝑛−1 ≥ 𝜇+𝑛−1 − 𝜇𝑛−1 𝜇−𝑛−1 ≤ ?¯?+𝑛−1 − 𝜇𝑛−1
𝜇+𝑛 ≥ 𝜇𝑛 − ?¯?−𝑛 𝜇+𝑛 ≤ 𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇−𝑛
𝜇−𝑛 ≥ 𝜇𝑛 − ?¯?+𝑛 𝜇−𝑛 ≤ 𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇+𝑛
Lemma 6 bounds 𝑚𝑠𝑖 in terms of the bounds on 𝜇
𝑠
𝑖 .
Lemma 6. Consider a random variable 𝑋 with known moments 𝜇𝑖 and
known bounds 𝜇𝑠
𝑖
and ?¯?𝑠𝑖 on 𝜇
𝑠
𝑖 (𝑠 ∈ {+,−}). The following inequalities hold
𝜇𝑠
𝑖
?¯?𝑠𝑖−1
≤ 𝑚𝑠𝑖 ≤
?¯?𝑠𝑖
𝜇𝑠
𝑖−1
√︃
𝜇𝑠
𝑖
?¯?𝑠𝑖−2
≤ 𝑚𝑠𝑖 ≤
√︃
?¯?𝑠𝑖+1
𝜇𝑠
𝑖−1
(6.27)
𝜇𝑖 − ?¯?−𝑖
?¯?+𝑖−1
≤ 𝑚+𝑖 ≤
𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇−𝑖
𝜇+
𝑖−1
𝜇𝑖 − ?¯?+𝑖
?¯?−𝑖−1
≤ 𝑚−𝑖 ≤
𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇+𝑖
𝜇−
𝑖−1
even 𝑖 (6.28)
𝜇𝑖 + 𝜇
−
𝑖
?¯?+𝑖−1
≤ 𝑚+𝑖 ≤
𝜇𝑖 + ?¯?
−
𝑖
𝜇+
𝑖−1
𝜇+
𝑖
− 𝜇𝑖
?¯?−𝑖−1
≤ 𝑚−𝑖 ≤
?¯?+𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖
𝜇−
𝑖−1
odd 𝑖 (6.29)
The bounds on 𝑚𝑠𝑖 are strict if and only if the bounds on 𝜇
𝑠
𝑖 are strict. The
identity
√︂
𝜇𝑠
𝑖
?¯?𝑠𝑖−2
= 𝑚𝑠𝑖 =
√︂
?¯?𝑠𝑖+1
𝜇𝑠
𝑖−1
holds if and only if 𝑋𝑠 is degenerate on
(0,∞).
In addition to Lemma 3-6, we check for improvements in the bounds
by employing Lemma 2(𝑖𝑖) on the obtained bounds (𝑠 ∈ {+,−}): 𝑚𝑠𝑖−1 ≤
𝑚𝑠𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑠𝑖+1. Subsequently, we return to Lemma 4 and repeat the loop until
none of the bounds has changed during a loop. Theorem 7 summarizes the
algorithm that enables us to find bounds on the moments 𝜇−𝑛 and 𝜇+𝑛 , and
the corresponding moment ratios 𝑚−𝑛 = 𝜇−𝑛 /𝜇
−
𝑛−1 and 𝑚
+
𝑛 = 𝜇
+
𝑛 /𝜇
+
𝑛−1.
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Theorem 7. Assume that the required moments 𝜇𝑖 are known. The index 𝑗
denotes an index that depends on 𝑖.
(𝑖) Initialize bounds on 𝑚−𝑖 and 𝑚
+
𝑖 (Lemma 3).
(𝑖𝑖) Bound 𝜇−𝑖 and 𝜇
+
𝑖 in terms of the bounds on 𝑚
−
𝑗 and 𝑚
+
𝑗 (Lemma 4).
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) Bound 𝜇−𝑖 and 𝜇
+
𝑖 in terms of the bounds on 𝜇
−
𝑗 , 𝜇
+
𝑗 , 𝑚
−
𝑗 , and 𝑚
+
𝑗
(Lemma 5).
(𝑖𝑣) Bound 𝑚−𝑖 and 𝑚
+
𝑖 in terms of the bounds on 𝜇
−
𝑗 and 𝜇
+
𝑗 (Lemma 6).
(𝑣) Bound 𝑚−𝑖 and 𝑚
+
𝑖 in terms of the bounds on 𝑚
−
𝑗 and 𝑚
+
𝑗 (Lemma
2(𝑖𝑖)).
(𝑣𝑖) Stop if none of the bounds has changed since step (𝑖𝑖), otherwise go to
step (𝑖𝑖).
6.4.2 Bounds on 𝑠𝑛(𝑋−) and 𝑠𝑛(𝑋+)
Define for 𝑛 = 0, 1, 2, . . .
𝑝𝑛(𝑥) =
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=0
𝑥𝑖
𝑖!
𝑟𝑛(𝑥) = 𝑒
𝑥 − 𝑝𝑛(𝑥) 𝑡𝑛(𝑥) =
{︃
𝑥−𝑛𝑟𝑛(𝑥) 𝑥 ̸= 0
0 𝑥 = 0
(6.30)
and for a random variable 𝑋 with E[𝑋𝑛] ̸= 0 the scaled remainder
𝑠𝑛(𝑋) =
E[𝑟𝑛(𝑋)]
E[𝑋𝑛]
. (6.31)
Define for 𝑡 < 1 and 𝜆 ̸= 0:
𝑐(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑢) = E
[︁
𝑍𝑑−1𝑡,𝜉 10≤𝑍𝑡,𝜉≤𝑢
√
1−𝑡
]︁
𝑍𝑡,𝜉 ∼ 𝑁
(︂
𝜉√
1− 𝑡 , 1
)︂
𝑚(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑢) =
𝑐(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑢)
𝑐(0; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑢)(1− 𝑡)𝑑/2 exp
(︂
𝜉2𝑡
2− 2𝑡
)︂
?^?𝑖 =
(︂
𝜆
2
)︂𝑖 𝑐(0; 𝑑+ 2𝑖, 𝜉, 𝑢)
𝑐(0; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑢)
𝑋𝜉,𝑢 =
1
2
𝑅2 (6.32)
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𝑠𝑛 (𝜆𝑋𝜉,𝑢) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1
𝜆𝑛Γ(𝑑/2+𝑛)
(︁
Γ(𝑑/2)
(1−𝜆)𝑑/2 −
∑︀𝑛
𝑖=0
𝜆𝑖Γ(𝑑/2+𝑖)
𝑖!
)︁
= 1𝑛!
[︀
2𝐹1
(︀
1, 𝑛+ 𝑑2 ;𝑛+ 1;𝜆
)︀− 1]︀ if 𝜉 = 0and 𝑢 =∞
1
?^?𝑛
(︁
𝑚(𝜆; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑢)−∑︀𝑛𝑖=0 ?^?𝑖𝑖! )︁ else
(6.33)
where the random variable 𝑅 has the density
𝑓𝑅(𝑟; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑢) =
𝑟𝑑−1
𝑐(0; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑢)
√
2𝜋
exp
(︂
−(𝑟 − 𝜉)
2
2
)︂
1𝑟≤𝑢. (6.34)
A recursive expression for 𝑐(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑢) is in (6.17).
Theorem 8. Suppose 𝜇 ≤ 0 and a ≤ 0 ≤ b with a finite. Let 𝑋 =
1
2𝑍
′B𝑍1a≤𝑍≤b with 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, I). The scaled remainder after 𝑛 terms of
𝑋− and 𝑋+ is bounded by respectively
min
(︀
𝑠𝑛 (𝜆𝑋0,∞) , 𝑠𝑛
(︀
𝜆𝑋‖𝜇‖,?¯?
)︀)︀ ≤ 𝑠𝑛(−𝑋−) < 0 (6.35)
𝑡𝑛(𝑚
+
𝑛+1) ≤ 𝑠𝑛(𝑋+) ≤ max
(︀
𝑠𝑛
(︀
?¯?𝑋0,∞
)︀
, 𝑠𝑛
(︀
?¯?𝑋‖𝜇‖,?¯?
)︀)︀
(6.36)
where 𝑡𝑛 and 𝑠𝑛 are as in (6.30) and (6.33), and
(𝑖) 𝜆 is a lower bound on min‖s‖=1 {𝜆(s) : 𝜆(s) ≤ 0, 𝑠𝑖 ≥ 0 if 𝑎𝑖 = 0}, i.e.,
𝜆 ≥ 𝜆min
?¯? is an upper bound on max‖s‖=1 {𝜆(s) : 𝜆(s) ≥ 0, 𝑠𝑖 ≤ 0 if 𝑏𝑖 = 0}, i.e.,
?¯? ≤ 𝜆max
where 𝜆(s) = s′Bs and 𝜆min and 𝜆max are the smallest and largest
eigenvalue of B, respectively.
(𝑖𝑖) 𝑚+𝑛+1 is a lower bound on E
[︁
(𝑋+)
𝑛+1
]︁
/E
[︀
(𝑋+)
𝑛]︀
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) ?¯? is an upper bound on sup
𝜇′x>0,x≥a
‖x‖, i.e.,
?¯? ≤ max
𝑗
⎯⎸⎸⎸⎷
⎛⎝ 1
𝜇𝑗
∑︁
𝑖 ̸=𝑗
𝑎𝑖𝜇𝑖
⎞⎠2 +∑︁
𝑖 ̸=𝑗
𝑎2𝑖 (6.37)
(𝑖𝑣) 𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋0,∞) is strictly convex and strictly increasing in 𝜆 with
lim
𝜆→0
𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋0,∞) = 0.
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Compared to Theorem 8, tighter bounds on 𝑠𝑛(𝑋−) and 𝑠𝑛(𝑋+) are
available by (𝑖) considering 𝑋s + 𝑋−s along a line, instead of 𝑋s and 𝑋−s
along separate half-lines, or (𝑖𝑖) splitting the 𝑑-dimensional unit ball 𝑆𝑑 in
the proof of Theorem 8 in smaller subsets for s than only the two subsets
based on the sign of 𝜆(s). Both adjustments could improve our method at
the expense of even more complicated bounds than in Theorem 8.
We employ Theorem 8 under the new measure, i.e., with tildes: −∞1 <
a˜ ≤ 0 ≤ b˜, 𝜇, and 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, I).
6.5 The covariance matrix and the location vector
Our method has some degrees of freedom in choosing the covariance matrix
Ω and the location vector 𝜇. We propose some possible choices for Ω and 𝜇.
The discussion follows an intuitive though general approach. Specific choices
are preferable for specific parameters in (6.1).
6.5.1 The covariance matrix Ω
The matrix Ω should at least ensure convergence of the series in (6.14).
Moran (1983) selects Ω such that B has a zero diagonal. Unfortunately,
this choice may result into a divergent series if the dominant eigenvalue of
B exceeds one (see Theorem 1). Each of the three proposed choices for Ω
resolves this issue. When feasible, a zero diagonal on B is still interesting
from a computational point of view in the summation (6.15).
Without loss of generality, we assume that the variance of each 𝑍𝑖 in the
original problem, i.e., the diagonal elements of Σ, are identical. Therefore,
we solely consider multiples of the identity matrix: Ω(𝜔) := 𝜔I such that
B = I− 𝜔Σ−1, and 𝜆(B) = 1− 𝜔𝜆(Σ−1). This gives
𝜆min(B) = 1− 𝜔𝜆max(Σ−1) 𝜆max(B) = 1− 𝜔𝜆min(Σ−1) (6.38)
We propose the following three choices for 𝜔:
(𝑖) By Theorem 8(𝑖𝑣), the absolute value of the scaled remainder increases
in the absolute value of 𝜆. That is, a small dominant eigenvalue leads
to a small scaled remainder. To minimize the dominant eigenvalue,
choose 𝜔 > 0 such that −𝜆min(B) = 𝜆max(B). Equivalently, by (6.38)
−1 + 𝜔𝜆max(Σ−1) = 1− 𝜔𝜆min(Σ−1),
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which gives
𝜔 =
2
𝜆min(Σ−1) + 𝜆max(Σ−1)
(6.39)
This 𝜔 minimizes the dominant eigenvalue of B among allΩ(𝜔). Lower
𝜔 correspond to higher |𝜆min(B)|, whilst higher 𝜔 correspond to higher
|𝜆max(B)|. Convergence of the expansion in (6.13) follows from Theo-
rem 1(𝑖𝑣) and (𝑣𝑖𝑖), and the positive definiteness of Σ−1:
𝜆min(B) = 1− 𝜔𝜆max(Σ−1) = 1− 2
𝜆min(Σ−1)/𝜆max(Σ−1) + 1
> −1
Notice that |𝜆min(B)| is close to zero if the condition number of Σ−1,
i.e., the ratio 𝜆max(Σ−1)/𝜆min(Σ−1) is close to one. Equivalently, the
condition number of Σ is ideally close to one.
(𝑖𝑖) Method (𝑖) does not take into account the convexity of 𝑠𝑛 in 𝜆, see
Theorem 8(𝑖𝑣). In other words, it underestimates the adverse effect
of a large positive 𝜆max(B) on 𝑠𝑛. The following more complicated
approach resolves this issue by minimizing the scaled remainder, or the
remainder of the upper bound of unbounded unit vectors. Motivated
by the bounds on nontruncated directions 𝑋0,∞ in (6.35)–(6.36) and
(6.38), we find 𝜔 > 0 that minimizes
min
𝜔>0
| |𝑠𝑛(𝜆max(B)𝑋0,∞)| − |𝑠𝑛(𝜆min(B)𝑋0,∞)| |
Equivalently, using (6.33)
min
𝜔>0
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒2𝐹1
(︂
1, 𝑛+ 𝑑2 ;𝑛+ 1;
𝜆max(B)
)︂⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒−
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒2𝐹1
(︂
1, 𝑛+ 𝑑2 ;𝑛+ 1;
𝜆min(B)
)︂⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
⃒⃒⃒⃒
⃒
Uniqueness of this optimization problem follows from the convexity of
the hypergeometric function 2𝐹1
(︀
1, 𝑛+ 𝑑2 ;𝑛+ 1; 𝑧
)︀
in 𝑧.
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) Another approach is to equalize the bounds on the remainders 𝑟𝑛 of
𝑋+ and 𝑋−:
min
𝜔>0
| |𝑟𝑛(𝜆max(B)𝑋0,∞)| − |𝑟𝑛(𝜆min(B)𝑋0,∞)| |
where, by (6.31) and (6.33)
𝑟𝑛(𝜆𝑋0,∞) =
1
(1− 𝜆)𝑑/2
− 1
Γ(𝑑/2)
∑︁𝑛
𝑖=0
𝜆𝑖Γ (𝑑/2 + 𝑖)
𝑖!
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Uniqueness of 𝜔 follows from the convexity of
|𝑟𝑛(𝜆𝑋0,∞)| = |𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋0,∞)||E[𝜆𝑋0,∞]𝑛 |
in 𝜆, which in turn follows from the convexity in 𝜆 of both components
on the right-hand side.
6.5.2 The central vector 𝜇
Recall from (6.14),
P(a ≤ 𝑍 ≤ b) = 𝑐1
⎛⎝ 𝑑∏︁
𝑗=1
(︁
Φ(?˜?𝑗 − ?˜?𝑗)− Φ(?˜?𝑗 − ?˜?𝑗)
)︁
+
∞∑︁
𝑘=1
1
𝑘!
E
[︃(︂
1
2
𝑈 ′B𝑈
)︂𝑘]︃⎞⎠
where
𝑐1 =
√︃
|Ω|
|Σ|𝑒
1
2
𝜇′Ω−1𝜇+ 1
2
𝜈′(Σ−1−Ω−1)𝜈 B = I−DΣ−1D
𝜈 = − (︀ΩΣ−1 − I)︀−1 𝜇 𝜇 = D−1(𝜇− 𝜈)
a˜ = D−1(a− 𝜈) b˜ = D−1(b− 𝜈)
𝑈 = 𝑍1a˜≤𝑍≤b˜ 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, I)
To compute the summants of 1𝑘!E
[︁(︀
1
2𝑈
′B𝑈
)︀𝑘]︁ in (6.14), we derived (6.15):
1
𝑘!
E
[︃(︂
1
2
𝑈 ′B𝑈
)︂𝑘]︃
=
∑︁
∑︀
𝑖≤𝑗 𝑚𝑖𝑗=𝑘
?¯?𝑚1111 ?¯?
𝑚12
12 . . . ?¯?
𝑚𝑑,𝑑
𝑑,𝑑
𝑚11!𝑚12! . . .𝑚𝑑,𝑑!
E[𝑈𝑚11 ] . . .E
[︀
𝑈𝑚𝑑𝑑
]︀
where ?¯?𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖𝑖/2, ?¯?𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏𝑖𝑗 , (𝑖 ̸= 𝑗), and 𝑚𝑖 =
∑︀
𝑗≥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑗 +
∑︀
𝑗≤𝑖𝑚𝑗𝑖.
For a small power 𝑘, single powers 𝑚𝑖 = 1 are relatively abundant in the
summation. As we prefer to truncate the series after a small number of
elements, we choose the vector 𝜇 such that E[𝑈𝑖] = 0 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑑. This
ensures E[𝑈 ′B𝑈 ] = 0 provided B has a zero diagonal.
Lemma 9. The unique 𝜇 = DB𝜈 that satisfies E[𝑈𝑖] = 0 corresponds to the
unique fixed-point f(𝜈) = 𝜈 with
𝑓𝑖(𝜈) =
𝜑𝑖 (a^−B𝜈)− 𝜑𝑖
(︁
b^−B𝜈
)︁
Φ𝑖
(︁
b^−B𝜈
)︁
− Φ𝑖 (a^−B𝜈)
+ e𝑖B𝜈 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑑 (6.40)
For the sequence 𝜈(𝑘) = f(𝜈(𝑘−1)), the distance ‖𝜈(𝑘) − 𝜈*‖ to the fixed point
𝜈* decreases each step with at least the factor max𝑖 |𝜆𝑖(B)|.
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Numerical problems may arise if both terms in the denominator of 𝑓𝑖 in
(6.40) are close to zero or close to one. Accordingly, we initialize the sequence
with 𝜈(0) = B−1a^ to ensure that the second term in the denominator of 𝑓𝑖
in (6.40) is one half.
Numerical experiments confirm that the sequence 𝜈(𝑘) = f(𝜈(𝑘−1)) con-
verges fast towards the fixed-point 𝜈* = f(𝜈*) that corresponds to E[𝑈𝑖] = 0
(𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑑). The location vector 𝜇 follows from 𝜇 = DB𝜈.
Using this vector 𝜇, the summation in (6.15) ideally neglects summants
involving at least one unit power E[𝑈𝑖] = 0. This could speed up the com-
putation time of our algorithm further, as particularly this summation is
computationally the most involving. However, the error bounds should take
into account the very small, though existent, approximation error in 𝜇 from
the fixed-point algorithm. This error translates into a small though nonzero
|E[𝑈𝑖]| which leads to E[𝑈 ′B𝑈 ] ̸= 0, even if B has a zero diagonal.
Powers 𝑚 > 1 of E[𝑈𝑚𝑖 ] = 0 (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑑) are more abundant in (6.15)
when the power 𝑘 of E
[︀
(𝑈 ′B𝑈)𝑘
]︀
is higher. It is straightforward to ex-
tend the analysis to the condition E[𝑈𝑚𝑖 ] = 0 for some odd integer 𝑚 > 1.
The benefit of E[𝑈𝑚𝑖 ] = 0 with a higher power 𝑚 is a potentially smaller
E
[︀
(𝑈 ′B𝑈)𝑘
]︀
for a higher 𝑘 which is ideally close to the number of trun-
cation terms 𝑛. Though interesting, we keep the analysis simple here by
choosing 𝑚 = 1, since it is computationally more expensive to compute 𝜇
for E[𝑈𝑚𝑖 ] = 0 with a higher 𝑚.
6.5.3 Comparison for equicorrelated distributions
We compare several 𝜇 and Ω for the special case that Σ corresponds to
an equicorrelated distribution. In doing this, we consider the 𝑑-dimensional
equicorrelated multivariate normal distribution 𝑍 with zero mean vector, cor-
relations 𝜌 and unit standard deviations. It is well-known that 𝜌 ∈
(︁
− 1𝑑−1 , 1
)︁
is equivalent to a positive definite covariance matrix Σ. Using some chosen
pair (𝜇,Ω), we estimate the probability P(𝑎1 ≤ 𝑍 ≤ ∞1) for given 𝑎 ≥ 0
and integer 𝑑 ≥ 2.
Using the results in section 6.5.1 and section 6.5.2, we derive expressions
for the covariance matrix Ω = 𝜔I, the location vector 𝜇, and the correspond-
ing vectors a˜, 𝜈 and 𝜇 and parameters 𝜆 and ?¯?. We compare our results with
the implicit choices in Moran (1983) and Hashorva and Hüsler (2003).
Indeed, fast simulation procedures are available for P(𝑎1 ≤ 𝑍 ≤ ∞) of
an equicorrelated normal distribution 𝑍 because of the simple representation
𝑍𝑖 =
√
𝜌𝑍0 +
√
1− 𝜌𝜀𝑖 where 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑑, 𝑍0 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1) and independent
𝜀𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1). Nevertheless, we can derive interesting analytical expressions
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for such distributions. For instance, we obtain convergence criteria in terms
of 𝑑 and 𝜌 for different Ω. We stress that our method is wider applicable,
i.e., it is not restricted to the equicorrelated case.
First, we derive some general expressions for equicorrelated normal dis-
tributions. Subsequently, we invoke Theorem 1 for convergence criteria and
bounds on the parameters under different setups.
Equicorrelated distributions
Define M as a 𝑑 × 𝑑 matrix with each diagonal element equal to 𝑚dg, and
each off-diagonal element equal to 𝑚off . Since
𝜆 (M) = 𝜆
(︀
𝑚off11
′ + (𝑚dg −𝑚off) I
)︀
= 𝜆
(︀
𝑚off11
′)︀+𝑚dg −𝑚off
we find two distinct eigenvalues
𝜆1(M) = 𝑚dg + (𝑑− 1)𝑚off 𝜆1⊥(M) = 𝑚dg −𝑚off (6.41)
with multiplicity 1 and 𝑑 − 1, respectively. The corresponding eigenspaces
are 1 and the space orthogonal to 1. It can be verified that the condition
number of M is ⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜆max(M)
𝜆min(M)
⃒⃒⃒⃒
= 1 + 𝑑
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝑚off
𝑚dg −𝑚off
⃒⃒⃒⃒
(6.42)
Further, M−1 has the following diagonal elements 𝑚invdg and off-diagonal
elements 𝑚invoff :
𝑚invdg =
𝑚dg +𝑚off(𝑑− 2)
(𝑚dg −𝑚off)(𝑚dg +𝑚off(𝑑− 1)) =
(𝑑− 1)𝜆1(M) + 𝜆1⊥(M)
𝑑𝜆1(M)𝜆1⊥(M)
(6.43)
𝑚invoff = −
𝑚off
(𝑚dg −𝑚off)(𝑚dg +𝑚off(𝑑− 1)) =
𝜆1⊥(M)− 𝜆1(M)
𝑑𝜆1(M)𝜆1⊥(M)
(6.44)
Consider M = Σ. Substituting 𝑚dg = 1 and 𝑚off = 𝜌 in (6.43) and (6.44)
implies that the inverse covariance matrixΣ−1 has positive diagonal elements
𝑠dg, and off-diagonal elements 𝑠off :
𝑠dg =
1 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌
(1− 𝜌) (1 + (𝑑− 1)𝜌) 𝑠off = −
𝜌
(1− 𝜌) (1 + (𝑑− 1)𝜌) (6.45)
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Notice that 𝑠off and 𝜌 ∈
(︁
− 1𝑑−1 , 1
)︁
have opposite signs. Equation (6.41)
gives the two distinct positive eigenvalues of Σ−1
𝜆1(Σ
−1) = 𝑠dg + (𝑑− 1)𝑠off = 1
1 + (𝑑− 1)𝜌 (6.46)
𝜆1⊥(Σ−1) = 𝑠dg − 𝑠off = 1
1− 𝜌 (6.47)
Each considered Ω is of the type Ω = 𝜔I, which means
B = I− 𝜔Σ−1 𝜈 = (︀I−ΩΣ−1)︀−1 𝜇 = B−1𝜇 (6.48)
a˜ =
1√
𝜔
(︀
a−B−1𝜇)︀ 𝜇 = 1√
𝜔
(𝜇− 𝜈) = 1√
𝜔
(︀
I−B−1)︀𝜇 (6.49)
We may find from (6.46), (6.47), and 𝜆(B) = 1− 𝜔𝜆(Σ−1):
𝜆1(B) = 1− 𝜔
1 + (𝑑− 1)𝜌 𝜆1⊥(B) = 1−
𝜔
1− 𝜌 (6.50)
Applying (6.43), (6.44), and (6.50) on B gives for B−1 the diagonal elements
𝑏invdg and off-diagonal elements 𝑏
inv
off :
𝑏invdg =
(𝑑− 1)𝜆1(B) + 𝜆1⊥(B)
𝑑𝜆1(B)𝜆1⊥(B)
=
(1 + (𝑑− 1)𝜌)(1− 𝜌)− 𝜔
(1 + (𝑑− 1)𝜌− 𝜔)(1− 𝜌− 𝜔)
𝑏invoff =
𝜆1⊥(B)− 𝜆1(B)
𝑑𝜆1(B)𝜆1⊥(B)
= − 𝜌𝜔
(1 + (𝑑− 1)𝜌− 𝜔)(1− 𝜌− 𝜔)
The probability measure of Moran (1983)
Let the superscript (𝑀) refer to variables of the measure of Moran (1983).
Recall that Moran (1983) uses 𝜇(𝑀) = 0 and for Ω(𝑀) =
(︀
D(𝑀)
)︀2 a diagonal
matrix with Ω(𝑀)𝑖𝑖 = 1/(Σ
−1)𝑖𝑖. Substituting 𝜔 = 1/𝑠dg in the expressions
of the equicorrelated case leads to
D(𝑀) =
1√
𝑠dg
I B
(𝑀)
𝑖𝑗 =
𝜌1𝑖 ̸=𝑗
1 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌
𝜈(𝑀) = 𝜇(𝑀) = 0 a˜(𝑀) = 𝑎
√
𝑠dg1
𝜆1(B
(𝑀)) = −(𝑑− 1)𝑠off
𝑠dg
=
(𝑑− 1)𝜌
1 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌 𝜆1⊥(B
(𝑀)) =
𝑠off
𝑠dg
=
−𝜌
1 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌
Under the measure of Moran (1983), each boundary in 𝑎1 is thus scaled by√
𝑠dg to correct for the standardization of Σ−1. The benefit of this stan-
dardization is a zero diagonal of B(𝑀).
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While 𝜆1⊥(B(𝑀)) > −1 holds for any 𝜌 ∈
(︁
− 1𝑑−1 , 1
)︁
,1 we have 𝜆1(B(𝑀)) ≤
−1 if 𝜌 ≤ 1/(3−2𝑑). For such 𝜌, the matrix Ω(𝑀) leads to a divergent series
expansion by the sufficient divergence condition in Theorem 1. In addition,
the error bounds we derived in Theorem 8 are unavailable when 𝜇(𝑀) = 0
and 𝑎 > 0, because ?˜?(𝑀)1 > 0 violates the assumption of nonpositive lower
bounds.2 In summary, the pair (𝜇(𝑀),Ω(𝑀)) implicitly used in Moran (1983)
is inappropriate if 𝜌 ≤ 1/(3− 2𝑑) or 𝑎 > 0 holds.
The probability measure of Hashorva and Hüsler (2003)
With a completely different approach, Hashorva and Hüsler (2003) derive
bounds for P(𝑍 ≥ a) from Jensen’s inequality, and the smallest and largest
eigenvalue of Σ. Similar to the method of Moran (1983), the implicit choice
Ω(𝐻) = Ω(𝑀) implies that the convergence condition is that both 𝜌 > 1/(3−
2𝑑) and 𝑎 ≤ 0 hold. Further, D(𝐻) = D(𝑀) and B(𝐻) = B(𝑀), 𝜆1(B(𝐻)) =
𝜆1(B
(𝑀)), and 𝜆1⊥(B(𝐻)) = 𝜆1⊥(B(𝑀)). The vector 𝜈(𝐻) is determined by
the location where the probability mass is maximal. Since Σ−1 is symmetric
and positive definite:
𝜈(𝐻) = argmin
x≥a
x′Σ−1x =
(︂
argmin
𝑥≥𝑎
𝑥21′Σ−11
)︂
1 = max(𝑎, 0)1
The case 𝑎 ≤ 0 coincides with 𝜇(𝑀) = 0 in Moran (1983): 𝜇(𝐻) = 𝜈(𝐻) = 0.
Now, we consider 𝑎 > 0 for which 𝜈(𝐻) = x^ = a. Using 𝜇 = B𝜈 from (6.48)
and 𝜆1(B(𝑀)) < 1,
𝜇(𝐻) = B(𝑀)𝜈(𝐻) = B(𝑀)a = 𝑎𝜆1(B
(𝑀))1 < 𝑎1
Hence,
𝜇(𝐻) =
(𝑑− 1)𝜌𝑎
1 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌1 𝜈
(𝐻) = 𝑎1
𝜇(𝐻) =
𝑎√
𝑠dg
𝜌− 1
1 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌1 < 0 a˜
(𝐻) =
1√
𝑠dg
(︁
a− 𝜈(𝐻)
)︁
= 0
For the two dimensional case in Figure 6.1 on p.130, we now have a˜(𝐻) =
𝜈(𝐻) = 0 and b˜(𝐻) = ∞1. As 𝜇(𝐻) < a˜(𝐻), the right panel in Figure 6.1
1Recall that a positive definite equicorrelated Σ corresponds to 𝜌 ∈
(︁
− 1
𝑑−1 , 1
)︁
.
2Because 𝑌 := 𝜆𝑋0,∞ with 𝑋0,∞ as in (6.32) is dominated by the conditional distri-
bution 𝑌𝑎 := 𝑌 |𝑌≥𝑎 with 𝑎 > 0, it follows that the scaled remainder of 𝑌 cannot be an
upper bound for the scaled remainder of 𝑌𝑎.
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indicates that we can restrict the analysis to directions s ≥ 0 starting from
𝜇(𝐻). Using a = 𝑎1, b = ∞1, 𝜆(s) = s′Bs, and sign(B(𝑀)𝑖𝑗 ) = sign(𝜌1𝑖 ̸=𝑗),
we have the following sharp bounds on 𝜆(s)
𝜆(𝐻) = min
‖s‖=1
{𝜆(s) : 𝜆(s) ≤ 0, s ≥ 0} = 𝜆min(B(𝑀))1𝜌<0 = 𝜆1(B(𝑀))1𝜌<0
?¯?(𝐻) = max
‖s‖=1
{𝜆(s) : 𝜆(s) ≥ 0, s ≥ 0} = 𝜆max(B(𝑀))1𝜌>0 = 𝜆1(B(𝑀))1𝜌>0
where we use 𝜆(e𝑖) = 0 for any vector e𝑖 with a 1 at the 𝑖th entry and zeros
elsewhere, since B(𝑀) has zero diagonal.
Each element in 𝑈 = 𝑍1a˜(𝐻)≤𝑍≤b˜(𝐻) = 𝑍1𝑍≥0 with 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇(𝐻), I) fol-
lows an independent standard normal distribution, first increased by ?˜?(𝐻)𝑖 <
0 and then all values below ?˜?(𝐻)𝑖 = 0 are set at zero. This implies that 𝑋 =
1
2𝑈
′B𝑈 = 12𝑑(𝑑−1)B
(𝑀)
12
∑︀
𝑖<𝑗 𝑈𝑖𝑈𝑗 is either nonpositive (B
(𝐻)
12 ≤ 0 if 𝜌 ≤ 0)
or nonnegative (B(𝐻)12 ≥ 0 if 𝜌 ≥ 0). The latter case with 𝜆(s) > 0 if s > 0 is
unfavorable from a computational view as this case leads to non-alternating
summants in (6.15) and so larger remainders that are in general harder to
bound.
Notice that the bound with ?¯? in (6.37) of Theorem 8 is redundant here
because these bounds correspond to bounded directions s from 𝜇(𝐻), whilst
𝜇(𝐻) < a˜(𝐻) < b˜(𝐻) =∞1 excludes such bounded directions.3
A new probability measure
Consider Ω = 𝜔I with 𝜔 from (6.39), (6.46), and (6.47) to ensure a minimal
absolute eigenvalue:
𝜔 =
2
(𝑑− 2)𝑠off + 2𝑠dg
=
2(1− 𝜌)(1 + (𝑑− 1)𝜌)
2 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌 (6.51)
By construction, both eigenvalues of B are equal in absolute value:
𝜆1(B) = 1− 𝜔𝜆1(Σ−1) = 1− 2 (1− 𝜌)
2 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌 =
𝑑𝜌
2 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌
𝜆1⊥(B) = 1− 𝜔𝜆1⊥(Σ−1) = 1− 2(1 + (𝑑− 1)𝜌)
2 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌 = −
𝑑𝜌
2 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌
3For the intuition, imagine again vectors satisfying 𝜇(𝐻) < a˜(𝐻) < b˜(𝐻) =∞1 for the
two-dimensional case in Figure 6.1 on p.130.
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It is easy to see that 𝜆1(B), 𝜆1⊥(B) > −1 if 0 ≤ 𝜌 < 1, which ensures
convergence of the series in (6.14) for 𝜌 ≥ 0 (see Theorem 1). If 𝜌 < 0, our
algorithm converges if 𝑑𝜌/(2+(𝑑−2)𝜌) > −1, or equivalently 𝜌 > −1/(𝑑−1).
This coincides with the condition for a positive definite equicorrelated Σ.
Hence, our method converges for any equicorrelated matrix when using B.
This benefit has the cost that B has a nonzero diagonal, which slows down
computations of the summation in (6.15).
Concerning 𝜇, the condition E
[︁
𝑍𝑖1?˜?𝑖≤𝑍𝑖
]︁
= 0 with 𝑍𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(?˜?𝑖, 1) implies
that we need ?˜?𝑖, ?˜?𝑖 < 0 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑑. Since ?˜?𝑖 < 0, ?˜?𝑖 = ∞, and 𝜆(s) =
s′Bs,
𝜆 = min
‖s‖=1
{𝜆(s) : 𝜆(s) ≤ 0} = 𝜆min(B) = −
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜌𝑑
2 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌
⃒⃒⃒⃒
?¯? = max
‖s‖=1
{𝜆(s) : 𝜆(s) ≥ 0} = 𝜆max(B) =
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝜌𝑑
2 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌
⃒⃒⃒⃒
By a˜, 𝜇 < 0 and symmetry of the variables, we find for ?¯? in Theorem 8(𝑖𝑖𝑖):4
?¯? = sup
𝜇′x>0,x≥a˜
‖x‖ = ‖a˜‖
The following lemma provides our 𝜇 that ensures E[𝑈 ] = 0, and indicates
whether 𝜇1 > 𝑎 holds.
Lemma 10. The location vector 𝜇 equals 𝜇11 with 𝜇1 = 𝑎 −
√
𝜔𝑦, 𝜔 from
(6.51), and 𝑦 the unique solution of
− 𝑎√
𝜔
+ 𝑦 =
𝜌𝑑
2(𝜌− 1)
𝜑(𝑦)
1− Φ(𝑦) (6.52)
A vector 𝜇 interior in the integration region 𝑇 (𝜇1 > 𝑎) is equivalent to
𝑎 < 𝜌𝑑
√︃
1 + (𝑑− 1)𝜌
𝜋 (1− 𝜌) (2 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌)
6.6 Numerical examples
This section first discusses numerical examples with equicorrelated distribu-
tions. Then, we consider random draws from a larger class of correlation
matrices.
4Figure 6.1 is illustrative here as ?¯? is the maximal distance from the origin to the
boundary of 𝑇 among all vectors x that satisfy 𝜇′x > 0.
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Consider the 𝑑-dimensional equicorrelated multivariate normal distri-
bution 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(0,Σ) with correlation parameter 𝜌 ∈
(︁
− 1𝑑−1 , 1
)︁
and unit
standard deviations. We are interested in estimating the probability 𝑝 :=
P(𝑍1 ≥ 𝑎, . . . , 𝑍𝑑 ≥ 𝑎) for given 𝑎 ≥ 0 and 𝑑 = 2, 3, . . ..
We obtain the location vector 𝜇* from Lemma 10, and the covariance
matrix Ω* = 𝜔I from 𝜔 in (6.51). This pair results in a matrix B with the
smallest dominant eigenvalue, convergence of our method, and E[𝑈 ] = 0.
Table 6.1 compares the performance of four different setups: (𝑖) (𝜇(𝐻),Ω(𝐻)),
(𝑖𝑖) (𝜇*,Ω(𝐻)), (𝑖𝑖𝑖) (𝜇*,Ω*), and (𝑖𝑣) the simulation method of Genz (1992).
For the setups (𝑖)–(𝑖𝑖𝑖), we compute the probability 𝑝 as the average of
the lower bound and the upper bound. This minimizes the absolute error
bound 𝜀 at half the difference between the two bounds. The method (𝑖𝑣)
of Genz (1992) only provides an error estimate 𝜀, not an error bound 𝜀.
Nonetheless, the error estimates of Genz (1992) are more conservative than
our error bounds. The error bounds 𝜀 of the three setups (𝑖)–(𝑖𝑖𝑖) are on
average comparable for 𝑛 = 4 in each of the four panels in Table 6.1, while
the bounds with 𝑛 = 8 terms are at least as accurate as the method of Genz
(1992).
Due to space limitations, we do not report the bounds of Hashorva and
Hüsler (2003) in Table 6.1. Although these bounds require a computation
time of no more than 2.0 ms, the bounds are not competitive with our
bounds. More specifically, the method of Hashorva and Hüsler (2003) gives
error bounds of 0.0702 and 0.1813 for the case in Panel A. For the case in
Panel B, the interval [1.77 · 10−3, 3.12 · 10−3] using the method of Hashorva
and Hüsler (2003) is also inaccurate compared to our method. This also
holds for the cases in Panels C and D, where the intervals of Hashorva and
Hüsler (2003) are [5.28 ·10−2, 0.101] and [1.01 ·10−4, 1.29 ·10−4], respectively.
The columns labeled 𝑟 report the ratio of the best error estimate and the
error bound: 𝑟 = (𝑝𝑛 − 𝑝14) /𝜀𝑛. A small |𝑟| indicates that the upper and
lower bound of 𝑝 are equally accurate. As a consequence, the true error is
very small while the error bound is very conservative. A value of 𝑟 close to
one means that the estimate for 𝑝 is too large, and the lower bound is more
accurate. The upper bound is more accurate if 𝑟 is close to minus one.
Our values of |𝑟| are not very close to one, thereby indicating that the
accuracy of the lower bound and upper bound are of the same order of mag-
nitude. Still, 𝑟 tends to be positive and most estimates for 𝑝 monotonically
decrease in 𝑛. This indicates that the subsequent downward revisions in
the upper bound exceed the upward revisions in the lower bound. In other
words, the lower bound tends to be more accurate than the upper bound.
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0.03
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8
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8
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0.76
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6
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8
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9
0.56
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9
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4
.874·
10 −
7
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1
0
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1
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1
6
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1
0
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1
5
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1
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1
3
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1.019156339
6
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1
2
0.26
0.01
1.019156339
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1
5
-0.17
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1.019156339
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1
7
0.00
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1.019156339
1
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44·10 −
1
4
0.02
1.019156339
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1
8
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1.019156339
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2
2
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We may exploit this for an improvement of our estimates for 𝑝.
The columns labeled time(𝑠) in Table 6.1 report the computation time
in seconds.5 Differences in computation time are small for low 𝑛. The com-
putation time increases when the number of terms 𝑛 increases, particularly
with the covariance matrix Ω* since the corresponding B* has a nonzero
diagonal. Nonetheless, for 𝑛 = 8 our method is still comparable with the
method of Genz (1992) in terms of computation time. This is remarkable
because in contrast to Genz (1992) we do not use a compiled version of our
code. Another potential improvement is the adoption of a parallel computing
package. For the equicorrelated case, additional computational benefits are
possible in (6.15) where each 𝑈𝑖 follows the same distribution, and ?¯?𝑖,𝑗 only
depends on whether ?¯?𝑖,𝑗 is a diagonal element of B¯ (see (6.45) and (6.48)).
Consider the results for 𝑑 = 5 and 𝜌 = 0.2 with 𝑎 = −0.1 and 𝑎 = 1 in
Panel A and B, respectively. It follows from Section 6.5 that our method con-
verges for each of the three considered setups. Among these three setups, the
convergence speed per term of the expansion is highest with the pair (𝜇*,Ω*)
by the following two reasons. First, the vector 𝜇* ensures that E[𝑈 ] ≈ 0,
which reduces E
[︀
(𝑈B𝑈)𝑘
]︀
and thereby the truncation error. Second, the
matrix Ω* corresponds to a matrix B* with smaller absolute eigenvalues.
Namely, 𝜆* = ?¯?* = 1/2.6 ≈ 0.385 compared to 𝜆(𝐻) = 0 and ?¯?(𝐻) = 0.5 for
Ω(𝐻). However, the matrix B* has nonzeros on the diagonal, which slows the
computation speed severely down. The results suggest that (𝜇*,Ω(𝐻)) is the
optimal setup for equicorrelated distributions in dealing with convergence
speed and computation time per term.
A similar picture emerges from the results with 𝑑 = 4 and 𝜌 = −0.1
using either 𝑎 = −0.1 (Panel C) or 𝑎 = 1 (Panel D). The estimates are more
accurate than in Panels A and B. This follows from the condition number
(6.42) and the corresponding smaller eigenvalues of B (see p.141). Here,
−𝜆* = ?¯?* = 2/9 while 𝜆(𝐻) = −0.375 and ?¯?(𝐻) = 0.
Figure 6.2 shows that the relative error bound 𝜀/𝑝 declines in the thresh-
old value 𝑎 for 𝑛 = 8. That is, while 𝑎 increases, the error bound decreases
more than the corresponding probability decreases. This decline in the rel-
ative error contrasts with standard algorithms such as Genz (1992) that
focus on a small absolute error. Hence, our method is particularly helpful
in estimating tail probabilities. Another remarkable pattern is the almost
linear decrease in the log error bound 𝜀 when the number of series terms 𝑛
increases. This is illustrated in Figure 6.3 for the case 𝑎 = 1. This feature
of the error bound has the potential to enable us to preselect a specific 𝑛 for
5The computations times are obtained with an i5-3230 CPU with 6 GB RAM.
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Figure 6.2: Effect of a change in 𝑎
−1 0 1 2
10−14
10−12
10−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
d = 5,ρ = 0.2, n = 8
a
−1 0 1 2
10−25
10−20
10−15
10−10
10−5
100
d = 4,ρ = −0.1, n = 8
a
p
ε
ε/p
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a desired 𝜀.
To study arbitrary non-equicorrelated covariance matrices Σ, we gener-
ated 10, 000 correlation matrices of dimension 𝑑 = 4 by sampling 𝑑 inde-
pendent eigenvalues from a uniform distribution on [0, 1], and sampling 𝑑
independent eigenvectors from a uniform distribution on the 𝑑-dimensional
unit sphere. Following Genz (1993), we generate the lower bound a = 𝑎1
from a uniform distribution on [−√𝑑, 0]. We calculate 𝑝 as the mean of the
lower bound and the upper bound after 𝑛 = 8 terms, and the error bound
equals half the difference between the two bounds. We use 𝜇* and Ω* to
ensure convergence.
The top left plot in Figure 6.4 contains the relative frequencies by error
bound 𝜀. It suggests that most, but far from all, Taylor series indicate
convergence after a truncation of 8 terms. For instance, while half of the error
bounds is below 9.0 · 10−4, a substantial 7.1% of the computed probabilities
exceeds 1 (top right plot). The middle plots indicate a similar widespread
pattern for the relative error bound. Fortunately, this pattern is predictable
to some extent. The left bottom plot in Figure 6.4 shows that a large error
bound 𝜀 is associated with a high dominant eigenvalue max |𝜆|. This is
intuitive as a high |𝜆| indicates a large remainder. Interestingly, Phinikettos
and Gandy (2011) provide a simulation method that is relatively efficient for
covariance matrices with high singular values which in general correspond to
high condition numbers. In contrast, our method performs best with a small
dominant eigenvalue, thus a small condition number.
The relation between the relative error bound 𝜀/𝑝 and the dominant
eigenvalue |𝜆| is somewhat less clear (not shown). Indeed, the dominant
eigenvalue mainly affects 𝜀, not 𝑝. As a consequence, there is no clear map-
ping from the probability estimate 𝑝 to the relative error bound 𝜀/𝑝, as
indicated by the right bottom plot in Figure 6.4.
6.7 Conclusion
This paper develops an analytical method to bound the probability of a mul-
tivariate normal distribution on a rectangular region. The method combines
a change of measure with a Taylor series expansion. The change of measure
is similar to an importance sampling approach. We derived error bounds by
exploiting that a multivariate normal distribution is an infinite mixture of
random variables that are closely related to the gamma distribution. The
bounds are tightest if the condition number of the covariance matrix is small.
Up to five dimensions, the bounds might be more precise than simula-
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Figure 6.4: Simulation results.
10, 000 random covariance matrices with 𝑑 = 4, and truncation after 𝑛 = 8 terms.
Relative frequency and cdf of error bound 𝜀 (top plots), relative frequency and cdf of
relative error bound 𝜀/𝑝 (middle), scatter plot of error bound and maximal absolute
eigenvalue max |𝜆(B)| (bottom left), and scatter plot of relative error bound relative to
estimated probability (bottom right).
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tion methods. The intuition is that simulation methods tend to focus on a
small absolute error. In addition, simulation methods only provide an error
estimate. For a given distribution, our relative bound increases in the size of
the integration region. This makes the method very well suited to estimate
tail probabilities.
Additional improvements are possible with a compiled version of our
code, a parallel computing package, or an even more accurate analysis of the
error bounds. Another interesting question is how to deal with the expo-
nentially increasing number of combinations when the dimension increases.
Here, a numerical integration method to estimate the remainder term is po-
tentially helpful. The numerical integration could be substituted by a faster
simulation method, at the expense of an error estimate instead of an error
bound.

Appendix
6.A Appendix
6.A.1 Proofs Section 6.3
We start with two lemmas that are helpful in proving Theorem 1.
Lemma 11. Consider the noncentral 𝜒2-distribution 𝑋 with 𝑘 ≥ 2 degrees
of freedom and noncentrality parameter 𝜉 ≥ 0. The shape of the tail of the
density function 𝑔 of 𝑌 = 𝜆𝑋/2 (𝜆 > 0) is independent of 𝜉 and satisfies
lim
𝑥→∞
𝑔(𝑥)
exp(−𝑥/𝜆0) = 0 if and only if 𝜆 > 𝜆0
Proof of Lemma 11
It is well known that the density function 𝑓𝑘,𝜉 of 𝑋 is a Poisson-weighted
average of central 𝜒2-distributions:
𝑓𝑘,𝜉(𝑥) =
∞∑︁
𝑖=0
𝑒−𝜉/2(𝜉/2)𝑖
𝑖!
𝑓𝑘+2𝑖(𝑥)
where 𝑓𝑗 is the density of the central 𝜒2-distribution with 𝑗 degrees of free-
dom:
𝑓𝑗(𝑥) =
{︃
𝑥(𝑗/2)−1
2𝑗/2Γ(𝑗/2)
𝑒−𝑥/2 𝑥 ≥ 0
0 otherwise
An upper bound on the density of 𝑌 = 𝜆𝑋/2 at 𝑌 = 𝑦 follows from
𝑔(𝑦) = 𝑓𝑘,𝜉
(︂
2𝑦
𝜆
)︂
=
2
𝜆
∞∑︁
𝑖=0
𝑒−𝜉/2(𝜉/2)𝑖
𝑖!
1
2𝑘/2+𝑖Γ (𝑘/2 + 𝑖)
(︂
2𝑦
𝜆
)︂ 𝑘
2
+𝑖−1
exp
(︁
−𝑦
𝜆
)︁
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=
2𝑒−𝜉/2
𝜆2𝑘/2
(︂
2𝑦
𝜆
)︂ 𝑘
2
−1
exp
(︁
−𝑦
𝜆
)︁ ∞∑︁
𝑖=0
(𝜉/2)𝑖
𝑖!Γ (𝑘/2 + 𝑖)
1
2𝑖
(︂
2𝑦
𝜆
)︂𝑖
≤ 𝑒
−𝜉/2
𝜆
(︁𝑦
𝜆
)︁ 𝑘
2
−1
exp
(︁
−𝑦
𝜆
)︁ ∞∑︁
𝑖=0
1
(𝑖!)2
(︂
𝜉𝑦
2𝜆
)︂𝑖
=
𝑒−𝜉/2
𝜆
(︁𝑦
𝜆
)︁ 𝑘
2
−1
exp
(︁
−𝑦
𝜆
)︁
𝐼0
(︃
2
√︂
𝜉𝑦
2𝜆
)︃
→ 𝑒
−𝜉/2
𝜆
(︁𝑦
𝜆
)︁ 𝑘
2
−1
exp
(︁
−𝑦
𝜆
)︁ 1√
𝜋
(︂
2𝜆
𝜉𝑦
)︂1/4
𝑒
√︁
2𝜉𝑦
𝜆 as 𝑦 →∞ (6.53)
where 𝐼0 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind with the well-known
property 𝐼0(𝑧) →
√︁
2
𝜋𝑧 𝑒
𝑧 as 𝑧 → ∞. An asymptotic lower bound follows
along similar lines from
𝑔(𝑦) =
2𝑒−𝜉/2
𝜆2𝑘/2Γ (𝑘/2)
(︂
2𝑦
𝜆
)︂ 𝑘
2
−1
exp
(︁
−𝑦
𝜆
)︁ ∞∑︁
𝑖=0
(𝜉/2)𝑖
𝑖!Γ (𝑘/2 + 𝑖)
1
2𝑖
(︂
2𝑦
𝜆
)︂𝑖
≥ 𝑒
−𝜉/2
𝜆Γ (𝑘/2)
𝜆
𝑦
exp
(︁
−𝑦
𝜆
)︁(︂𝜉
2
)︂−𝑘/2 ∞∑︁
𝑖=0
1
((𝑘/2 + 𝑖)!)2
(︂
𝜉𝑦
2𝜆
)︂𝑘/2+𝑖
(6.54)
The summation term in (6.54) is of course strictly dominated by exp( 𝜉𝑦2𝜆).
Because exp(−𝑦/𝜆) is the dominant term that drives both the asymptotic
upper bound (6.53) and the lower bound (6.54) to zero,
lim
𝑦→∞
𝑔(𝑦)
exp(−𝑦/𝜆0) = 0 if and only if 𝜆 > 𝜆0
which does not depend on 𝜉.
Lemma 12. Consider a random variable 𝑋 with a probability density func-
tion 𝑓 that has a tail similar to a gamma distribution with parameters 𝑑 > 0
and 𝜆 > 0:
𝑓(𝑥) ∝ |𝑥|𝑑−1 exp(−𝜆|𝑥|) |𝑥| → ∞
The series expansion
∑︀∞
𝑘=0 E
[︀
𝑋𝑘
]︀
/𝑘! of E[𝑋] converges if and only if 𝜆 > 1.
Proof of Lemma 12
Let 𝑚𝑘 := E
[︀
𝑋𝑘
]︀
/𝑘!. For 𝑘 = 0, 1, 2, . . .
𝑚𝑘 =
1
𝑘!
lim
𝑧→∞
ˆ 𝑧
𝑥=−𝑧
𝑥𝑘𝑓(𝑥) d𝑥 (6.55)
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= lim
𝑧→∞
𝑧𝑘+1
(𝑘 + 1)!
[︂
(−1)𝑘
ˆ 0
𝑥=−𝑧
𝑤𝑘(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥) d𝑥+
ˆ 𝑧
𝑥=0
𝑤𝑘(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥) d𝑥
]︂
(6.56)
where 𝑤𝑘(𝑥) := (𝑘 + 1)(|𝑥|/𝑧)𝑘/𝑧 is the weight of the strictly positive 𝑓(𝑥)
in the integral. The total weight of both integrals in (6.56) equals one:
lim
𝑧→∞
ˆ 0
𝑥=−𝑧
𝑤𝑘(𝑥) d𝑥 = lim
𝑧→∞
ˆ 𝑧
𝑥=0
𝑤𝑘(𝑥) d𝑥 = 1
For an arbitrary 𝜀 ∈ (0, 1] and 𝑘 large, the relative weight of 𝑤𝑘(𝑥) in the
subset [0, (1− 𝜀)𝑧] of [0, 𝑧] converges to zero if 𝑧 →∞:
lim
𝑘,𝑧→∞
´ (1−𝜀)𝑧
𝑥=0 𝑤𝑘(𝑥)d𝑥´ 𝑧
𝑥=0𝑤𝑘(𝑥)d𝑥
= lim
𝑘,𝑧→∞
´ (1−𝜀)𝑧
𝑥=0
𝑘+1
𝑧
(︀
𝑥
𝑧
)︀𝑘
d𝑥´ 𝑧
𝑥=0
𝑘+1
𝑧
(︀
𝑥
𝑧
)︀𝑘
d𝑥
= lim
𝑘→∞
(1− 𝜀)𝑘+1 = 0
Since
⃒⃒´ 𝑧
𝑥=0𝑤𝑘(𝑥)d𝑥
⃒⃒
<∞, we have for all 𝑦 ∈ [0,∞),
lim
𝑘→∞
ˆ 0
𝑥=−𝑦
𝑤𝑘(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥) d𝑥 = lim
𝑘→∞
ˆ 𝑦
𝑥=0
𝑤𝑘(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥) d𝑥 = 0.
We find for (6.56) with finite 𝑦
lim
𝑘→∞
𝑦𝑘+1
(𝑘 + 1)!
[︂
(−1)𝑘
ˆ 0
𝑥=−𝑦
𝑤𝑘(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥) d𝑥+
ˆ 𝑦
𝑥=0
𝑤𝑘(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥) d𝑥
]︂
= 0.
Thus, lim𝑘→∞𝑚𝑘 in (6.55) is completely determined by 𝑓(𝑥) with |𝑥| > 𝑦:
𝑚𝑘 → 1
𝑘!
lim
𝑦→∞
[︂ˆ −𝑦
𝑥=−∞
𝑥𝑘 𝑓(𝑥) d𝑥+
ˆ ∞
𝑥=𝑦
𝑥𝑘 𝑓(𝑥) d𝑥
]︂
In other words, the gamma-shaped tail of 𝑓 fully determines the limit of the
sequence 𝑚𝑘. Next, we identify the gamma distributions with a convergent
sequence 𝑚𝑘.
Consider the moments of a gamma distribution 𝑌 with parameters 𝑑 > 0
and 𝜆 > 0:
E
[︁
𝑌 𝑘
]︁
=
Γ(𝑑+ 𝑘)
Γ(𝑑)𝜆𝑘
By Stirling’s formula,
E
[︀
𝑌 𝑘
]︀
𝑘!
=
Γ(𝑑+ 𝑘)
𝑘! Γ(𝑑)𝜆𝑘
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∝
√︀
2𝜋(𝑑+ 𝑘 − 1)
Γ(𝑑)𝜆𝑘
√
2𝜋𝑘
(︂
𝑑+ 𝑘 − 1
𝑒
)︂𝑑+𝑘−1 (︁ 𝑒
𝑘
)︁𝑘
∝ 1
Γ(𝑑)𝜆𝑘
(︂
𝑑+ 𝑘 − 1
𝑒
)︂𝑑−1(︂
1 +
𝑑− 1
𝑘
)︂𝑘+1/2
∝ 1
Γ(𝑑)𝜆𝑘
(︂
𝑑+ 𝑘 − 1
𝑒
)︂𝑑−1
𝑒𝑑−1
∝ 1
Γ(𝑑)𝜆𝑘
(𝑑+ 𝑘 − 1)𝑑−1 .
Therefore, E
[︀
𝑌 𝑘
]︀
/𝑘!→ 0 if and only if 𝜆 > 1.
Since the tails determine the asymptotics of the sequence 𝑚𝑘 of 𝑋, the
sequence 𝑚𝑘 converges to zero (𝑚𝑘 → 0) if and only if 𝜆 > 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
Diagonalize the symmetric matrix B = I − DΣ−1D as B = VΛV′ with
Λ𝑗𝑗 = 𝜆𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑑). The matrix DΣ−1D is positive definite, which
implies 𝜆𝑗 < 1. It follows from 𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇, I) that 𝑍 ∼ 𝜇 + 𝑆𝑍0 with 𝑆 the
direction of 𝑍 uniform on the unit 𝑑-sphere, and 𝑍0, the distance to 𝜇, has
density
ℎ(𝑧) =
21−𝑑/2
Γ(𝑑/2)
𝑧𝑑−1𝑒−𝑧
2/2
The factor 𝑧𝑑−1 is the Jacobian in a spherical representation. This gives for
E[exp(𝑋)] with 𝑋 = 12𝑍
′B𝑍1a≤𝑍≤b the spherical representation
E[exp(𝑋)] =
1
𝑆𝑑
ˆ
‖s‖=1
E
[︂
exp
(︂
1
2
(𝜇+ s𝑍0)
′B(𝜇+ s𝑍0)
)︂
1a≤𝜇+s𝑍0≤b
]︂
ds
(6.57)
where 𝑆𝑑 =
´
‖s‖=1 ds is the surface of the unit 𝑑-sphere. As follows from
the proof of Lemma 12, it suffices for studying the convergence of (6.57) to
consider the tail of each 𝑋s := 12(𝜇+ s𝑍0)
′B(𝜇+ s𝑍0) in the mixture (6.57).
A truncated𝑋s has finite moments and, hence, a convergent Taylor series
expansion for exp (𝑋s). That is, only non-truncated 𝑋s can result in a
divergent series expansion of exp(𝑋). The truncation of the (univariate)
distribution 𝑋s depends on the indicator function in (6.57). Since a > −∞
and 𝐼 = {𝑖 : 𝑏𝑖 = ∞}, we have a non-truncated distribution 𝑋s (thus
lim
𝑧→∞ 1a≤𝜇+s𝑧≤b = 1) if and only if each of the following three conditions
holds:
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(𝑎) 𝑠𝐼 ≥ 0
(𝑏) 𝑠𝑖 > 0 if 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 and 𝜇𝑖 < 𝑎𝑖
(𝑐) 𝑠𝑖 = 0 and 𝜇𝑖 ∈ [𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖] if 𝑖 /∈ 𝐼
A violation of any of the necessary divergence conditions (𝑎)–(𝑐) implies that
the series exp(𝑋s) converges. That is, the violation of (𝑐) gives the sufficient
convergence condition (𝑖) in Theorem 1.
Next, we study the elements in the set 𝐼 to further identify distributions
𝑋s with a divergent series expansion. We refer to a variable 𝑥 in this reduced
dimension as ?^?. Notice that B^ = B𝐼𝐼 with eigenvalue decomposition V^Λ^V^′
(with V^′ = V^−1) has in general V^ ̸= V𝐼𝐼 , Λ^ ̸= Λ𝐼𝐼 , and ?^?𝑖 < 1. Since
b^ = b𝐼 =∞1,
E
[︁
exp
(︁
?^?
)︁]︁
= E
[︂
exp
(︂
1
2
𝑍 ′B^𝑍
)︂
1a^≤𝑍
]︂
= E
[︂
exp
(︂
1
2
𝑍 ′V^Λ^V^′𝑍)
)︂
1a^≤𝑍
]︂
= E
[︂
exp
(︂
1
2
?^? ′Λ^?^?
)︂
1a^≤V^−1?^?
]︂
where ?^? = V^′𝑍 ∼ 𝑁(𝜉, I) with 𝜉 = V^′𝜇. This means that we consider
a sum of 𝑑 independent noncentral 𝜒2-distributions with 𝜉 containing the
noncentrality parameters. Lemma 11 indicates that the noncentrality pa-
rameters in 𝜉 have no effect on the tail shape. Therefore, we neglect 𝜉 and
so 𝜇 by considering the spherical representation (6.57) in the reduced dimen-
sion with ?^?s^ := 12𝑍
2
0 ?^?(^s) and ?^?(^s) := s^′B^s^ along each direction s^. Motivated
by the divergence condition (𝑎), we only consider nonnegative s^. For large
𝑍0,
E
[︁
exp
(︁
?^?
)︁]︁
∼ 𝑐2
ˆ
‖s^‖=1,^s≥0
E
[︂
exp
(︂
1
2
(^s𝑍0)
′B(^s𝑍0)
)︂
1a^≤𝜇+s^𝑍0
]︂
ds^
= 𝑐2
ˆ
‖s^‖=1,^s≥0
E
[︁
exp
(︁
?^?s^
)︁
1a^≤𝜇+s^𝑍0
]︁
ds^
where 𝑐2 is a proportionality constant, and ∼ means that the approximation
is valid for large 𝑍0, i.e., large
⃒⃒⃒
?^?s^
⃒⃒⃒
. Each ?^?s^ = 12𝑍
2
0 ?^?(^s) has probability
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density function
ℎs^(𝑧)d𝑧 =
⎧⎨⎩
ℎs^
(︁√
2𝑥/?^?(^s)
)︁
√
2?^?(^s)𝑥
d𝑥 ∝ 𝑥 𝑑2−1𝑒−
𝑥
?^?(s^)d𝑥 if sign(𝑥) = sign(𝜆(^s))
0 otherwise
(6.58)
where we used the implied derivative d𝑧 = d𝑥/
√︁
2?^?(^s)𝑥 of 𝑍0 =
√︁
2?^?s^/?^?(^s).
The density function in (6.58) implies that
⃒⃒⃒
?^?s^
⃒⃒⃒
follows aGamma(𝑑/2, |?^?(^s)|)-
distribution. Using ?^?𝑖 < 1, all directions s^ satisfy ?^?(^s) < 1. Therefore,
directions with ?^?(^s) > −1 satisfy |?^?(^s)| < 1, and thus have by Lemma 12 a
convergent Taylor series in (6.57).
Collecting previous results implies that only s^ ≥ 0 with ?^?(^s) ≤ −1 have a
divergent series expansion. As a consequence, emptiness of the set 𝒮 in (𝑖𝑖) of
Theorem 1 is a sufficient condition for convergence. It is straightforward that
the set 𝒮 is empty if one of the convergence conditions (𝑖𝑖𝑖)-(𝑣𝑖𝑖) holds. On
the other hand, it suffices for divergence if the set 𝒮 has a positive measure.
6.A.2 Proofs Section 6.4.1
Proof of Lemma 2
(𝑖) First consider a strictly positive 𝑋. Then 𝑌 = log𝑋 is well-defined.
Define 𝑚(𝛼) = E[𝑋𝛼], then log𝑚(𝛼) is easily seen to be the cu-
mulant generating function of 𝑌 . As these functions are known to
be strictly convex for non-degenerate random variables, 2 log𝑚((𝛼 +
𝛽)/2) < log𝑚(𝛼)+ log𝑚(𝛽) and setting 𝛼 = 𝑛, 𝛽 = 𝑛− 2 then proves
𝜇𝑛−2𝜇𝑛 > 𝜇2𝑛−1.
For general nonnegative 𝑋 the inequality can be shown to be true
by conditioning, since E[𝑋𝑛] = E [𝑋𝑛 |𝑋 > 0]P(𝑋 > 0). The only
condition, P(𝑋 > 0) > 0, follows from the assumed non-degeneracy.
For 𝑋 unrestricted in sign, note that 𝜇𝑛 ≤ E[|𝑋|𝑛], with equality for
even 𝑛. The strict inequality 𝜇2𝑛 < E[|𝑋|𝑛]2 holds for odd 𝑛 and 𝑋
with nonzero probability mass both left and right of zero. These facts
imply that 𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑛−2 > 𝜇2𝑛−1 for any nondegenerate 𝑋 and even 𝑛.
It is straightforward that equality holds for the degenerate case.
(𝑖𝑖) Follows from 𝜇𝑖 > 0 and (𝑖).
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Proof of Lemma 3
We prove strict bounds for 𝑋 with both 𝑋− and 𝑋+ nondegenerate, since
the equality cases of (𝑖)-(𝑖𝑣) are straightforward.
The constraints in (6.21) are straightforward. By definition,𝑚𝑠1 = 𝜇𝑠1/𝜇𝑠0 =
𝜇𝑠1. The first column of inequalities in (6.22)-(6.24) follows from 𝜇𝑖 =
𝜇+𝑖 +(−1)𝑖𝜇−𝑖 . For a nonnegative random variable 𝑋 with cdf 𝐹 and support
on [𝑥, ?¯?]
𝑥 < 𝑚𝑖+1 =
´ ?¯?
𝑥 𝑥𝑥
𝑖d𝐹 (𝑥)´ ?¯?
𝑥 𝑥
𝑖d𝐹 (𝑥)
< ?¯?
The second and third column in (6.23) and (6.24) follow from
1
𝑚+𝑛
=
𝜇+𝑛−1
𝜇+𝑛
>
𝜇+𝑛−1 − 𝜇−𝑛−1
𝜇+𝑛 + 𝜇
−
𝑛
=
1
𝑚𝑛
𝑚+𝑛−1 =
𝜇+𝑛−1
𝜇+𝑛−2
>
𝜇+𝑛−1 − 𝜇−𝑛−1
𝜇+𝑛−2 + 𝜇
−
𝑛−2
= 𝑚𝑛−1
1
𝑚−𝑛
=
𝜇−𝑛−1
𝜇−𝑛
>
𝜇−𝑛−1 − 𝜇+𝑛−1
𝜇+𝑛 + 𝜇
−
𝑛
= − 1
𝑚𝑛
𝑚−𝑛−1 =
𝜇−𝑛−1
𝜇−𝑛−2
>
𝜇−𝑛−1 − 𝜇+𝑛−1
𝜇+𝑛−2 + 𝜇
−
𝑛−2
= −𝑚𝑛−1
Proof of Lemma 4
We first obtain strict bounds for 𝑋 with both 𝑋− and 𝑋+ both nonde-
generate. The moments 𝜇𝑛−2, 𝜇𝑛−1 and 𝜇𝑛 are known and satisfy 𝜇𝑖 =
𝜇+𝑖 + (−1)𝑖𝜇−𝑖 (𝑖 = 𝑛 − 2, 𝑛 − 1, 𝑛). Combining this with 0 < 𝑚+𝑛−1 < 𝑚+𝑛
(apply Lemma 2 to 𝑋+)
𝜇−𝑛−2 = 𝜇𝑛−2 −
𝜇+𝑛−1
𝜇+𝑛−1
𝜇+𝑛−2 = 𝜇𝑛−2 −
𝜇+𝑛−1
𝑚+𝑛−1
< 𝜇𝑛−2 −
𝜇+𝑛−1
𝑚+𝑛
𝜇−𝑛−1 = 𝜇
+
𝑛−1 − 𝜇𝑛−1
𝜇−𝑛 = 𝜇𝑛 −𝑚+𝑛𝜇+𝑛−1
It is most convenient to derive bounds in terms of the reciprocal of 𝜇+𝑖 , 𝜇
−
𝑖 ,
𝑚+𝑖 and 𝑚
−
𝑖 :
𝑚−𝑛 > 𝑚
−
𝑛−1 ⇔𝜇−𝑛−2𝜇−𝑛 > (𝜇−𝑛−1)2
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⇒
(︃
𝜇𝑛−2 −
𝜇+𝑛−1
𝑚+𝑛
)︃
𝜇−𝑛 >
(︀
𝜇−𝑛−1
)︀2
⇔
(︃
𝜇𝑛−2 −
𝜇+𝑛−1
𝑚+𝑛
)︃(︀
𝜇𝑛 −𝑚+𝑛𝜇+𝑛−1
)︀
>
(︀
𝜇+𝑛−1 − 𝜇𝑛−1
)︀2
⇔𝜇𝑛−2𝜇𝑛 −𝑚+𝑛𝜇+𝑛−1𝜇𝑛−2 −
𝜇+𝑛−1𝜇𝑛
𝑚+𝑛
+
(︀
𝜇+𝑛−1
)︀2
> (𝜇+𝑛−1)
2 − 2𝜇+𝑛−1𝜇𝑛−1 + 𝜇2𝑛−1
⇔ 1
𝜇+𝑛−1
>
𝜇𝑛
𝑚+𝑛
− 2𝜇𝑛−1 + 𝜇𝑛−2𝑚+𝑛
𝜇𝑛−2𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇2𝑛−1
(6.59)
Starting from
𝜇−𝑛−2 = 𝜇𝑛−2 −
𝜇+𝑛−1
𝑚+𝑛−1
𝜇−𝑛−1 = 𝜇
+
𝑛−1 − 𝜇𝑛−1 𝜇−𝑛 < 𝜇𝑛 −𝑚+𝑛−1𝜇+𝑛−1
gives along similar lines (replace 𝑚+𝑛 by 𝑚
+
𝑛−1 in (6.59).)
1
𝜇+𝑛−1
>
𝜇𝑛
𝑚+𝑛−1
− 2𝜇𝑛−1 + 𝜇𝑛−2𝑚+𝑛−1
𝜇𝑛−2𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇2𝑛−1
(6.60)
Equations (6.59) and (6.60) imply, respectively
1
𝜇+𝑛
=
1
𝜇+𝑛−1𝑚
+
𝑛
>
𝜇𝑛
(𝑚+𝑛 )2
− 2𝜇𝑛−1
𝑚+𝑛
+ 𝜇𝑛−2
𝜇𝑛−2𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇2𝑛−1
(6.61)
1
𝜇+𝑛−2
=
𝑚+𝑛−1
𝜇+𝑛−1
>
𝜇𝑛 − 2𝜇𝑛−1𝑚+𝑛−1 + 𝜇𝑛−2
(︀
𝑚+𝑛−1
)︀2
𝜇𝑛−2𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇2𝑛−1
(6.62)
Since−𝑋 = 𝑋−−𝑋+, we can switch all – and + symbols and use 𝐸[(−𝑋)𝑖] =
(−1)𝑖𝜇𝑛−1 to obtain from (6.59)–(6.62)
1
𝜇−𝑛−1
>
𝜇𝑛
𝑚−𝑛
+ 2𝜇𝑛−1 + 𝜇𝑛−2𝑚−𝑛
𝜇𝑛−2𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇2𝑛−1
(6.63)
1
𝜇−𝑛−1
>
𝜇𝑛
𝑚−𝑛−1
+ 2𝜇𝑛−1 + 𝜇𝑛−2𝑚−𝑛−1
𝜇𝑛−2𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇2𝑛−1
(6.64)
1
𝜇−𝑛
>
𝜇𝑛
(𝑚−𝑛 )2
+ 2𝜇𝑛−1
𝑚−𝑛
+ 𝜇𝑛−2
𝜇𝑛−2𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇2𝑛−1
(6.65)
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1
𝜇−𝑛−2
>
𝜇𝑛 + 2𝜇𝑛−1𝑚−𝑛−1 + 𝜇𝑛−2
(︀
𝑚−𝑛−1
)︀2
𝜇𝑛−2𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇2𝑛−1
(6.66)
The bounds in (6.59)–(6.66) depend on the known moments 𝜇𝑛−2, 𝜇𝑛−1 and
𝜇𝑛 as well as on the unknown moment ratios 𝑚𝑠𝑛−1 and 𝑚𝑠𝑛 (𝑠 ∈ {+,−}).
We first bound (6.59) and (6.63) in terms of the known moments. Define
𝑔+(𝑥) =
1
𝑎𝑛
(︂
𝑏𝑛𝑥− 2𝑚𝑛−1 + 1
𝑥
)︂
𝑔−(𝑥) =
1
𝑎𝑛
(︂
𝑏𝑛𝑥+ 2𝑚𝑛−1 +
1
𝑥
)︂
where 𝑎𝑛 and 𝑏𝑛 are as in (6.25), and we suppress the dependence of 𝑔+ and
𝑔− on 𝑛 for brevity. The bounds in (6.59) and (6.63) are 1/𝜇𝑠𝑛−1 > 𝑔𝑠(1/𝑚𝑠𝑛).
The bounds on 𝑚𝑠𝑛 satisfy from Lemma 3
max
(︂
1
𝑚𝑛
, 0
)︂
≤ 1
?¯?+𝑛
≤ 1
𝑚+𝑛
≤ 1
𝑚+𝑛
max
(︂
− 1
𝑚𝑛
, 0
)︂
≤ 1
?¯?−𝑛
≤ 1
𝑚−𝑛
≤ 1
𝑚−𝑛
(6.67)
Thus, we need a lower bound on 𝑔𝑠 at the positive but unknown value 1/𝑚𝑠𝑛 ∈
[1/?¯?𝑠𝑛, 1/𝑚
𝑠
𝑛]. For the first derivative of 𝑔𝑠,
d𝑔𝑠
d𝑥
=
1
𝑎𝑛
(︂
𝑏𝑛 − 1
𝑥2
)︂
By Lemma 2(𝑖), 𝑎𝑛 > 0 such that 𝑔𝑠 decreases on (0, 1/
√
𝑏𝑛) and increases
on (1/
√
𝑏𝑛,∞). Therefore, the minimizing 𝑥 of 𝑔𝑠(𝑥) on [1/?¯?𝑠𝑛, 1/𝑚𝑠𝑛] is as
close as possible to 1/
√
𝑏𝑛. Equivalently, the minimizing 𝑥 of 𝑔𝑠(1/𝑥) for
𝑥 ∈ [𝑚𝑠𝑛, ?¯?𝑠𝑛] is as close as possible to 𝑥 =
√
𝑏𝑛:
1
𝜇𝑠𝑛−1
> 𝑤𝑠𝑛 (𝑚
𝑠
𝑛, ?¯?
𝑠
𝑛) 𝑠 ∈ {+,−} (6.68)
where
𝑤𝑠𝑛(𝑐, 𝑑) =
⎧⎨⎩
𝑔𝑠(1/𝑐)
√
𝑏𝑛 < 𝑐
𝑔𝑠(1/
√
𝑏𝑛) 𝑐 ≤
√
𝑏𝑛 ≤ 𝑑
𝑔𝑠(1/𝑑)
√
𝑏𝑛 > 𝑑
The bounds in (6.68) are positive because 𝑚𝑛 > 𝑚𝑛−1 implies
√
𝑏𝑛 >
|𝑚𝑛−1| such that the global minimum of 𝑔𝑠 admits 𝑔𝑠(1/
√
𝑏𝑛) > 0. Thus,
the reciprocal of (6.68) gives upper bounds for 𝜇𝑠𝑛−1 < 𝑣𝑠𝑛 (𝑚𝑠𝑛, ?¯?𝑠𝑛) :=
1/𝑤𝑠𝑛 (𝑚
𝑠
𝑛, ?¯?
𝑠
𝑛). A similar derivation starting from (6.60) and (6.64) yields
𝜇𝑠𝑛−1 < 𝑣𝑠𝑛
(︀
𝑚𝑠𝑛−1, ?¯?𝑠𝑛−1
)︀
.
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Letting ?¯?𝑠𝑛−1 = min
(︀
𝑣𝑠𝑛 (𝑚
𝑠
𝑛, ?¯?
𝑠
𝑛) , 𝑣
𝑠
𝑛
(︀
𝑚𝑠𝑛−1, ?¯?𝑠𝑛−1
)︀)︀
represent an upper
bound on 𝜇𝑠𝑛−1, an upper bound on 𝜇𝑠𝑛 is available from 𝜇𝑠𝑛 ≤ ?¯?𝑠𝑛?¯?𝑠𝑛−1.
Nonetheless, if
√
𝑏𝑛 < ?¯?
𝑠
𝑛 we can obtain tighter bounds from (6.61) and
(6.65). More precisely, we prove that in our range of interest the bounds
in (6.61) and (6.65) increase monotonically in the unknown parameters 𝑚𝑠𝑛.
Accordingly, the upper bounds on𝑚+𝑛 and𝑚−𝑛 give the tightest lower bounds
on (6.61) and (6.65), respectively. Let
ℎ(𝑥) = 𝑥 𝑔+(𝑥) =
1
𝑎𝑛
(︀
𝑏𝑛𝑥
2 − 2𝑚𝑛−1𝑥+ 1
)︀
The bounds in (6.61) and (6.65) are 1/𝜇+𝑛 > ℎ(1/𝑚+𝑛 ) and 1/𝜇−𝑛 > ℎ(−1/𝑚−𝑛 ),
respectively. For the first derivative of ℎ (note 𝑚𝑛−1 = 𝑏𝑛/𝑚𝑛),
dℎ
d𝑥
=
2𝑏𝑛
𝑎𝑛
(︂
𝑥− 1
𝑚𝑛
)︂
The function ℎ decreases on (−∞, 1/𝑚𝑛) and increases on (1/𝑚𝑛,∞). By
(6.67) we have 1/𝑚𝑛 ≤ 1/?¯?+𝑛 ≤ 1/𝑚+𝑛 , which means ℎ (1/?¯?+𝑛 ) ≤ ℎ (1/𝑚+𝑛 ).
Thus, we can safely use ?¯?+𝑛 without violating the lower bound ℎ(1/𝑚+𝑛 )
on 1/𝜇+𝑛 in (6.61). We also assumed −1/𝑚−𝑛 ≤ −1/?¯?−𝑛 < 0 < 1/𝑚𝑛,
which ensures ℎ(−1/?¯?−𝑛 ) ≤ ℎ(−1/𝑚−𝑛 ). Hence, the upper bound ?¯?−𝑛 on
𝑚−𝑛 cannot violate the lower bound on 1/𝜇−𝑛 in (6.65). Obviously, a strictly
tighter bound ?¯?𝑠𝑛 on 𝑚𝑠𝑛 produces a strictly tighter bound on 1/𝜇𝑠𝑛.
The minimum of ℎ, and so each lower bound, is positive:
ℎ
(︂
1
𝑚𝑛
)︂
=
1
𝑎𝑛
(︂
𝑏𝑛
𝑚2𝑛
− 2𝑚𝑛−1
𝑚𝑛
+ 1
)︂
=
1
𝑎𝑛
(︂
1− 𝑚𝑛−1
𝑚𝑛
)︂
> 0
Inverting the positive lower bounds gives
𝜇+𝑛 < 1/ℎ(1/?¯?
+
𝑛 ) = ?¯?
+
𝑛 𝑢
+
𝑛 (?¯?
+
𝑛 )
𝜇−𝑛 < 1/ℎ(−1/?¯?−𝑛 ) = −𝑚−𝑛 𝑢+𝑛 (−𝑚−𝑛 ) = 𝑚−𝑛 𝑢−(𝑚−𝑛 ).
with the functions 𝑢+𝑛 (.) and 𝑢−𝑛 (.) as in (6.26). The upper bounds on 𝜇𝑠𝑛−2
follow from (6.62), (6.66), and a similar analysis on 𝑘(𝑥) := 𝑥2ℎ(1/𝑥) =
𝑥/𝑢+𝑛 (𝑥). The function 𝑘 has a minimum 𝑘(𝑚𝑛−1) = (𝑏𝑛−𝑚2𝑛−1)/𝑎𝑛 > 0, de-
creases on [−?¯?−𝑛−1,−𝑚−𝑛−1], and increases on [𝑚+𝑛−1, ?¯?+𝑛−1]. Since −𝑚−𝑛−1 <
𝑚𝑛−1 < 𝑚+𝑛−1, the upper bounds on 𝜇
𝑠
𝑛−2 are determined by 𝑚𝑠𝑛−1.
The case with equality signs follows by noting that 𝑏𝑛 = 𝑚𝑛−1 if and
only if |𝑋| degenerates at (0,∞).
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Proof of Lemma 5
Follows from 𝜇𝑠𝑖 = 𝑚
𝑠
𝑖𝜇
𝑠
𝑖−1 and 𝜇𝑖 = 𝜇
+
𝑖 + (−1)𝑖𝜇−𝑖 and Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 6
We prove the case with strict bounds, the case with equality signs is triv-
ial. The two leftmost inequalities in (6.27) are straightforward. The two
rightmost inequalities in (6.27) follow immediately from Lemma 2(𝑖𝑖):
𝑚𝑠𝑖−1 <
√︁
𝑚𝑠𝑖−1𝑚
𝑠
𝑖 =
√︃
𝜇𝑠𝑖
𝜇𝑠𝑖−2
< 𝑚𝑠𝑖
Since 𝜇𝑖 = 𝜇+𝑖 + (−1)𝑖𝜇−𝑖 and 𝜇𝑠𝑖 = 𝑚𝑠𝑖𝜇𝑠𝑖−1
(−1)𝑖𝑚+𝑖 =
(−1)𝑖𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇−𝑖
𝜇+𝑖−1
(−1)𝑖𝑚−𝑖 =
𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇+𝑖
𝜇−𝑖−1
By carefully constructing the most conservative bounds from the implied
sign of the numerators above,
If 𝜇−
𝑖
< (−1)𝑖𝜇𝑖: (−1)𝑖𝑚+𝑖 <
(−1)𝑖𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇−𝑖
𝜇+
𝑖−1
else (−1)𝑖𝑚+𝑖 <
(−1)𝑖𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇−𝑖
?¯?+𝑖−1
If ?¯?−𝑖 < (−1)𝑖𝜇𝑖: (−1)𝑖𝑚+𝑖 >
(−1)𝑖𝜇𝑖 − ?¯?−𝑖
?¯?+𝑖−1
else (−1)𝑖𝑚+𝑖 >
(−1)𝑖𝜇𝑖 − ?¯?−𝑖
𝜇+
𝑖−1
If 𝜇+
𝑖
< 𝜇𝑖: (−1)𝑖𝑚−𝑖 <
𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇+𝑖
𝜇−
𝑖−1
else (−1)𝑖𝑚−𝑖 <
𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇+𝑖
?¯?−𝑖−1
If ?¯?+𝑖 < 𝜇𝑖: (−1)𝑖𝑚−𝑖 >
𝜇𝑖 − ?¯?+𝑖
?¯?−𝑖−1
else (−1)𝑖𝑚−𝑖 >
𝜇𝑖 − ?¯?+𝑖
𝜇−
𝑖−1
By Lemma 3, 𝜇+𝑖 < 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜇
−
𝑖 < 𝜇𝑖 for even 𝑖 such that (6.28) contains the
if-cases above. For odd 𝑖, we have by Lemma 𝜇+𝑖 > 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜇
−
𝑖 > −𝜇𝑖 such
that (6.29) contains the else-cases above.
6.A.3 Proofs Section 6.4.2
We derive in some lemmas the required building blocks for the bounds in
Theorem 8. We extensively use the definitions in (6.30)–(6.31).
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Lemma 13. The function 𝑡𝑛 has the following properties (𝑛 = 0, 1, 2, . . .)
𝑡𝑛(𝑥) =
∞∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑥𝑘
(𝑛+ 𝑘)!
sign(𝑡𝑛(𝑥)) = sign(𝑥)
𝑡𝑛 > − 1
𝑛!
𝑡′𝑛 > 0 𝑡
′′
𝑛 > 0
Proof of Lemma 13
The summation representation of 𝑡𝑛 follows from the Taylor series of 𝑒𝑥 in
the definition of 𝑟𝑛(𝑥). Consider the function
𝑡0(𝑥;𝑢) := 𝑒
𝑢𝑥 − 1 =
∞∑︁
𝑘=1
(𝑢𝑥)𝑘
𝑘!
.
Define 𝑡𝑛(𝑥;𝑢) recursively by
𝑡𝑛(𝑥;𝑢) =
ˆ 𝑢
𝑣=0
𝑡𝑛−1(𝑥; 𝑣) d𝑣 𝑛 = 1, 2, . . . (6.69)
It follows that 𝑡𝑛(𝑥;𝑢) =
∑︀∞
𝑘=1
𝑢𝑛+𝑘𝑥𝑘
(𝑛+𝑘)! such that 𝑡𝑛(𝑥; 1) = 𝑡𝑛(𝑥). If 𝑥0 < 𝑥1
then 𝑡0(𝑥0;𝑢) < 𝑡0(𝑥1;𝑢) for all 𝑢 > 0 and, by induction on 𝑛 in (6.69),
𝑡𝑛(𝑥0;𝑢) < 𝑡𝑛(𝑥1;𝑢) for all 𝑢 > 0. This shows 𝑑𝑑𝑥 𝑡𝑛(𝑥;𝑢) > 0, and in
particular 𝑡′𝑛 > 0. The sign of 𝑡𝑛 now follows from 𝑡𝑛(0) = 0. Further,
lim
𝑥→−∞ 𝑡𝑛(𝑥) = lim𝑥→−∞𝑥
−𝑛𝑒𝑥 −
𝑛∑︁
𝑘=0
𝑥𝑘−𝑛
𝑘!
= − 1
𝑛!
For the second derivative, notice that by the convexity of 𝑡0,
𝑡0(𝑥0 + 𝛿;𝑢)− 𝑡0(𝑥0;𝑢) < 𝑡0(𝑥1 + 𝛿;𝑢)− 𝑡0(𝑥1;𝑢) 𝛿, 𝑢 > 0 𝑥0 < 𝑥1
Induction on 𝑛 through (6.69) implies
𝑡𝑛(𝑥0 + 𝛿;𝑢)− 𝑡𝑛(𝑥0;𝑢) < 𝑡𝑛(𝑥1 + 𝛿;𝑢)− 𝑡𝑛(𝑥1;𝑢)
which implies an increasing slope of 𝑡𝑛, i.e., 𝑡′′𝑛 > 0.
Lemma 14 contains several properties of 𝑠𝑛 from (6.31).
Lemma 14. Suppose 𝜇𝑛 ̸= 0 where 𝑛 is an arbitrary integer. Then,
(𝑖) 𝑠𝑛(𝑋) = E
[︀
𝑡𝑛(𝑋
(𝑛))
]︀
with the cdf of 𝑋(𝑛) as defined in (6.18).
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(𝑖𝑖) If 𝑋 ≥ 0, 𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋) is strictly convex and strictly increasing in 𝜆 with
lim
𝜆→0
𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋) = 0
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) If 𝑋 ≥ 0,
− 1
𝑛!
< 𝑠𝑛(−𝑋) < 0 < 𝑡𝑛(𝑚𝑛+1) ≤ 𝑠𝑛(𝑋)
where as before, 𝑚𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖/𝜇𝑖−1. The inequalities are all strict if and
only if 𝑋 is nondegenerate.
(𝑖𝑣) If 0 ≤ 𝑋(𝑛) ≤s𝑡 𝑌 (𝑛),
− 1
𝑛!
< 𝑠𝑛 (−𝑌 ) ≤ 𝑠𝑛(−𝑋) < 0 < 𝑠𝑛 (𝑋) ≤ 𝑠𝑛 (𝑌 )
The inequalities are all strict if and only if 𝑋 is strictly dominated by
𝑌 .
(𝑣) If 𝑋 ≡ 𝑥,
𝑠𝑛(𝑋) = 𝑡𝑛(𝑥)
(𝑣𝑖) If 𝑋 = 𝐵 𝑌 with 𝐵 an independent Bernoulli random variable with
P(𝐵 = 1) > 0,
𝑠𝑛(𝑋) = 𝑠𝑛(𝑌 )
Proof of Lemma 14
(𝑖) Using subsequently (6.31), (6.19), and Lemma 13 produces
𝑠𝑛(𝑋) =
1
𝜇𝑛
∞∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜇𝑛+𝑖
(𝑛+ 𝑖)!
=
∞∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜇
(𝑛)
𝑖
(𝑛+ 𝑖)!
= E
[︁
𝑡𝑛(𝑋
(𝑛))
]︁
(𝑖𝑖) Similar to (𝑖),
𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋) =
E[𝑟𝑛(𝜆𝑋)]
E[(𝜆𝑋)𝑛]
= E
[︃ ∞∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝜆𝑋(𝑛))𝑖
(𝑛+ 𝑖)!
]︃
= E
[︁
𝑡𝑛(𝜆𝑋
(𝑛))
]︁
which leads to
d
d𝜆
𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋) = E
[︁
𝑋(𝑛)𝑡′𝑛(𝜆𝑋
(𝑛))
]︁
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d2
d𝜆2
𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋) = E
[︂(︁
𝑋(𝑛)
)︁2
𝑡′′𝑛(𝜆𝑋
(𝑛))
]︂
The required result follows from P
(︀
𝑋(𝑛) ̸= 0)︀ > 0 and 𝑡′′𝑛 > 0 in Lemma
13.
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) From Lemma 13, we have −1/𝑛! < 𝑡𝑛(𝑥) < 0 if 𝑥 < 0. Substituting
the result of Lemma 14(𝑖),
− 1
𝑛!
< 𝑠𝑛(−𝑋) = E
[︁
𝑡𝑛(−𝑋(𝑛))
]︁
< 0
Lemma 2(𝑖𝑖) indicates that the moment ratios𝑚𝑖 of 𝑋 ≥ 0 is a positive
and nondecreasing series. Since 𝑡𝑛(𝑥) > 0 for 𝑥 > 0 (see Lemma 13)
0 < 𝑡𝑛(𝑚𝑛+𝑗+1) =
∞∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑚𝑘𝑛+𝑗+1
(𝑛+ 𝑘)!
≤
∞∑︁
𝑘=1
1
(𝑛+ 𝑘)!
𝑛+𝑗+𝑘∏︁
𝑙=𝑛+𝑗+1
𝑚𝑙 =
1
𝜇𝑛+𝑗
∞∑︁
𝑘=1
𝜇𝑛+𝑗+𝑘
(𝑛+ 𝑘)!
= 𝑠𝑛
(︁
𝑋(𝑗)
)︁
Substituting 𝑗 = 0 gives Lemma 14(𝑖𝑖𝑖). The inequalities are strict
unless 𝑋 is degenerate.
(𝑖𝑣) Rewriting 𝑠𝑛 in terms of 𝑡𝑛 (see (𝑖)), the result follows from the lower
bound −1/𝑛! on 𝑡𝑛, 𝑡′𝑛 > 0, and 𝑡𝑛(0) = 0 (see Lemma 13). The
inequalities are strict unless 𝑋 𝑑=𝑌 , because then also 𝑋(𝑛) 𝑑=𝑌 (𝑛).
(𝑣) Follows immediately from the definitions in (6.30) and (6.31).
(𝑣𝑖) By the law of total expectations,
𝑠𝑛(𝑋) =
E [𝑟𝑛(𝑋) |𝐵 = 0]P(𝐵 = 0) + E [𝑟𝑛(𝑋) |𝐵 = 1]P(𝐵 = 1)
E [𝑋𝑛 |𝐵 = 0]P(𝐵 = 0) + E [𝑋𝑛 |𝐵 = 1]P(𝐵 = 1)
=
0 + E[𝑟𝑛(𝑌 )]P(𝐵 = 1)
0 + E[𝑌 𝑛]P(𝐵 = 1)
= 𝑠𝑛(𝑌 )
Below, we consider the random variables 𝑋 ≥ 0 and 𝑌 ≥ 0 with density
functions 𝑓 and 𝑔, and positive support on 𝑆𝑋 = (0, ?¯?] and 𝑆𝑌 = (0, 𝑦],
respectively. The density functions are also allowed to be nonzero at 0.
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The operator 𝑋 ≤MLR 𝑌 indicates ?¯? ≤ 𝑦, and a nondecreasing likelihood
ratio on the shared support 𝑆𝑋𝑌 = {𝑆𝑋 ∩ 𝑆𝑌 }∖{0} = (0,min(?¯?, 𝑦)]:6
𝑔(𝑥1)
𝑓(𝑥1)
≤ 𝑔(𝑥2)
𝑓(𝑥2)
𝑥1 < 𝑥2 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ∈ 𝑆𝑋𝑌
The pair𝑋 and 𝑌 is then said to satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR)
property. We denote by 𝑋 <MLR 𝑌 the case where (𝑖) 𝑋 ≤MLR 𝑌 and (𝑖𝑖)
?¯? < 𝑦 or 𝑔(𝑥1)/𝑓(𝑥1) < 𝑔(𝑥2)/𝑓(𝑥2) holds for all 𝑥1 < 𝑥2 with 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 in
some dense subset of 𝑆𝑋𝑌 .
Notice that no condition is imposed on the likelihood ratio at 0. Lemma
15 contains some useful properties of the MLR property. 𝑋|𝑋>0 refers to
the distribution of 𝑋 conditional on 𝑋 > 0. The corresponding cdf is
𝐹 (𝑥) = P
(︀
𝑋|𝑋>0 ≤ 𝑥
)︀
=
P(0 < 𝑋 ≤ 𝑥)
P(𝑋 > 0)
=
𝐹 (𝑥)− 𝐹 (0)
1− 𝐹 (0)
Lemma 15. Let the monotonic function ℎ : R+ → R+ be continuously
differentiable with ℎ(0) = 0 and ℎ′ > 0.
If 𝑋 ≤MLR 𝑌 , then for 𝑛 = 0, 1, 2, . . .
(𝑖) ℎ(𝑋(𝑗)) ≤MLR ℎ(𝑌 (𝑗)) for all 𝑗 ∈ R
(𝑖𝑖) 𝑋|𝑋>0 ≤MLR 𝑌 |𝑌 >0
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑋 ≤st 𝑌
(𝑖𝑣) −1/𝑛! < 𝑠𝑛 (−ℎ(𝑌 )) ≤ 𝑠𝑛 (−ℎ(𝑋)) < 0 < 𝑠𝑛 (ℎ(𝑋)) ≤ 𝑠𝑛 (ℎ(𝑌 ))
The inequalities ≤, ≤st and ≤MLR are all strict if and only if (𝑎) ?¯? < 𝑦 or
(𝑏) 𝑋 <𝑀𝐿𝑅 𝑌 .
Proof of Lemma 15
Denote the density of the distributions 𝑋, ?˜? := 𝑋|𝑋>0, 𝑌 , and 𝑌 := 𝑌 |𝑌 >0
by 𝑓 , 𝑔, 𝑓 and 𝑔, respectively.
(𝑖) First, notice that 𝑋 ≤MLR 𝑌 and 𝑋(𝑗) ≤MLR 𝑌 (𝑗) are equivalent
because the support remains the same under the transformation (6.18),
and
𝑔(𝑗)(𝑥1)
𝑓 (𝑗)(𝑥1)
=
𝑐𝑥𝑗1𝑔(𝑥1)
𝑥𝑗1𝑓(𝑥1)
≤ 𝑐𝑥
𝑗
2𝑔(𝑥2)
𝑥𝑗2𝑓(𝑥2)
=
𝑔(𝑗)(𝑥2)
𝑓 (𝑗)(𝑥2)
𝑥1 < 𝑥2 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ∈ 𝑆𝑋𝑌
6More general results follow from the formal, but less intuitive, definition of the MLR
property, 𝑓(𝑥2)𝑔(𝑥1) ≤ 𝑓(𝑥1)𝑔(𝑥2), or allowing for a discontinuous support of 𝑓 and 𝑔.
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where the proportionality constant 𝑐 = E[𝑋
(𝑗)]E[𝑌 ]
E[𝑌 (𝑗)]E[𝑋]
corrects for the dif-
ferent moments after applying (6.18).
Second, we show that the monotonic transformation ℎ does not affect
the MLR property. Define ?^? = ℎ (𝑋) and 𝑌 = ℎ (𝑌 ) with densi-
ties 𝑓 and 𝑔, respectively. The support of ?^? is still a subset of the
support of 𝑌 since 𝑆𝑋 ⊂ 𝑆𝑌 and ℎ does not change the support. Be-
cause ℎ(0) = 0, the support of 𝑋 and 𝑌 still contains arbitrarily small
positive values. By the inverse function theorem,
𝑓(𝑥) =
d
d𝑥
P
(︀
𝑋 ≤ ℎ−1(𝑥))︀ = d
d𝑥
𝐹 (ℎ−1(𝑥)) =
=
dℎ−1(𝑥)
d𝑥
𝑓(ℎ−1(𝑥)) =
𝑓(ℎ−1(𝑥))
ℎ′(𝑥)
Because ℎ−1(𝑥) is positive and increasing in 𝑥, and 𝑋 ≤MLR 𝑌 , we
find again an increasing likelihood ratio:
𝑔(𝑥)
𝑓(𝑥)
=
ℎ′(𝑥)
𝑓(ℎ−1(𝑥))
𝑔(ℎ−1(𝑥))
ℎ′(𝑥)
=
𝑔(ℎ−1(𝑥))
𝑓(ℎ−1(𝑥))
This proves ?^? ≤MLR 𝑌 .
(𝑖𝑖) For 𝑥1 < 𝑥2 and 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ∈ 𝑆𝑋𝑌
𝑔(𝑥1)
𝑓(𝑥1)
=
𝑐𝑔(𝑥1)
𝑓(𝑥1)
≤ 𝑐𝑔(𝑥2)
𝑓(𝑥2)
=
𝑔(𝑥2)
𝑓(𝑥2)
(6.70)
where the constant 𝑐 = E[?˜?]E[𝑌 ]
E[𝑌 ]E[𝑋]
= P(𝑌 >0)P(𝑋>0) corrects for the different
probability mass of 𝑋 and 𝑌 at zero. Thus, the likelihood ratio is still
increasing, and the support on the positive half-line remains the same.
This proves 𝑋|𝑋>0 ≤MLR 𝑌 |𝑌 >0.
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) For 𝑥1 < 𝑥2 and 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ∈ 𝑆𝑋𝑌
𝑓(𝑥2)𝑔(𝑥1) ≤ 𝑓(𝑥1)𝑔(𝑥2)
Integrating 𝑥1 over [0, 𝑥2], and 𝑥2 over [𝑥1,∞) gives, respectively
𝑓(𝑥2)𝐺(𝑥2) ≤ 𝐹 (𝑥2)𝑔(𝑥2)
(1− 𝐹 (𝑥1))𝑔(𝑥1) ≤ 𝑓(𝑥1)(1−𝐺(𝑥1))
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This implies
1− 𝐹 (𝑥1)
1−𝐺(𝑥1) ≤
𝑓(𝑥1)
𝑔(𝑥1)
≤ 𝑓(𝑥2)
𝑔(𝑥2)
≤ 𝐹 (𝑥2)
𝐺(𝑥2)
Choosing 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 arbitrarily close to any 𝑥 shows after some rewrit-
ing that 𝐺(𝑥) ≤ 𝐹 (𝑥), which proves (𝑖𝑖𝑖).
(𝑖𝑣) From (𝑖) and (𝑖𝑖𝑖), we have 𝑋(𝑛+𝑗) ≤st 𝑌 (𝑛+𝑗) for all 𝑛 + 𝑗 ∈ R. By
Lemma 14(𝑖𝑣), and because 𝑛 + 𝑗 is arbitrary, we have for all 𝑗 ∈ R,
and 𝑛 = 0, 1, 2, . . .
− 1
𝑛!
< 𝑠𝑛 (−𝑌 ) ≤ 𝑠𝑛 (−𝑋) < 0 < 𝑠𝑛 (𝑋) ≤ 𝑠𝑛 (𝑌 )
Using (𝑖), and repeating the steps with ?^? := ℎ(𝑋) ≤MLR 𝑌 := ℎ(𝑌 )
results in (𝑖𝑣).
The equivalent condition for strictness of the inequalities follows from the
definition of the MLR property and the proof.
Lemma 15 indicates that 𝑋(𝑖) ≤MLR 𝑌 (𝑖) for some 𝑖 ∈ R is sufficient
to prove 𝑋(𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑋(𝑗)>0
≤st 𝑌 (𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑌 (𝑗)>0
for all 𝑗 ∈ R. The less restrictive
𝑋(𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑋(𝑗)>0
≤st 𝑌 (𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑌 (𝑗)>0
does not imply the inequality 𝑋(𝑗+1)
⃒⃒
𝑋(𝑗+1)>0
≤st
𝑌 (𝑗+1)
⃒⃒
𝑌 (𝑗+1)>0
. For instance, consider the positive 𝑋(𝑗) = 𝑋(𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑋(𝑗)>0
and
𝑌 (𝑗) = 𝑌 (𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑌 (𝑗)>0
with
P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗) = 1
)︁
=
1
2
P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗) = 4
)︁
=
1
2
P
(︁
𝑌 (𝑗) = 2
)︁
=
1
2
P
(︁
𝑌 (𝑗) = 4
)︁
=
1
2
Using
P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗+1) = 𝑖
)︁
=
𝑖P
(︀
𝑋(𝑗) = 𝑖
)︀
E
[︀
𝑋(𝑗)
]︀
with means E
[︀
𝑋(𝑗)
]︀
= 52 and E
[︀
𝑌 (𝑗)
]︀
= 3 gives
P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗+1) = 1
)︁
=
1
5
P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗+1) = 4
)︁
=
4
5
P
(︁
𝑌 (𝑗+1) = 2
)︁
=
1
3
P
(︁
𝑌 (𝑗+1) = 4
)︁
=
2
3
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Thus, 𝑋(𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑋(𝑗)>0
≤st 𝑌 (𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑌 (𝑗)>0
, while it follows from the cdfs at 𝑥 = 2
that 𝑋(𝑗+1)
⃒⃒
𝑋(𝑗+1)>0
st 𝑌 (𝑗+1)
⃒⃒
𝑌 (𝑗+1)>0
.
Vice versa, the inequality 𝑋(𝑗+1)
⃒⃒
𝑋(𝑗+1)>0
≤st 𝑌 (𝑗+1)
⃒⃒
𝑌 (𝑗+1)>0
does not
imply 𝑋(𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑋(𝑗)>0
≤st 𝑌 (𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑌 (𝑗)>0
. To see this, suppose
P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗+1) = 1
)︁
= 1/2 P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗+1) = 2
)︁
= 1/4 P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗+1) = 4
)︁
= 1/4
P
(︁
𝑌 (𝑗+1) = 1
)︁
= 1/2 P
(︁
𝑌 (𝑗+1) = 4
)︁
= 1/2
We have E
[︀
1/𝑋(𝑗+1)
]︀
= 11/16, E
[︀
1/𝑌 (𝑗+1)
]︀
= 5/8, and 𝑋(𝑗+1) ≤st 𝑌 (𝑗+1).
Using
P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗) = 𝑖
)︁
=
P
(︀
𝑋(𝑗+1) = 𝑖
)︀
𝑖
1
E
[︀
1/𝑋(𝑗+1)
]︀
implies
P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗) = 1
)︁
= 8/11 P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗) = 2
)︁
= 2/11 P
(︁
𝑋(𝑗) = 4
)︁
= 1/11
P
(︁
𝑌 (𝑗) = 1
)︁
= 4/5 P
(︁
𝑌 (𝑗) = 4
)︁
= 1/5
Here, 𝑋(𝑗+1)
⃒⃒
𝑋(𝑗+1)>0
≤st 𝑌 (𝑗+1)
⃒⃒
𝑌 (𝑗+1)>0
, but the cdfs at 𝑥 = 1 imply
𝑋(𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑋(𝑗)>0
st 𝑌 (𝑗)
⃒⃒
𝑌 (𝑗)>0
.
The next lemma applies some of the results of the preceding lemmas to
a specific distribution.
Lemma 16. Define the random variable 𝑋𝜉,𝑙,𝑢 = 12𝑅
2 where 𝑅 has density
𝑓𝑅(𝑟; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢) =
|𝑟|𝑑−1
𝑐(0; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢)
√
2𝜋
exp
(︂
−(𝑟 − 𝜉)
2
2
)︂
1𝑙≤𝑟≤𝑢 (6.71)
with
𝑐(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢) = E
[︁
|𝑍𝑡,𝜉|𝑑−11𝑙√1−𝑡≤𝑍𝑡,𝜉≤𝑢√1−𝑡
]︁
𝑍𝑡,𝜉 ∼ 𝑁
(︂
𝜉√
1− 𝑡 , 1
)︂
𝑡 < 1
If 𝑙 ≥ 0, a recursive expression for 𝑐(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢) is in (6.17). If 𝑙 < 0, a re-
cursive expression follows from (6.17) and the decomposition 𝑐(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢) =
𝑐(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 0, 𝑙) + 𝑐(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 0, 𝑢).
(𝑖) For 𝑡 < 1, the moment generating function of 𝑋𝜉,𝑙,𝑢 is given by
𝑚(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢) =
𝑐(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢)
𝑐(0; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢)(1− 𝑡)𝑑/2 exp
(︂
𝜉2𝑡
2− 2𝑡
)︂
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(𝑖𝑖) If 𝜆 < 1, 𝜆 ̸= 0
𝑠𝑛 (𝜆𝑋𝜉,𝑙,𝑢) =
1
?^?𝑛
(︃
𝑚(𝜆; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢)−
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=0
?^?𝑖
𝑖!
)︃
where 𝑚(𝜆; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢) is from (𝑖), and
?^?𝑖 =
(︂
𝜆
2
)︂𝑖 𝑐(0; 𝑑+ 2𝑖, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢)
𝑐(0; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢)
,
with 𝑐(0; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢) recursively defined in (6.17).
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) If 𝑙 = 0, 𝑢 ≥ 0, and 𝜆 > 0
For 𝑥 ∈
[︁
0, 𝑢
2
2
]︁
,
𝑓𝑋(𝑥; 𝜉, 0, 𝑢) =
(2𝑥)𝑑/2−1
𝑐(0; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢)
√
2𝜋
exp
(︃
−(
√
2𝑥− 𝜉)2
2
)︃
For 𝜉0 < 𝜉1,
𝑠𝑛(−𝜆𝑋𝜉1,0,𝑢) < 𝑠𝑛(−𝜆𝑋𝜉0,0,𝑢) < 0 < 𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋𝜉0,0,𝑢) < 𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋𝜉1,0,𝑢)
For 𝑢0 < 𝑢1,
𝑠𝑛(−𝜆𝑋𝜉,0,𝑢1) < 𝑠𝑛(−𝜆𝑋𝜉,0,𝑢0) < 0 < 𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋𝜉,0,𝑢0) < 𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋𝜉,0,𝑢1)
(𝑖𝑣) If 𝜉 = 0, 𝑙 = 0 and 𝑢 =∞, 𝜆 < 1, 𝜆 ̸= 0
|𝜆|𝑋0,0,∞ ∼ Gamma
(︂
𝑑
2
, |𝜆|
)︂
𝑠𝑛(𝜆𝑋0,0,∞) =
1
𝜆𝑛Γ(𝑑/2 + 𝑛)
(︃
Γ(𝑑/2)
(1− 𝜆)𝑑/2
−
∑︁𝑛
𝑖=0
𝜆𝑖Γ (𝑑/2 + 𝑖)
𝑖!
)︃
=
1
𝑛!
(︂
2𝐹1
(︂
1, 𝑛+
𝑑
2
;𝑛+ 1;𝜆
)︂
− 1
)︂
Proof of Lemma 16
Define 𝑐𝑡,𝑑 = 𝑐(𝑡; 𝑑, 𝜉, 𝑙, 𝑢) and 𝑍𝑡 = 𝑍𝑡,𝜉 for convenience. The recursive pro-
cedure to compute 𝑐𝑡,𝑑 serves to handle the absolute operator of the moments
of 𝑍𝑡.
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(𝑖) The mgf 𝑚(𝑡) of 𝑋𝜉,𝑙,𝑢 is
𝑚(𝑡) = E
[︂
exp
(︂
𝑡
2
𝑅2
)︂]︂
=
1
𝑐0,𝑑
√
2𝜋
ˆ 𝑢
𝑙
|𝑟|𝑑−1 exp
(︂
𝑡
2
𝑟2 − (𝑟 − 𝜉)
2
2
)︂
d𝑟
=
1
𝑐0,𝑑
√
2𝜋
ˆ 𝑢
𝑙
|𝑟|𝑑−1 exp
(︂
−1
2
(1− 𝑡)𝑟2 + 𝜉𝑟 − 𝜉
2
2
)︂
d𝑟
=
1
𝑐0,𝑑
√
2𝜋
ˆ 𝑢
𝑙
|𝑟|𝑑−1 exp
(︃
−1
2
[︂
𝑟
√
1− 𝑡− 𝜉√
1− 𝑡
]︂2
+
1
2
𝜉2
1− 𝑡 −
𝜉2
2
)︃
d𝑟
=
exp
(︀
𝜉2𝑡/(2− 2𝑡))︀
𝑐0,𝑑
√
1− 𝑡√2𝜋
ˆ 𝑢√1−𝑡
𝑙
√
1−𝑡
(︂ |𝑠|√
1− 𝑡
)︂𝑑−1
exp
(︃
−1
2
[︂
𝑠− 𝜉√
1− 𝑡
]︂2)︃
d𝑠
=
1
𝑐0,𝑑(1− 𝑡)𝑑/2 exp
(︂
𝜉2𝑡
2− 2𝑡
)︂
E
[︀|𝑍𝑡|𝑑−11𝑙√1−𝑡≤𝑍𝑡≤𝑢√1−𝑡]︀
=
𝑐𝑡,𝑑
𝑐0,𝑑(1− 𝑡)𝑑/2 exp
(︂
𝜉2𝑡
2− 2𝑡
)︂
where 𝑍𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(𝜉/
√
1− 𝑡, 1)
(𝑖𝑖) Follows from the definition of 𝑠𝑛, and
?^?𝑖 = E
[︀
(𝜆𝑋)𝑖
]︀
=
𝜆𝑖
2𝑖
E
[︀
𝑅2𝑖
]︀
=
(︂
𝜆
2
)︂𝑖 ˆ 𝑢
𝑙
𝑟𝑑−1+2𝑖
𝑐0,𝑑
√
2𝜋
exp
(︂
−(𝑟 − 𝜉)
2
2
)︂
d𝑟
=
(︂
𝜆
2
)︂𝑖 1
𝑐0,𝑑
E
[︁
|𝑍0|𝑑−1+2𝑖1𝑙≤𝑍0≤𝑢
]︁
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) Using 𝑙 = 0, we have 𝑅 ≥ 0, and the cdf of 𝑋𝜉,0,𝑢 satisfies
𝐹𝑋(𝑥; 𝜉, 0, 𝑢) = P(𝑋𝜉,0,𝑢 ≤ 𝑥) = P
(︀
𝑅2 ≤ 2𝑥)︀
= P
(︁
|𝑅| ≤
√
2𝑥
)︁
= P
(︁
𝑅 ≤
√
2𝑥
)︁
Differentiating to 𝑥,
𝑓𝑋(𝑥; 𝜉, 0, 𝑢) =
1√
2𝑥
𝑓𝑅
(︁√
2𝑥; 𝜉, 0, 𝑢
)︁
=
(2𝑥)𝑑/2−1
𝑐0,𝑑
√
2𝜋
exp
(︃
−(
√
2𝑥− 𝜉)2
2
)︃
10<
√
2𝑥≤𝑢
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While the parameter 𝜉 affects the proportionality constant 𝑐0,𝑑, it does
not change the dynamics of the likelihood ratio on the shared support
of 𝑥. That is, for 0 <
√
2𝑥 ≤ 𝑢
𝑓𝑋(𝑥; 𝜉1, 0, 𝑢)
𝑓𝑋(𝑥; 𝜉0, 0, 𝑢)
∝ exp
(︃
−
(︀√
2𝑥− 𝜉1
)︀2
2
+
(︀√
2𝑥− 𝜉0
)︀2
2
)︃
= exp
(︂√
2𝑥 (𝜉1 − 𝜉0) + 𝜉
2
0 − 𝜉21
2
)︂
This likelihood ratio increases with 𝑥 since 𝜉0 < 𝜉1. Furthermore,
𝑓(𝑥; 𝜉0, 0, 𝑢) has the same support as 𝑓(𝑥; 𝜉1, 0, 𝑢), which proves
𝑋𝜉0,0,𝑢 <MLRP 𝑋𝜉1,0,𝑢. The inequalities for 𝜉0 < 𝜉1 in (𝑖𝑖𝑖) follow from
Lemma 15(𝑖𝑣) with ℎ(𝑥) = 𝜆𝑥.
If 0 <
√
2𝑥 ≤ 𝑢0, the likelihood ratio function
𝑓𝑋(𝑥; 𝜉, 0, 𝑢1)
𝑓𝑋(𝑥; 𝜉, 0, 𝑢0)
∝ exp
(︃
−
(︀√
2𝑥− 𝜉)︀2
2
+
(︀√
2𝑥− 𝜉)︀2
2
)︃
= 1
is constant, and, by 𝑢0 < 𝑢1, the support of 𝑓(𝑥; 𝜉, 0, 𝑢0) is strictly
contained in the support of 𝑓(𝑥; 𝜉, 0, 𝑢1). This implies 𝑋𝜉,0,𝑢0 <MLRP
𝑋𝜉,0,𝑢1 . Lemma 15(𝑖𝑣) with ℎ(𝑥) = 𝜆𝑥 now gives the inequalities for
𝑢0 < 𝑢1.
(𝑖𝑣) Define 𝑌 := 𝜆𝑋0,0,∞. Because
𝐹|𝑌 |(𝑦; 0, 0,∞) = P(|𝜆|𝑋0,0,∞ ≤ 𝑦) = 𝐹𝑋
(︂
𝑦
|𝜆| ; 0, 0,∞
)︂
the density of |𝑌 | is given by
𝑓|𝑌 | (𝑦; 0, 0,∞) =
1
|𝜆|𝑓𝑋
(︂
𝑦
|𝜆| ; 0, 0,∞
)︂
=
(2𝑦)𝑑/2−1
|𝜆|𝑑/2𝑐0,𝑑
√
2𝜋
exp
(︂
− 𝑦|𝜆|
)︂
where we used 𝑓𝑋 from (𝑖𝑖𝑖). Notice that 𝑌 ∼ Gamma
(︀
𝑑
2 , 𝜆
)︀
if 𝜆 > 0,
and −𝑌 ∼ Gamma (︀𝑑2 ,−𝜆)︀ if 𝜆 < 0. The moment generating function
of 𝑌 is E[𝑡𝑌 ] = (1− 𝜆𝑡)𝑑/2. This gives for all 𝜆 ̸= 0
𝑠𝑛 (𝜆𝑋0,0,∞) =
1
E[𝑌 𝑛]
∞∑︁
𝑖=1
E
[︀
𝑌 𝑛+𝑖
]︀
(𝑛+ 𝑖)!
=
1
E[𝑌 𝑛]
(︃
E[exp (𝑌 )]−
∑︁𝑛
𝑖=0
E
[︀
𝑌 𝑖
]︀
𝑖!
)︃
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=
Γ (𝑑/2)
𝜆𝑛Γ (𝑑/2 + 𝑛)
(︃
1
(1− 𝜆)𝑑/2
− 1
Γ (𝑑/2)
∑︁𝑛
𝑖=0
𝜆𝑖Γ (𝑑/2 + 𝑖)
𝑖!
)︃
The representation with the hypergeometric function follows from
𝑛!
E[𝑌 𝑛]
∞∑︁
𝑖=1
E
[︀
𝑌 𝑛+𝑖
]︀
(𝑛+ 𝑖)!
=
Γ (𝑑/2)
𝜆𝑛Γ (𝑑/2 + 𝑛)
∞∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜆𝑛+𝑖Γ (𝑑/2 + 𝑛+ 𝑖)
(𝑛+ 1) . . . (𝑛+ 𝑖) Γ (𝑑/2)
=
∞∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜆𝑖
∏︁𝑖
𝑗=1
(︂
𝑑/2− 1
𝑛+ 𝑗
+ 1
)︂
= 2𝐹1
(︂
1, 𝑛+
𝑑
2
;𝑛+ 1;𝜆
)︂
− 1
Lemma 17 bounds the scaled remainder of a mixture of distributions in
terms of the scaled remainder of the components of the mixture.
Lemma 17. Consider a continuum of nonnegative random variables 𝑋𝑠 on
𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 with 𝒮 a collection with positive measure. The random variables are
disjoint in the sense that P(𝑋𝑠𝑋𝑡 = 0) = 1 if 𝑠 ̸= 𝑡. For 𝑋 =
´
𝑠∈𝒮 𝑋𝑠 d𝑠
and 𝑛 = 0, 1, 2, . . .
min
𝑠∈𝒮
𝑠𝑛(−𝑋𝑠) ≤ 𝑠𝑛(−𝑋) < 0 < 𝑠𝑛(𝑋) ≤ max
𝑠∈𝒮
𝑠𝑛(𝑋𝑠)
The inequalities are all strict if and only if there exists a set 𝑆 ⊆ 𝒮 with´
𝑠∈𝑆 E[𝑋
𝑛
𝑠 ] d𝑠 > 0 that satisfies for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆
min
𝑠∈𝒮
𝑠𝑛(𝑋𝑠) < 𝑠𝑛(𝑋𝑠) < max
𝑠∈𝒮
𝑠𝑛(𝑋𝑠) (6.72)
Proof of Lemma 17
Because E
[︁
𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑋
𝑗
𝑡
]︁
= 0 for 𝑠 ̸= 𝑡 and 𝑖, 𝑗 ≥ 1, it follows that E[︀(𝑋𝑠 +𝑋𝑡)𝑘]︀ =
E
[︀
𝑋𝑘𝑠
]︀
+ E
[︀
𝑋𝑘𝑡
]︀
. This means E[𝑟𝑛(𝑋𝑠 +𝑋𝑡)] = E[𝑟𝑛(𝑋𝑠)] + E[𝑟𝑛(𝑋𝑡)]. Ex-
tending this result to the continuum 𝒮, and using (6.31) and 𝑠𝑛(𝑋𝑠) > 0
(see Lemma 14(𝑖𝑖𝑖))
0 < 𝑠𝑛(𝑋) =
E[𝑟𝑛(𝑋)]
E[𝑋𝑛]
=
1
E[𝑋𝑛]
E
[︂
𝑟𝑛
(︂ˆ
𝑠∈𝒮
𝑋𝑠 d𝑠
)︂]︂
=
1
E[𝑋𝑛]
ˆ
𝑠∈𝒮
E[𝑟𝑛(𝑋𝑠)] d𝑠 =
ˆ
𝑠∈𝒮
E[𝑋𝑛𝑠 ]
E[𝑋𝑛]
E[𝑟𝑛(𝑋𝑠)]
E[𝑋𝑛𝑠 ]
d𝑠
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=
ˆ
𝑠∈𝒮
E[𝑋𝑛𝑠 ]
E[𝑋𝑛]
𝑠𝑛(𝑋𝑠) d𝑠 ≤ max
𝑠∈𝒮
𝑠𝑛(𝑋𝑠)
The latter inequality holds strictly if and only if there exists a set 𝑆 ⊆ 𝒮 with
positive measure 𝑠𝑛(𝑋𝑠) < max𝑠∈𝒮 𝑠𝑛(𝑋𝑠) for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆. By 𝑠𝑛(−𝑋𝑠) < 0
(see Lemma 14(𝑖𝑖𝑖))
0 > 𝑠𝑛(−𝑋) = E[𝑟𝑛(−𝑋)]E[(−𝑋)𝑛] =
ˆ
𝑠∈𝒮
E[(−𝑋𝑠)𝑛]
E[(−𝑋)𝑛] 𝑠𝑛 (−𝑋𝑠) d𝑠 ≥ min𝑠∈𝒮 𝑠𝑛 (−𝑋𝑠)
The statement on strictness of the inequality is now straightforward.
Lemma 18 enables us to find a simple bound of a standard optimization
problem.
Lemma 18. Consider the optimization problem
max
x
‖x‖ (6.73)
subject to x ≥ a and c′x ≥ 0 where c < 0 and a ≤ 0 are 𝑑-dimensional
vectors.
Define for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑑 the 𝑑-dimensional vector x(𝑖) by
𝑥
(𝑖)
𝑘 =
{︃
− 1𝑐𝑖
∑︀
𝑗 ̸=𝑖 𝑎𝑗𝑐𝑗 𝑘 = 𝑖
𝑎𝑘 𝑘 ̸= 𝑖
(6.74)
There exists an optimal x that satisfies c′x = 0, and exactly one out of the
𝑑 constraints in x ≥ a is not binding. The maximal value of (6.73) equals
max
𝑖=1...𝑑
‖x(𝑖)‖ = max
𝑖
⎯⎸⎸⎸⎷
⎛⎝− 1
𝑐𝑖
∑︁
𝑗 ̸=𝑖
𝑎𝑗𝑐𝑗
⎞⎠2 +∑︁
𝑗 ̸=𝑖
𝑎2𝑗
Proof of Lemma 18
We first show that there exists an optimum where exactly one constraint
in x ≥ a is not binding. The solution of the optimization problem (6.73) is
identical with the convex objective function ‖x‖2 =∑︀𝑘 𝑥2𝑘. By the convexity
of this objective function, x cannot be an optimum if multiple constraints in
x ≥ a are not binding.
Suppose all constraints x ≥ a are binding, i.e., x = a. This x is not the
(unique) optimum. To see this, consider some 𝑖 with 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 below the mean
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𝑎𝑗𝑐𝑗 : 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 ≤ 1𝑑a′c, and define x(𝑖) as in (6.74). Obviously, c′x(𝑖) = 0, and
exactly one constraint in x(𝑖) ≥ a is not binding, namely 𝑥(𝑖)𝑖 > 0 ≥ 𝑎𝑖. It
follows from∑︁
𝑗 ̸=𝑖
𝑎𝑗𝑐𝑗 = −𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 + a′c ≥
(︂
−1
𝑑
+ 1
)︂
a′c ≥ (𝑑− 1)𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖
and −1/𝑐𝑖 > 0, that
‖x(𝑖)‖2 =
∑︁
𝑘
(︁
𝑥
(𝑖)
𝑘
)︁2 ≥ (𝑑− 1)2𝑎2𝑖 +∑︁
𝑗 ̸=𝑖
𝑎2𝑗 ≥ ‖a‖2
This excludes x = a as the (unique) optimum. The bound is strict for 𝑑 > 2,
the case of our interest.
We stress that the optimum x(𝑖) does not necessarily satisfy 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖 ≤ 1𝑑a′c.
For instance, suppose c = (−4,−1,−1)′ and a = (−0.1,−1,−1)′. The
maximum is at x(2) and x(3), while 𝑎2𝑐2 = 𝑎3𝑐3 > 13a
′c. Still, 𝑎1𝑐1 ≤ 13a′c
and ‖x(1)‖ > ‖a‖ hold, which serves our purpose to show that x = a is not
optimal.
The constraint c′x ≥ 0 binds at the optimal x. If c′x > 0, we can further
increase the unique 𝑥𝑖 with 𝑥𝑖 > 0 > 𝑎𝑖, since 𝑐𝑖 < 0. This implies that the
optimal x is one of the 𝑑 vectors x(𝑖). Collecting previous results gives the
lemma.
The preceding lemmas enable us to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 8
The random variable 𝑋 has the following density in polar coordinates
𝑓
(︂
1
2
s′Bs𝑟2
)︂
=
1
P(a ≤ 𝑍 ≤ b)
1
|𝑆𝑑|
1a≤𝑟s≤b√
2𝜋
𝑟𝑑−1 exp
(︂
−1
2
‖𝑟s− 𝜇‖2
)︂
(6.75)
where |𝑆𝑑| is the surface of the 𝑑-dimensional sphere 𝑆𝑑, s ∈ 𝑆𝑑, 𝑟 ≥ 0 is
the distance to the origin 𝜈 = 0 where 𝑍 = 0, and 1/P(a ≤ 𝑍 ≤ b) is a
proportionality constant. For example, in the two dimensional example in
the right panel in Figure 6.1 on p.130, we have 𝑟 = ‖x˜‖ as the distance to the
origin, s = x˜/‖x˜‖ as the direction from the origin to x˜, and ‖𝑟s−𝜇‖ = ‖x˜−𝜇‖
as the distance from x˜ to 𝜇 which determines the probability mass at x˜ under
the new measure. Using ‖s‖ = 1,
‖𝑟s− 𝜇‖2 = ‖𝑟s‖2 + ‖𝜇‖2 − 2𝑟𝜇′s
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= 𝑟2 + ‖𝜇‖2 − 2𝑟𝜇′s
=
(︀
𝑟 − 𝜇′s)︀2 − (𝜇′s)2 + ‖𝜇‖2 (6.76)
Let 𝜆(s) = s′Bs, and 𝑢(s) ≥ 0 is the maximal distance from the origin to
the boundaries of the region enclosed by a and b. Since a ≤ 0s ≤ b, the
density of 𝑋 along each s is proportional to
𝑓
(︂
1
2
𝜆(s)𝑟2; s
)︂
∝ 10≤𝑟≤𝑢(s) exp
(︂
−1
2
[︁(︀
𝑟 − 𝜇′s)︀2 − (𝜇′s)2 + ‖𝜇‖2]︁)︂
Therefore, 𝑋 ∼ 12𝜆(𝑆)𝑅2𝑆 with 𝑆 uniform on 𝑆𝑑, and by (6.75) and (6.76)
the probability density function of 𝑅s is proportional to
𝑟𝑑−1 exp
(︂
−1
2
(︀
𝑟 − 𝜇′s)︀2)︂ 10≤𝑟≤𝑢(s) (6.77)
Using the notation introduced in Lemma 16, let the random variable
𝑋s ∼ 12𝜆(s)𝑅2s = 12𝜆(s)𝑋𝜉(s),0,𝑢(s) represent the conditional distribution
𝑋|𝑆=s. Then,
𝑋− = max(−𝑋, 0) = 1|𝑆𝑑|
ˆ
𝑠∈𝒮−
−𝑋𝑠ds 𝒮− = {s ∈ 𝑆𝑑 : 𝜆(s) < 0}
𝑋+ = max(𝑋, 0) =
1
|𝑆𝑑|
ˆ
𝑠∈𝒮+
𝑋𝑠ds 𝒮+ = {s ∈ 𝑆𝑑 : 𝜆(s) ≥ 0}
Applying Lemma 17 to the nonnegative mixtures 𝑋− and 𝑋+,
min
s∈𝒮−
𝑠𝑛(𝑋s) ≤ 𝑠𝑛(−𝑋−) < 0 < 𝑠𝑛(𝑋+) ≤ max
s∈𝒮+
𝑠𝑛(𝑋s). (6.78)
We neglect unit vectors s ∈ 𝑆𝑑 with 𝑢(s) = 0 since the probability mass
along such vectors degenerates at zero in (6.77), or equivalently, 𝑋s ≡ 0.
To identify such vectors, note that 𝑢(s) = 0 corresponds to an origin at
the boundary of the region in [a,b] and s pointing outward this region.
Therefore, such s satisfy (𝑖) 𝑠𝑖 < 0 for some 𝑖 with 𝑎𝑖 = 0, or (𝑖𝑖) 𝑠𝑖 > 0 for
some 𝑖 with 𝑏𝑖 = 0. Neglecting such vectors gives the following bounds on
𝜆(s):
𝜆 = min
‖s‖∈𝒮−
{𝜆(s) : 𝑠𝑖 ≥ 0 if 𝑎𝑖 = 0}
?¯? = max
‖s‖∈𝒮−
{𝜆(s) : 𝑠𝑖 ≤ 0 if 𝑏𝑖 = 0}
182 A new evaluation method for the multivariate normal distribution
We certainly obtain for 𝜆 and ?¯? the minimal and maximal eigenvalue of B if
the origin is in the interior of the region. That is, when a and b are strictly
negative and strictly positive, respectively.
By Lemma 14(𝑖𝑖), 𝜆 ≤ 0 provides a (negative) lower bound on 𝑠𝑛 (𝑋s)
for each s ∈ 𝒮−. Similarly, ?¯? ≥ 0 corresponds to an upper bound on
maxs∈𝒮+ 𝑠𝑛 (𝑋s) for each s ∈ 𝒮+.
Note that (6.77) is similar to (6.71) on p.174 with mean 𝜉 = 𝜇′s. Lemma
16(𝑖𝑖𝑖) indicates that upper bounds on 𝜉(s) := 𝜇′s and 𝑢(s) bound each
𝑠𝑛 (𝑋s). Depending on 𝜉(s), the bounds on 𝑠𝑛(𝑋s) are of two different types:
(𝑖) 𝜉(s) < 0: Using 𝜉(s) < 0 and 𝑢(s) ≤ ∞:
𝑠𝑛 (𝜆𝑋0,0,∞) ≤ 𝑠𝑛(𝑋s) s ∈ 𝒮− (6.79)
𝑠𝑛(𝑋s) ≤ 𝑠𝑛
(︀
?¯?𝑋0,0,∞
)︀
s ∈ 𝒮+ (6.80)
(𝑖𝑖) 𝜉(s) > 0: The mean 𝜉(s) = 𝜇′s of 𝑅s is maximal at 𝑆𝑑 for s = 𝜇/‖𝜇‖.
Thus, 𝜉(s) ≤ ‖𝜇‖. The function 𝑢(s) measures the distance along s
from the origin to the boundaries of the integration region 𝑇 deter-
mined by a and b. There exists at least one 𝑠𝑖 < 0, because 𝜇 ≤ 0,
and by assumption 𝜉(s) = 𝜇′s > 0. This implies 𝑢(s) < ∞ since all
elements in a are finite. The parameter ?¯? is an upper bound on 𝑢(s)
for all s that satisfy 𝜇′s ≥ 0. Ideally, it equals
sup
a≤x≤b,𝜇′x≥0
‖x‖ <∞
A simple upper bound on this optimization problem follows by drop-
ping the upper bound b on x. The closed-form solution of Lemma 18
implies the upper bound (6.37). We have for 𝜉(s) > 0
𝑠𝑛
(︀
𝜆𝑋‖𝜇‖,0,?¯?
)︀ ≤ 𝑠𝑛(𝑋s) s ∈ 𝒮− (6.81)
𝑠𝑛(𝑋s) ≤ 𝑠𝑛
(︀
?¯?𝑋‖𝜇‖,0,?¯?
)︀
s ∈ 𝒮+ (6.82)
Combining (6.79)–(6.82) yields
min
(︀
𝑠𝑛 (𝜆𝑋0,0,∞) , 𝑠𝑛
(︀
𝜆𝑋‖𝜇‖,0,?¯?
)︀)︀ ≤ min
s∈𝒮−
𝑠𝑛 (𝑋s)
max
s∈𝒮+
𝑠𝑛 (𝑋s) ≤ max
(︀
𝑠𝑛
(︀
?¯?𝑋0,0,∞
)︀
, 𝑠𝑛
(︀
?¯?𝑋‖𝜇‖,0,?¯?
)︀)︀
Applying these inequalities with the lower bound 𝑡𝑛(𝑚+𝑛+1) on 𝑠𝑛(𝑋
+) from
Lemma 14(𝑖𝑖𝑖) to (6.78) gives the bounds in Theorem 8. Lemma 14(𝑖𝑖) gives
the properties of 𝑠𝑛 in Theorem 8(𝑖𝑣). In the statement of the Theorem, we
removed the subscript 𝑙 = 0 from 𝑋𝜉,𝑙,𝑢 for convenience.
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6.A.4 Proofs Section 6.5
Proof of Lemma 9
We find ?˜?𝑖 such that 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑍0 + ?˜?𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(?˜?𝑖, 1),
E[𝑈𝑖] = E
[︁
𝑍𝑖1?˜?𝑖≤𝑍𝑖≤?˜?𝑖
]︁
= E
[︁
(𝑍0 + ?˜?𝑖)1?˜?𝑖−?˜?𝑖≤𝑍0≤?˜?𝑖−?˜?𝑖
]︁
= 𝜑(?˜?𝑖 − ?˜?𝑖)− 𝜑(?˜?𝑖 − ?˜?𝑖) +
[︁
Φ(?˜?𝑖 − ?˜?𝑖)− Φ(?˜?𝑖 − ?˜?𝑖)
]︁
?˜?𝑖
= 𝜑
(︂
𝑎𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖
𝐷𝑖𝑖
)︂
− 𝜑
(︂
𝑏𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖
𝐷𝑖𝑖
)︂
+
[︂
Φ
(︂
𝑏𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖
𝐷𝑖𝑖
)︂
− Φ
(︂
𝑎𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖
𝐷𝑖𝑖
)︂]︂
?˜?𝑖
(6.83)
= 𝜑 (?^?𝑖 − ?^?𝑖)− 𝜑
(︁
?^?𝑖 − ?^?𝑖
)︁
+
[︁
Φ
(︁
?^?𝑖 − ?^?𝑖
)︁
− Φ (?^?𝑖 − ?^?𝑖)
]︁
?˜?𝑖 (6.84)
= 0
As before, x^ = D−1x and x˜ = D−1(x− 𝜈) for any vector x. Using (6.8), we
may find
𝜇 = D−1𝜇 =
(︀
D−1 −DΣ−1)︀ 𝜈 = BD−1𝜈 = B𝜈 (6.85)
and
𝜇 = D−1(𝜇− 𝜈) = (B− I)𝜈 (6.86)
Substituting (6.85) and (6.86) into (6.84) leads to
𝜑𝑖 (a^−B𝜈)− 𝜑𝑖
(︁
b^−B𝜈
)︁
Φ𝑖
(︁
b^−B𝜈
)︁
− Φ𝑖 (a^−B𝜈)
= e𝑖(I−B)𝜈
where e𝑖 is the vector with one nonzero entry at element 𝑖, and that entry
is equal to 1. Thus, we want to find the fixed-point f(𝜈) = 𝜈 with
𝑓𝑖(𝜈) =
𝜑𝑖 (a^−B𝜈)− 𝜑𝑖
(︁
b^−B𝜈
)︁
Φ𝑖
(︁
b^−B𝜈
)︁
− Φ𝑖 (a^−B𝜈)
+ e𝑖B𝜈 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑑
For existence and uniqueness, it suffices by Banach fixed-point theorem to
show that f is a contraction mapping. To prove this, notice that any 𝜈 =
B−1𝜇, the component 𝑓𝑖 equals the conditional expectation,
𝑓𝑖(B
−1𝜈) = E
[︁
𝑍0
⃒⃒⃒
?^?𝑖 − ?^?𝑖 < 𝑍0 < ?^?𝑖 − ?^?𝑖
]︁
+ ?^?𝑖
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= E
[︁
𝑍0 + ?^?𝑖
⃒⃒⃒
?^?𝑖 < 𝑍0 + ?^?𝑖 < ?^?𝑖
]︁
This function has an absolute derivative with respect to ?^?𝑖 that is smaller
than one. Since 𝜇 = B𝜈, the absolute derivative of the elements in f is along
any direction 𝜈 at most max𝑖 |𝜆𝑖(B)|:⃒⃒⃒⃒
d𝑓𝑖
d𝜈𝑗
⃒⃒⃒⃒
=
⃒⃒⃒⃒
d𝑓𝑖
d𝜇
′ d𝜇
d𝜈𝑗
⃒⃒⃒⃒
=
⃒⃒⃒⃒
d𝑓𝑖
d𝜇
′
Be𝑗
⃒⃒⃒⃒
≤ max
𝑖
|𝜆𝑖(B)|
This shows that f is a contraction mapping:
‖f(𝜈(𝑘))− f(𝜈(𝑚))‖ ≤
⃦⃦⃦
𝜈(𝑘) − 𝜈(𝑚)
⃦⃦⃦
max
𝑖
|𝜆𝑖(B)| < ‖𝜈(𝑘) − 𝜈(𝑚)‖
For the sequence 𝜈(𝑘) = f(𝜈(𝑘−1)), the distance ‖𝜈(𝑘)−𝜈*‖ to the fixed point
𝜈* decreases each step with at least the factor max𝑖 |𝜆𝑖(B)|.
Proof of Lemma 10
Using symmetry, 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎, 𝑏𝑖 =∞, 𝐷𝑖𝑖 =
√
𝜔, and (6.49), we obtain
?˜?11 =
𝜇1√
𝜔
(︀
I−B−1)︀1 = 𝜇1√
𝜔
(︂
1− 1
𝜆1(B)
)︂
1 =
2𝜇1√
𝜔
𝜌− 1
𝜌𝑑
1.
This implies for (6.83)
𝜑
(︂
𝑎− 𝜇1√
𝜔
)︂
+
(︂
1− Φ
(︂
𝑎− 𝜇1√
𝜔
)︂)︂
2𝜇1√
𝜔
𝜌− 1
𝜌𝑑
= 0
Letting
𝑦 :=
𝑎− 𝜇1√
𝜔
(6.87)
gives
𝜑(𝑦) + (1− Φ(𝑦)) 2√
𝜔
𝜌− 1
𝜌𝑑
(︀
𝑎− 𝑦√𝜔)︀ = 0
We obtain (6.52) after some rewriting.
Next, we show that for any 𝜌, a unique 𝑦 solves (6.52). The left-hand
side (LHS) of (6.52) is linearly increasing in 𝑦 with a constant slope of one.
On the right-hand side (RHS) is the inverse Mills’ ratio 𝜑/(1−Φ) scaled by
the scalar 𝜌𝑑/[2(𝜌 − 1)]. The inverse Mills’ ratio monotonically increases,
which means that the RHS decreases from 0 to −∞ if the scalar is negative,
i.e., if 𝜌 > 0. This confirms the uniqueness of the solution 𝑦 for 𝜌 > 0.
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If 𝜌 < 0, we obtain from 𝜌 > −1/(𝑑− 1) that 1− 1/𝜌 > 𝑑 such that
𝜌𝑑
2(𝜌− 1) =
𝑑
2(1− 1/𝜌) <
1
2
The derivative on the RHS in (6.52) is then between 0 and 1/2, because the
inverse Mills’ ratio has derivative between zero and one. This proves that 𝑦
is unique for 𝜌 < 0. Uniqueness of 𝑦 is trivial for the remaining case 𝜌 = 0.
Using (6.87), the inequality 𝜇1 > 𝑎 is equivalent to 𝑦 < 0 which means
that the LHS of (6.52) exceeds the RHS at 𝑦 = 0. Equivalently,
− 𝑎√
𝜔
>
𝜌𝑑
2(𝜌− 1)
𝜑(0)
1/2
𝑎 < − 𝜌𝑑
𝜌− 1
√︂
𝜔
2𝜋
= 𝜌𝑑
√︃
1 + (𝑑− 1)𝜌
𝜋 (1− 𝜌) (2 + (𝑑− 2)𝜌) .

Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Sinds het faillissement van Lehman Brothers in september 2008 is er veel
aandacht voor het gevaar van systeemrisico in de financiële sector. Dit heeft
geleid tot een aantal hervormingen in de financiële sector. Een zichtbaar re-
sultaat is de invoering van het zogenaamde Single Supervisory Mechanism in
november 2014. Hierdoor is de Europese Centrale Bank nu de belangrijkste
toezichthouder op het bankwezen binnen de eurozone. Dit grensoverschrij-
dende toezicht ondervangt het probleem van verminderd nationaal toezicht
op buitenlandse takken binnen de eurozone en is daarmee een belangrijke
stap in de vorming van een Europese bankenunie.
Het derde financiële steunpakket voor Griekenland is een andere recente
gebeurtenis waarbij systeemrisico een prominente rol speelde. De hervormin-
gen die aan dit pakket zijn verbonden lijken sterk op de voorstellen die slechts
een week voor de overeenkomst van dit steunpakket waren afgewezen in een
Grieks referendum. Met de instemming voor het steunpakket negeerden de
Griekse beleidsmakers niet alleen de uitslag van het referendum, maar schon-
den ze ook verkiezingsbeloftes bij de verkiezingen van nog geen zes maanden
eerder. Wanbetaling, of erger, Griekenland uit de eurozone (een Grexit) kan
echter leiden tot een onvoorspelbare kettingreactie, met name in de Griekse
economie. Zo kan een plotselinge herinvoering van een eigen munt resulteren
in een nieuwe uitstroom van kapitaal, een sterke depreciatie van de nieuwe
munt, bankruns, rechtszaken over contractuele verplichtingen en andere sys-
teemrelevante problemen. In een uiterst geval kan het zelfs leiden tot het
uiteenvallen van de eurozone.
De afgelopen jaren daalde echter het grensoverschrijdende risico van een
eventueel faillissement van Griekenland. Toen de eerste problemen in Grieken-
land aan het licht kwamen in 2009, streefde de Trojka (EC, ECB en het IMF)
er nog naar om een Grexit hoe dan ook te voorkomen. Belangrijk daarbij
was de eerdere systeemcrisis na het faillissement van Lehman Brothers en de
volatiliteit op financiële markten die duidde op een sterke nervositeit onder
beleggers. Sindsdien zijn buitenlandse investeringen in Griekenland sterk
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afgenomen en zijn het Griekse bankwezen en de Trojka de belangrijkste in-
vesteerders in Griekse staatsobligaties. Dit maakt het grensoverschrijdende
effect van een Griekse wanbetaling een stuk beter voorspelbaar. Buiten
Griekenland reageerden de financiële markten dan ook gelaten op het poli-
tieke tumult rondom het derde steunpakket. Zo steeg de rente op Portugese
tienjaars staatsobligaties naar 3,2%, wat zeer beperkt is in vergelijking met
de 17,3% in januari 2012. Daarom heerst nu een consensus dat het systeem-
risico na een Grieks faillissement vooral lokale gevolgen heeft. De Grieken
stonden hierdoor met de rug tegen de muur tijdens de onderhandelingen.
Hoe belangrijk systeemrisico ook is, toch bestaat er geen eenduidige
definitie van systeemrisico. Wel is duidelijk dat het gaat om het risico op de
ineenstorting van een geheel systeem. Om zulke risico’s te beoordelen is een
diepgaande analyse nodig van vele kenmerken van het systeem. Uiteraard
duiden meerdere zwakke componenten met onderling sterke verbindingen op
een zeer kwetsbaar systeem. Het is echter vaak minder eenvoudig om van te
voren te bepalen hoe sterk een verbinding tussen componenten tijdens een
sterke schok is. Verder is moeilijk om vooraf in te schatten wat een extra
component zal doen met de kwetsbaarheid van het systeem. Leidt bijvoor-
beeld de toetreding van een land tot de eurozone tot een stabielere economie
in de gehele eurozone? Zou het opheffen van de handelsboycot tussen Rus-
land en een groot deel van Europa het gebied als geheel economisch stabieler
maken? Bij het beoordelen van zulke kwesties is het van belang om het
besmettingsgevaar binnen het systeem zo goed mogelijk in kaart te brengen.
Zo’n analyse beperkt zich niet tot het financieel-economische systeem. Het
is ook toepasbaar op het inschatten van de sociaal-economische gevolgen van
een cyberaanval, een stroomuitval en een uitbraak van een virus als ebola.
Systeemrisico is niet hetzelfde als systematisch risico. In financiële porte-
feuilletheorie verwijst systematisch risico naar het risico dat niet kan wor-
den geëlimineerd door diversificatie met effecten zoals aandelen en obli-
gaties. Aandelen hebben bijvoorbeeld een gemeenschappelijke blootstelling
aan terreuraanslagen, natuurrampen en andere rampen. Tenzij een belegger
een tegengestelde positie inneemt met derivaten is systematisch risico niet
volledig te elimineren. Systematisch risico gaat dus over de gemeenschap-
pelijke blootstelling van afzonderlijke componenten aan externe schokken.
Dus al kan systematisch risico tot een systeemcrisis leiden, het is slechts één
mogelijke vorm van systeemrisico.
Dit proefschrift gaat over systeemrisico in de financiële sector. Speci-
fieker gezegd gaat het in op meerdere aspecten van het ontstaan van sys-
teemrisico in de financiële sector en de besmettingseffecten daarvan. Het
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is daarbij een bouwsteen voor een verdere analyse van het effect van sys-
teemrisico op de reële economie. Om systeemrisico vast te stellen in de
financiële sector meten we systeemrisico in Europese aandelen (hoofdstuk
2) en aandelen in de Verenigde Staten (hoofdstuk 3) met twee verschillende
methodes. Na meting van een aanzienlijke mate van systeemrisico in de fi-
nanciële sector, beschouwen we in hoofdstuk 2 de gevolgen van systeemrisico
op de prijsvorming van aandelen. Daarnaast identificeren we determinanten
van systeemrisico, zowel empirisch (hoofdstuk 3) als theoretisch (hoofdstuk
4). Hoofdstuk 5 beschouwt een eerlijke verdeling van systeemrisico over de
onderliggende componenten, dus banken in een bancaire context. Tot slot
presenteren we in hoofdstuk 6 een nauwkeuriger methode voor het berekenen
en simuleren van systeemrisico met de multivariate normale verdeling.
De hoofdstukken zijn geordend op basis van de link naar het dagelijks
leven. De eerste twee hoofdstukken zijn vooral empirisch georiënteerd, de
andere drie hoofdstukken in toenemende mate theoretisch. Hoewel ieder
hoofdstuk over systeemrisico gaat, zijn de hoofdstukken ook afzonderlijk te
lezen. Er volgt nu een korte samenvatting van ieder hoofdstuk.
Hoofdstuk 2 toont aan dat binnen de Europese financiële sector grote
instellingen een significant lager rendement behalen na correctie voor stan-
daard risicofactoren. Dit patroon is in geen enkele andere bedrijfstak in
Europa te vinden. Het patroon is te interpreteren als een indicatie voor
een latente staatsgarantie. Deze garantie beschermt alleen grote financiële
instellingen tegen grote schokken en blijkt vrij sterk te zijn. Zelfs tijdens de
schuldencrisis overstemde het grotere individuele faillissementsrisico de twi-
jfels over staatsgaranties. Een andere bevinding is dat de financiële factor
een meer marktconforme beprijzing van aandelen geeft dan de momentum
factor. De financiële factor verklaart namelijk een aantal anomalieën op
grote en waardeaandelen in het Europese Fama en French (2012)-model.
In hoofdstuk 3 definiëren we staartafhankelijkheid op bedrijfstakniveau
als maat voor systeemrisico op financiële markten. We meten de staartafhan-
kelijkheid in de 48 Amerikaanse Fama en French (1997) bedrijfstakken door
het tellen van simultane extreme negatieve rendementen binnen een bedri-
jfstak. De vijf industrieën die het hoogst scoren op staartafhankelijkheid
zijn het bankwezen, petroleum & aardgas, nutsbedrijven, financiële handel
en verzekeringen. Alle andere bedrijfstakken scoren beduidend lager. Een
grote marktbeta, een grote marktkapitalisatie en een kleine volatiliteit zijn
belangrijke determinanten van staartafhankelijkheid. Daarnaast is staart-
afhankelijkheid een belangrijke indicator voor staartafhankelijkheid in het
volgende jaar.
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Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert in een theoretisch model hoe de maatschappe-
lijke welvaart afhangt van het gezamenlijke effect van de balansomvang,
het bankkapitaal en de onderlinge afhankelijkheid van vermogenstitels. Het
model suggereert dat banken voor minder kapitaal kiezen dan sociaal wenselijk
is, terwijl banken voor een te grote balansomvang kiezen als afhankelijkheden
klein zijn. Strenger kapitaalbeleid resulteert in grotere banken bij lage fail-
lissementskosten, hoge financieringskosten en hoge belastingtarieven. Voor
de maatschappelijke welvaart is niettemin kapitaalbeleid effectiever dan beleid
dat zich richt op een kleinere balansomvang. Dit geldt met name als afhanke-
lijkheden laag zijn, dus in tijden van economische voorspoed. Onze resultaten
ondersteunen het anticyclische kapitaalbeleid in de voorstellen van Basel
III en impliceren een tegengestelde striktheid van monetair en prudentieel
beleid.
Hoofdstuk 5 identificeert een eenvoudige voldoende voorwaarde om sys-
teemrisico eerlijk te verdelen op basis van de Shapley waarde. Onze voor-
waarde houdt in dat twee risicomaten op bankniveau in Segoviano and Good-
hart (2009) en Zhou (2010) een Shapley waarde zijn. De veel gebruikte MES
in Acharya et al. (2012) en ΔCoVaR in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) zijn
echter geen Shapley waarde.
De staarten van de multivariate normale verdeling spelen een belangrijke
rol om systeemrisico te simuleren en te berekenen, hetzij direct of indirect.
Zo is de 𝑡-verdeling een mix van oneindig veel normale verdelingen. Zelfs
voor de multivariate normale verdeling gaat bij bestaande methodes veel
nauwkeurigheid verloren bij de modellering van de multivariate staarten.
Hoofdstuk 6 stelt daarom een nieuwe analytische methode voor om de kansen
van de multivariate normale verdeling te begrenzen. Deze methode combi-
neert een Taylor expansie met een verandering van kansmaat. De verkregen
grenzen zijn (𝑖) strikter dan die van bestaande methodes, (𝑖𝑖) bij een aanzien-
lijk deel van de gesimuleerde cases met een lage dimensie nauwkeuriger dan
de simulatiemethode van Genz (1992), en (𝑖𝑖𝑖) het nauwkeurigst als het con-
ditiegetal van de covariantiematrix bijna één is. De relatieve fout van de
grenzen daalt in de staart waardoor onze methode in het bijzonder bruikbaar
is in het multivariate staartgebied. Dit is dus belangrijk voor systeemrisico
aangezien systeemgebeurtenissen realisaties zijn in dit staartgebied.
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Major policy decisions dealing with financial markets can create substantial 
uncertainty about systemic risk, sometimes with disastrous consequences. 
The decision to allow Lehman Brothers to fail, for example, led to the financial 
meltdown in 2008, causing the Great Recession. In a similar vein, recent fears 
of a breakup of the eurozone have resulted in panic on the financial markets 
due to concerns about the potential systemic effects of a breakup.
Several essential aspects of systemic risk are still unresolved issues for academics, 
policy makers, and the public at large. Is systemic risk really a significant factor 
in the financial industry? What are the determinants of this risk? How should 
a policy maker deal with systemic risk? Can we trust the outcome of a 
standard simulation on the likelihood of multiple simultaneous extreme 
events? This thesis addresses these important issues.
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